Ghana’s Migration Trends Reflect West African Ties and Global Connections
A seller at Makola Market in central Accra.
Credit: Renate Wefers/iStock.com.
Highlights
Ghana’s migration policies have sought to promote mobility within West Africa while fostering ties with the diaspora and managing the tradeoffs of emigration.
- Ghana hosted 532,000 immigrants in 2024, mostly from West Africa, while 1.1 million Ghanaians lived abroad.
- Remittances provide sizable economic benefits, but the emigration of health professionals and other highly skilled workers has raised alarm.
- Concerns about abuse of Ghanaian workers in destination countries have elevated efforts to safeguard their welfare, including banning the recruitment of domestic workers for the Gulf countries.
- In recent years, instability in the Sahel has prompted significant humanitarian displacement to Ghana.
Ghana occupies a notable position as a country of origin, destination, transit, and return migration. Situated along the Gulf of Guinea and embedded in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the country has historically served as a hub of population movement, trade, and labor circulation.1 Its migration profile therefore combines longstanding regional mobility within West Africa with growing connections to destinations beyond the region.
Ghana's role as both a destination and origin country has created policy tensions around facilitating regional mobility while managing irregular migration, border security, labor mobility, and the social and economic consequences of emigration. These patterns have been shaped by economic restructuring, regional integration, demographic shifts, environmental change, and globalization. Demographic change is particularly relevant to migration insofar as population growth and the expansion of the working-age population have increased demand for employment and livelihoods, while uneven opportunities have influenced Ghanaians’ decisions about whether and where to emigrate.
An estimated 1.1 million people from Ghana lived abroad in 2024, according to the UN Population Division, while remittance inflows reached nearly U.S. $7.8 billion by the end of 2025, highlighting the developmental significance of transnational networks and diaspora engagement.2 At the same time, Ghana, with a population of approximately 34 million, hosted an estimated 532,000 immigrants in 2024, including people from across West Africa and beyond. These figures illustrate the multidirectional nature of migration in, from, and through Ghana.
Ghana’s story also partly echoes the legacy of the transatlantic slave trade. During the colonial era, the region then known as the Gold Coast was a major point of transit for enslaved people being brought to the Americas. Recently, Ghana has sought to strengthen engagement with the descendants of these enslaved people and others in the global diaspora, through citizenship reforms, investment initiatives, and heritage tourism programs such as the Year of Return and Beyond the Return campaigns. These initiatives have positioned the country as a destination for its diaspora and made it a leading advocate of pan-African engagement and acknowledgment of the slave trade.
Ghanaian migration policy has evolved significantly since independence in 1957. Initially a major destination for immigrants from across the region, in line with the historic pan-African vision of founding President Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana experienced a dramatic policy reversal with the 1969 Aliens Compliance Order. That edict led to the expulsion of an estimated 200,000 West Africans and marked a shift toward more restrictive migration governance, although subsequent policies reflected a more uneven mix of immigration controls and commitments to regional mobility.3 The move was emulated by others; more than 1 million Ghanaians were expelled from Nigeria between 1983 and 1985. Since the early 2000s, however, Ghana has progressively re-engaged with regional mobility by implementing the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment, which allows for free entry and stay of up to 90 days across the bloc’s 12 Member States. The government has also engaged with global frameworks such as the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. And it has developed comprehensive migration governance frameworks, especially since development of the country's 2016 National Migration Policy.4
At the same time, the government increasingly faces competing development and political imperatives.5 While labor emigration generates remittances, investment, and knowledge transfers, growing emigration of Ghanaian health professionals and other skilled workers has intensified concerns about brain drain and human-capital loss. Reports of exploitation and abuse of Ghanaian workers in the Persian Gulf and South Africa have also elevated concerns about migrant protection. Similarly, Ghana's efforts to deepen regional integration coexist with periodic nationalist sentiments, particularly within the informal trade and small-scale mining sectors, as well as security concerns amid instability in the Sahel.
Taken together, Ghana's migration experience illustrates the opportunities and tensions that emerge when migration simultaneously functions as livelihood strategy, development resource, governance challenge, and mechanism for negotiating questions of citizenship, belonging, regional integration, and the legacy of enslavement. This country profile provides information on Ghana’s recent immigration and emigration trends and policy, including labor migration, humanitarian displacement, and questions about brain drain.
