Seeking to Ramp Up Deportations, the Trump Administration Quietly Expands a Vast Web of Data

To help accomplish its aim of mass deportations, the Trump administration is tapping into numerous federal, state, and local databases at an unprecedented scale, and making more of them interoperable. The reach into and communication between information storehouses—including ones containing sensitive information about all U.S. residents’ taxes, health, benefits receipt, and addresses—allows U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other authorities to harvest, exchange, and share a vast trove of data. The aim of tapping government and commercial databases appears twofold: attempt to secure large-scale arrests and deportations of removable noncitizens, and instill a sense of fear so that others “self deport.”

The Trump administration’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), launched by Elon Musk, has played an oversized role in this data-leveraging mission, accessing sensitive databases across government agencies and breaking down long-standing silos erected for operational and privacy reasons. And the software company Palantir, a longtime ICE contractor, has been awarded a new contract initially for $30 million to build a “streamlined” database to aid immigration enforcement.

Palantir’s Immigration Lifecycle Operating System (ImmigrationOS) will add to an already formidable arsenal of data available to ICE, including from the private sector. The agency is believed to be among the largest government purchasers of commercial credit, utility, motor vehicle agency, and other information—including airline passenger data, according to recent reporting. By one estimate, in 2022 ICE was able to know the addresses of three out of four U.S. adults—citizen and noncitizen alike.

ICE was established as part of the U.S. counterterrorism and homeland security machinery that was expanded in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. While the post-9/11 enterprise was aimed at foreign terrorists, today’s principal enforcement mission across a range of government agencies is to assist the Trump administration’s quest to carry out 1 million deportations annually.

The government’s tapping into databases with sensitive personal information—including databases never before used for large-scale immigration enforcement, such as voter information—has raised alarm among civil libertarians and security experts, who fear the potential for privacy violations for all U.S. residents and possible exploitation by nefarious actors.

This article looks at the recent efforts to expand ICE’s domestic surveillance and arrest capabilities by giving it access to new databases to build a vast, interoperable data network that can be used for immigration enforcement purposes, with the possibility of future implications for U.S. citizens. It places the current moves within a 25-year legacy of information-sharing initiatives in the immigration realm.

Combining Databases

Since DOGE’s creation shortly after President Donald Trump took office in January, its mission has expanded. Initially established to slash spending across the government, DOGE gained new authority with a March 20 executive order on eliminating “information silos” and thus making government databases more interoperable. Although immigration enforcement was not mentioned explicitly, the order has become a potent tool for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

DOGE has already gained access to a variety of immigration databases including:

• The immigration courts (formally known as the Executive Office for Immigration Review, or EOIR). The Courts and Appeals System (ECAS) database provides details about the millions of noncitizens who have come before the immigration courts. This includes demographic data such as names and addresses as well as any immigration court testimony and information about individuals’ engagement with law enforcement.
• U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The agency’s Data Business Intelligence Services contains information on noncitizens who have applied for naturalization, refugee or asylee status, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA), or Temporary Protected Status (TPS).
• The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The department’s Unaccompanied Alien Children portal contains information about the unaccompanied minors under HHS’s care, as well as their sponsors. This includes therapy records and other sensitive data, as well as demographic information such as address, school, and biometric identifiers.  

DOGE is also tapping databases not previously used for immigration enforcement (or indeed any purpose unrelated to the agencies’ primary mission). These include databases of the:

• Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
• Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
• Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, sometimes known as food stamps)
• Social Security Administration (SSA)
• U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
• U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
• U.S. Education Department
• U.S. Postal Service

Of these agencies and offices, DOGE has asked for information that could be used for immigration enforcement, such as immigration status, home address, and work address. Legal challenges have been filed to block DOGE from accessing data from the IRS and SSA.

In a joint release with DHS and USCIS, DOGE in April announced the overhaul of the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) database into one streamlined system that allows federal, state, and local officials to verify the immigration status of people applying for benefits.

Palantir’s Immigration Enforcement Database

In April, ICE expanded its contract with Palantir to start the process of building ImmigrationOS. The company has been tasked with using government data to construct a “master system” on immigration enforcement, with a prototype expected in September.

The system is intended to aid ICE in three ways, according to federal contracting records. First, ImmigrationOS is being designed to help ICE identify removable noncitizens by using AI to sift through immigration records, criminal histories, and affiliation with transnational criminal organizations. It will also include a “near real-time” tracker to monitor unauthorized immigrants’ voluntary departure from the United States. And the system will provide “immigration lifecycle management,” seeking to minimize operational delays by coordinating logistics for detention, removal, and administrative follow-through.