Immigration Led by ECOWAS Neighbors
Official data on immigration are limited, but the UN Population Division estimates that more than 532,000 immigrants lived in Ghana as of mid-2024, accounting for less than 2 percent of its population.6 The overwhelming majority of these immigrants were from elsewhere in West Africa, reflecting the integration of the ECOWAS region, with more than two-thirds from either Togo, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, or Burkina Faso (see Table 1). Togo, Nigeria, and Côte d'Ivoire are other ECOWAS Member States, as was Burkina Faso until it formally withdrew from the bloc in early 2025 following a military coup. Additionally, significant trade and commerce occur at the border, as people cross back and forth.
Table 1. Immigrants in Ghana, by Country of Origin, 2024
|
Country of Origin |
Number of Immigrants |
Share (%) |
|---|---|---|
| TOTAL |
532,000 |
100% |
|
Togo |
116,000 |
22% |
|
Nigeria |
90,000 |
17% |
|
Côte d'Ivoire |
83,000 |
16% |
|
Burkina Faso |
75,000 |
14% |
|
Liberia |
39,000 |
7% |
|
Benin |
22,000 |
4% |
|
Niger |
8,000 |
1% |
|
Mali |
7,000 |
1% |
|
Sierra Leone |
3,000 |
1% |
|
Gambia |
2,000 |
0% |
|
Other |
87,000 |
16% |
Labor Immigration
Ghana's labor immigration is governed primarily by the 2000 Immigration Act (Act 573), which established the work-permit and immigrant-quota system, and the 2013 Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act (Act 865), which sets minimum foreign-capital thresholds and reserves specific activities for Ghanaian nationals.7 The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), a part of the Ministry of the Interior, administers residence and work permits, which are typically valid for one year and renewable subject to continued eligibility.8
A substantial number of traders and workers in the informal sector circulate within West Africa. Although the ECOWAS protocol guarantees the right of establishment, the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act of 2013 prohibits all foreigners—including ECOWAS citizens—from participating in the informal sector and imposes high capital requirements on foreign entrepreneurs. This law has been the source of contestation between Ghanaian traders, represented by the Ghana Union of Traders Association, and those from Nigeria. The protocol also requires ECOWAS citizens to obtain valid residence and work permits in the destination country, but this requirement is routinely violated by informal-sector workers and cross-border traders.
Other immigrant workers are concentrated in the oil and gas, mining, finance, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) and development sectors, where employers must demonstrate that positions cannot be filled locally before visa approval is granted.9 Certain professions—including medicine, nursing, engineering, and law—carry additional licensing requirements administered by professional bodies, and sector-specific regulators such as the Minerals Commission impose further conditions on foreign-born staffing in extractive industries.10
Table 2. Key Immigration Actors and Laws in Ghana, 2026
|
Agency |
Description |
|---|---|
| Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) | • Processes work and residence permits • Leads enforcement, including deportations |
| Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) | • Administers immigrant quotas linked to registered foreign-owned enterprises |
| Minerals Commission and Petroleum Commission | • Imposes sector-specific local-hiring and labor-market requirements for extractive-industry companies |
|
Law |
Description |
|---|---|
| Immigration Act, 2000 (Act 573) | • Establishes the work-permit and immigrant-quota system • Governs conditions, renewals, and employer guarantees |
| Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908) | • Establishes GIS as the operational authority for entry, residence, and exit control |
| Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, 2013 (Act 865) | • Sets minimum foreign-capital thresholds and reserves specified activities for Ghanaian nationals • Intersects with expatriate staffing quotas |
| Minerals and Mining (Amendment) Act, 2019 (Act 995) | • Sets a minimum sentence for noncitizens convicted of illegal mining |
The legal framework is layered rather than unified: General immigration control sits with GIS, while sector-specific regulators retain independent authority over the staffing of immigrants in strategic industries. For instance, a 2019 amendment to the Minerals and Mining Act sets a prison sentence of 15 to 25 years for noncitizens convicted of illegal mining, showing how sentencing policy has been used specifically to deter foreign involvement in the practice. Chinese participation in unlicensed small-scale gold mining (popularly known as galamsey) has been the most politically and diplomatically sensitive dimension of unsanctioned labor immigration.11 A 2013 crackdown resulted in the deportation or voluntary departure of more than 4,500 Chinese workers, yet the practice persisted, prompting the creation of a joint police-military task force known as Operation Vanguard in 2017.12 More than 1,600 Chinese were repatriated for illegal mining from 2009 to 2022, and additional arrests and repatriations have occurred intermittently since. However, the full scope of this enforcement is unclear, since there is no single authoritative dataset on foreign involvement in galamsey. The general trend, nonetheless, is one of recurring waves of enforcement followed by renewed inflows, rather than a sustained decline.
Refugees and Asylum Seekers
Ghana has periodically hosted West African refugees and asylum seekers since the 1990s, including Liberians and Sierra Leoneans fleeing civil war and Ivorians displaced by the 2010-11 post-election crisis. The registered refugee population remained relatively stable through much of the early 2010s before increasing noticeably, with the recent rise driven chiefly by insecurity in the Sahel. As of June 2026, nearly two-thirds of the more than 21,200 refugees in Ghana were from Burkina Faso, Ghana’s northern neighbor (see Table 3).
Table 3. Refugee Population in Ghana, by Country of Origin, June 2026
|
Country of Origin |
Number of Refugees |
Share (%) |
|---|---|---|
| TOTAL |
21,246 |
100% |
|
Burkina Faso |
13,368 |
63% |
|
Togo |
3,407 |
16% |
|
Sudan |
1,061 |
5% |
|
Côte d'Ivoire |
684 |
3% |
|
Cameroon |
662 |
3% |
|
Liberia |
629 |
3% |
|
Syria |
331 |
2% |
|
Other |
1,104 |
5% |
Conflict and insecurity in the Sahel, particularly in neighboring Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, have contributed to increased forced displacement toward Ghana in recent years. Ghana has responded by establishing reception centers near the border at Tarikom, in 2023, and Zini, in 2024.13 In February 2025, the government granted prima facie refugee status to Burkinabes seeking protection. These measures reflect Ghana's role as a country of asylum and its efforts to respond to displacement generated by insecurity in the wider region.14
The most consequential recent development concerns Liberian refugees who arrived in previous years. In February 2024, Ghanaian authorities demolished the Buduburam settlement near Accra, which had already been formally decommissioned in 2012, displacing an estimated 15,000 residents. Roughly 4,700 people were subsequently repatriated to Liberia and about 4,000 opted for local integration under temporary, work-restricted permits.15 The episode renewed scrutiny of Ghana's legal framework for refugee protection, the implementation of the Refugee Law of 1992, and persistent gaps that have left marginalized populations, many of whom lack legal status, reliant on NGOs and faith-based organizations.
Student, Marriage, and Diaspora Immigration
International students, particularly from Nigeria and other ECOWAS Member States, form a substantial share of enrollment at Ghana’s largest universities, reflecting Ghana's comparative advantage in regional tertiary education and relatively liberal ECOWAS mobility provisions. Foreign spouses of Ghanaians continue to face documentation and dual-citizenship hurdles, since legal residence tied to marriage must be periodically renewed and does not automatically confer citizenship.
A smaller but symbolically significant immigration flow comprises members of the diaspora and retirees from North America, whose settlement the government has actively encouraged through initiatives including the 2019 Year of Return, which marked 400 years since the beginning of the transatlantic slave trade. This immigration has also been reinforced by recent diaspora-engagement diplomacy, including the November 2025 Ghana-Barbados exchanges.
Similarly, heritage tourism anchored around the “slave castles” of Cape Coast and Elmina, alongside cultural festivals in Accra, remain a defining feature of international visits to Ghana, sustained by the continuing resonance of diaspora-oriented programming since 2019. Travelers’ ability to obtain streamlined entry such as a visa on arrival, available to nationals of African Union Member States, continues to evolve as the government seeks to expand tourism from nontraditional countries such as those in the Caribbean without growing its broader immigration enforcement and reception capacity.16
Emigration Across West Africa and Beyond
Slightly more than half of Ghanaian emigrants live in North America or Europe, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada. Many others go to other West African nations. Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire are the second and fourth largest destination countries, respectively, together home to more than one-third of Ghanaian-born migrants (see Table 4). This reflects longstanding intra-ECOWAS labor and trading circulation rather than the more visible professional emigration to high-income countries.