Palantir’s long history with ICE has focused on aiding criminal investigations. This new endeavor would expand that partnership to also focus on civil immigration violations.

Immediate Impacts and Long-Term Repercussions

The administration has yet to indicate the degree to which any arrests or deportations have been carried out as a result of this new focus on leveraging data. Highly visible enforcement operations already seem to have had a chilling effect on immigrant communities across the country. Anecdotal reporting suggests some immigrants have been concerned about visiting the hospital, attending a court hearing, or sending their children to school, for fear of being arrested. The building of a massive database for immigration enforcement undoubtedly contributes further to this climate of fear. This may be intentional for an administration that is emphatic about wanting unauthorized immigrants to leave the country voluntarily.

Privacy experts, immigrant-rights advocates, and others have expressed concern that the push to mine government databases for immigration enforcement purposes could harm immigrants and the U.S. born alike over the longer term, as well as hamper other functions of government.

For example, the U.S. tax system mostly functions on voluntary compliance. Unauthorized immigrants contributed nearly $100 billion in local, state, and federal taxes in 2022, the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy estimates. Concerns that taxpayers’ information could be shared with ICE could lead to a decline in compliance, resulting in reduced tax revenue.

The administration is casting a wide net, seeking access to data in federal and state benefits systems, including health and housing. For example, ICE has subpoenaed information on participants in California’s Cash Assistance Program for Immigrants, a state program that provides benefits for those not eligible for Social Security. Such actions could deter eligible residents from applying for health and other public benefits.

ICE’s Already Robust Access to Data 

ICE has long held the map to a labyrinth of information from various federal and state databases and private data brokers.

At the federal level, it has been able to access FBI records to check for prior immigration violations, warrants, or terrorist affiliations, as well as DHS databases on U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions or the receipt of immigration statuses including lawful permanent residence (also known as a green card) or U.S. citizenship. These databases also may hold information about an individual’s address or place of employment.

Leveraging State and Local Data Troves

The lion’s share of ICE’s information comes through data-sharing agreements with states and localities. ICE taps into Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) data, particularly in states that allow unauthorized individuals to obtain a driver’s license. Procedures vary widely by state. As of 2023, 19 states (plus Washington, DC and Puerto Rico) issued driver’s licenses regardless of immigration status. Many of the states have specific statutory bars that limit sharing information with federal agencies; for example, Illinois requires a judicial warrant, subpoena, or court order to share information with ICE. Even when states have protections, however, they have often lacked enforcement mechanisms, meaning that information has still routinely been shared with ICE. In multiple states, ICE has scanned drivers’ licenses photographs using facial recognition technology.

ICE also can tap into the 80 “fusion centers” across the country and in outlying territories that are overseen by DHS but owned and operated by states and localities. The fusion centers are responsible for integrating and sharing data from federal, state, local, tribal, and private partners. From them, ICE can obtain license plate numbers, last known address, wage or other employment information, updated photographs, and biometrics, among other information.

The agency also accesses databases through 287(g) agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, which provide information often leading to deportations when noncitizens are arrested. The scope and scale of the data vary. Generally, authorities establish their own information-sharing protocols, unless local or state laws mandate or limit cooperation with ICE. For example, California’s SB 54 prohibits local authorities from assisting ICE, with limited exceptions, while Tennessee’s SB 2576 requires authorities to send arrestees’ immigration information to the federal government. Similarly, North Carolina’s proposed Criminal Illegal Alien Enforcement Act would mandate that officers hold an unauthorized inmate 48 hours beyond their release date and notify ICE two hours before their release. 

Buying Information from the Private Sector

ICE also purchases information from private companies about a wide array of often-detailed aspects about U.S. residents’ lives, including records on utilities, credit, and health. From 2008 to 2021, ICE spent $2.8 billion on data collection and sharing and surveillance initiatives, according to the Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown Law School.

These arrangements can circumvent privacy laws if government agencies sell information to private companies, which in turn sell the information to ICE. Something similar is happening in air travel. While U.S. airlines are not themselves directly selling data to ICE on the billions of flights that occur annually, a clearinghouse jointly owned by nine major airlines, the Airlines Reporting Corporation (ARC), has been selling passenger names, financial information, and flight itineraries to the federal government, for use by ICE and other agencies, according to an investigation by the news organization The Lever. Similarly, state and local police reportedly searched a private license plate-reader system on behalf of federal immigration authorities more than 4,000 times since June 2024.

A 25-Year Legacy of Data-Sharing

Immigration authorities’ access to some of the vast trove of data collected by the government and the private sector began in the aftermath of 9/11, when lack of data-sharing across federal intelligence, law enforcement, and immigration agencies was perceived as responsible for allowing the entry of some hijackers. Greater data-sharing ordered after the terrorist attacks was intended to break down the gaps in communication.