Table 4. Emigrants from Ghana, by Country of Destination, 2024
|
Destination |
Number of Emigrants |
Share (%) |
|---|---|---|
| TOTAL |
1,055,000 |
100% |
|
United States |
258,000 |
24% |
|
Nigeria |
256,000 |
24% |
|
United Kingdom |
155,000 |
15% |
|
Côte d'Ivoire |
97,000 |
9% |
|
Italy |
49,000 |
5% |
|
Togo |
48,000 |
5% |
|
Burkina Faso |
34,000 |
3% |
|
Canada |
26,000 |
3% |
|
Spain |
24,000 |
2% |
|
Benin |
17,000 |
2% |
Health professionals form a visible and policy-sensitive segment of Global North-bound emigration. More than 1,200 Ghanaian nurses moved to the United Kingdom in 2022 alone, a scale that led the International Council of Nurses to question the ethics of recruiting nurses from a country experiencing what the World Health Organization (WHO) described as a worrying nurse-to-population ratio.17 The WHO Global Code of Practice recommends that destination countries refrain from actively recruiting health workers from Ghana and other countries on the WHO Health Workforce Support and Safeguards List, while recognizing that individual health workers may seek employment abroad independently or through existing government-to-government agreements. This exception has allowed continued recruitment from Ghana despite its protected status.18 Beyond the health sector, teachers and engineers are among those who emigrate to the Global North in substantial numbers.
Domestic and construction workers tend to move to Gulf states under considerably less protected conditions. Roughly 75,000 Ghanaians were estimated to be working across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states as of 2023, including about 27,000 in Saudi Arabia and 24,000 in the United Arab Emirates.19 In 2017, amid concern about abuses, Ghana’s government temporarily banned emigration of domestic workers to the Persian Gulf, declining to issue visas for them to work in the region.20 The suspension remained in place as of this writing, although it restricts formal recruitment rather than individual Ghanaians' ability to emigrate. Critics have alleged that it pushes migrants to travel through illicit channels, increasing the risk of trafficking. The government has also signed bilateral labor migration agreements with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates; the pacts, however, do not cover domestic workers. This situation has created a protection gap that formal policy instruments have not yet closed.
Institutionally, responsibility for regulating and protecting migrant workers is distributed across the GIS, the Diaspora Affairs Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Labour, Jobs, and Employment. These agencies jointly constitute Ghana's National Coordination Mechanism on Migration, which is the principal government platform on the issue, operationalized through the National Implementation Plan for the Global Compact on Migration, with six priority areas: institutional and policy coherence and coverage, labor migration, border management and immigration, trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, diaspora engagement and remittances, and return and reintegration.
Irregular Labor Migration
Migration via Libya is the dominant irregular pathway connecting Ghana to Europe, although travel via the Sahara-Mediterranean corridor carries significant risks including exploitation, detention, and death. Ghanaians account for only a small share of the irregular migrants passing through Libya: less than 2 percent in early 2026.21
Irregular movement within the ECOWAS free-movement zone has also drawn concern. The GIS has raised concern about rising abuse of the ECOWAS protocol’s provisions on free movement to mask Ghanaians’ onward irregular migration out of the region.22 Tightening immigration policies in the Global North, reflected in more restrictive visa regimes and tighter asylum systems, may have reinforced reliance on irregular channels for Ghanaians unable to migrate regularly, as has been the case for other West Africans.
Recruitment and Trafficking
Formal, licensed recruitment agencies operate alongside a dense informal network of brokers, popularly known as “connection men,” who arrange placements, particularly for Gulf-bound domestic and construction work, outside regulatory oversight. Ghanaian law does not prohibit licensed agencies from charging workers recruitment fees, although the Ministry of Labour, Jobs, and Employment discourages them. Nonetheless, fraudulent recruiters sometimes exploit people—particularly women—bound for domestic work abroad and tend not to face punishment.23
At the same time, Ghana’s crackdown on human trafficking has increased. In 2025, authorities rescued more than 2,300 trafficking victims, up from 821 in 2021.24 Authorities attribute the increase partly to improved detection, rather than a rise in prevalence. Many victims come from neighboring countries including Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Benin. Document fraud, including the falsification of nationality or identity to circumvent visa restrictions, has been separately documented among migrants transiting through Ghana.