Immigration attracted significant focus given the fact the 19 hijackers entered legally, chiefly on tourist or business visas. For example, the pre-existing Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) was expanded and bolstered by the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 to track and collect in one automated system all documentation on international students from all countries.

A Long-Standing Reliance on State and Local Information-Sharing

The post-9/11 period also brought about expansions to state-level data collection and access. For example, the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, which is primarily used by police to access and exchange information on outstanding warrants and individuals’ criminal histories, grew to include immigration files. This NCIC Immigration Violator File (IVF) contains information on noncitizens convicted of a felony and deported, those subject to a final deportation order but who remain in the country, and those in violation of the National Security Entry-Exit System (NSEERS; a now terminated registry established after 9/11 that imposed certain reporting requirements on U.S.-resident males ages 16 and older from predominantly Muslim-majority countries).

The changes to SEVIS and NCIC IVF faced backlash. Universities claimed the SEVIS interface could be clunky, making compliance difficult for school administrators and students alike. Meanwhile, NCIC IVF included data on civil, not just criminal, violations, which significantly detracted from the anti-terrorism mandate of the program. It was also found to have significant inaccuracies; for 42 percent of immigration-related hits from 2002 to 2004, DHS could not confirm if an immigration violation had actually occurred.

Most notable was the expansion of the 287(g) program, which allows state and local authorities to enter into voluntary agreements with ICE to share information about a person’s immigration status and issue a detainer to hold and then transfer a noncitizen to ICE custody (see Box 1). Although authorized in the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), the first 287(g) agreement was not signed until 2002. The number of agreements grew slowly but over time vastly expanded ICE’s access to information about noncitizen arrests. These arrangements became a force multiplier: deputizing local and state authorities to carry out immigration enforcement functions typically reserved for federal agents.

Secure Communities was another important post-9/11 initiative, established as a voluntary pilot under President George W. Bush and becoming fully operational across all 3,181 state and local law enforcement agencies nationally under President Barack Obama. Secure Communities allowed state and local law enforcement to check federal criminal and immigration databases to determine the immigration status of those booked into or leaving custody. The information-sharing program facilitated a significant increase in deportations from the U.S. interior—up to 322,000 in fiscal year 2011, which remains the highest on record—and earned Obama the monicker “deporter in chief.” However, it was also met with controversy, given the indiscriminate nature of who was pushed into the deportation pipeline, accusations of racial profiling, and a chilling effect that drastically reduced immigrant communities’ trust in and cooperation with local law enforcement.

As criticism grew, the Obama administration replaced Secure Communities in 2014 with the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), which allowed state and local jurisdictions to tailor their cooperation with ICE.

Since then, the pendulum has swung back and forth. The first Trump administration ordered the termination of PEP and restoration of Secure Communities, and expanded federal enforcement priorities to effectively target for arrest and removal any noncitizen with an immigration violation. The Biden administration revoked the order restoring Secure Communities and narrowed enforcement priorities. Since returning to office, Trump has reinstated the expansive enforcement priorities of his first term but has not reinstated Secure Communities.                                

Looking Ahead

It is uncertain whether expanding the troves of data accessible to the personnel carrying out immigration enforcement will substantially help the Trump administration meet its ambitious target of 1 million deportations annually—one it does not at present appear on track to achieve this year, based on the first several months of activity. More information does not automatically lead to more arrests of the noncitizens who are easiest to remove. More arrests, which also require more detention space, are not necessarily accompanied by a commensurate increase in deportations. Courts across the country have shown resistance to quick removals and have insisted on applying the protections of due process and judicial review. That is time consuming and will increase the backlogs not only at immigration courts but also at federal courts. Adding to an expanding docket is not a recipe for obtaining removals. At the same time, the administration is seeking billions of dollars in new funding from Congress in an attempt to alleviate some of these strains. Whether additional funding will lead to a dramatic increase in removals remains to be seen. 

There also appears to be growing unease among law enforcement agencies, especially state and local ones, that limited resources are being disproportionately directed at federal immigration goals at the expense of other critical domestic law enforcement mandates.

Billed as a force multiplier for immigration enforcement, ICE’s access to an increasingly complex web of data is not passing without criticism. As with prior chapters in government expansion of immigration-related data-sharing, the current effort has raised concerns about the potential for racial profiling, diminished trust in local law enforcement by immigrant communities, possible reduced usage of public benefits and services, and the potential for misuse or theft of sensitive personal data for immigrants and U.S. citizens alike.

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