Remittances
Officially recorded remittances to Ghana rose from $5.1 billion in 2023 to approximately $7.8 billion in 2025, equivalent to 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), according to the Bank of Ghana.25 Remittances have continued increasing even through a period of appreciation of the Ghanaian cedi that officials initially feared would depress financial transfers, indicating that remittance behavior is driven more by household need than by short-term exchange rates. The scale of these inflows is clearest when compared to foreign direct investment (FDI): In 2024, remittances outpaced the $1.7 billion in FDI by nearly four to one.26
Including money sent via informal channels, total inflows for 2024 were estimated at around $11.5 billion, which would make remittances Ghana's largest single source of foreign exchange, ahead of both gold and cocoa exports, two of its most lucrative industries.27 Individuals in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Canada are the principal sources for these monetary transfers.28
However, the extent to which these remittances improve household-level welfare and Ghana's broader developmental transformation remains under debate. The Bank of Ghana's 2026 Remit2Invest initiative reflected the official recognition that consumption-oriented transfers have yet to be systematically converted into investable diaspora capital.29 At the same time, members of the diaspora send knowledge, skills, and normative influence in addition to their financial contributions.
Recent Policies and Ongoing Debates
Since 2016, the Ghanaian government has made significant progress developing a comprehensive migration governance framework. Reflecting the country's changing migration profile, policy has increasingly shifted from viewing migration primarily as a security concern towards recognizing its potential to drive development. This policy evolution aligns with continental and global frameworks, including the African Union's Migration Policy Framework for Africa, the ECOWAS free-movement protocol, and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration.30 Nevertheless, implementation continues to face institutional, financial, and coordination constraints.
Three main policies have shaped migration governance in Ghana since 2016: the National Migration Policy, the National Labour Migration Policy, and the Diaspora Engagement Policy.
National Migration Policy (2016)
The 2016 National Migration Policy, which was undergoing revision as of this writing, represented Ghana's first comprehensive migration policy and remains the overarching framework for migration governance. The policy addresses both internal and international migration, labor migration, border management, forced displacement, diaspora engagement, migrant protection, and migration data management within a whole-of-government effort.31 It recognizes migration as a multidimensional phenomenon that can contribute to national development when effectively managed.
The policy attempts to balance migration management with the protection of migrants' rights by emphasizing safe, orderly, and regular migration, while acknowledging the developmental contributions of migrants through remittances, investments, skills transfers, and knowledge exchange. It calls for stronger coordination among different stakeholders within and outside the government.
Despite its broad scope, implementation has progressed unevenly. Several assessments point to persistent challenges, including weak interministerial coordination, overlapping institutional mandates, inadequate financing, and limited monitoring and evaluation systems.32 The National Coordination Mechanism on Migration was established in 2023 to provide a formal platform for inter-agency coordination and implementation of the National Migration Policy and Ghana's commitments under the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. While this represents an important institutional response, evidence of its effectiveness in resolving coordination and implementation gaps remains limited.33
National Labour Migration Policy (2020)
Building on the National Migration Policy, the government adopted the National Labour Migration Policy in 2020 to strengthen governance of labor mobility and improve protection for Ghanaian workers abroad. It reflected growing concerns over increasing labor migration to destinations in the Gulf, Europe, and other African countries, where migrants have experienced exploitation, contract substitution, unsafe working conditions, and human-rights abuses. The National Labour Migration Policy promotes ethical recruitment, improved labor-market information systems, bilateral labor agreements, predeparture orientation, skills recognition, and postarrival support services. It also seeks to strengthen institutional collaboration.
Since its adoption, implementation has been supported through the establishment of technical working groups, the National Coordination Mechanism, and the National Implementation Plan for the Global Compact for Migration.34 However, policy ambition continues to outpace implementation capacity. Limited inspection of recruitment agencies, weak enforcement of labor standards across international recruitment chains, and inadequate monitoring of bilateral labor agreements have constrained the policy's effectiveness. These gaps are particularly evident in efforts to protect low-skilled emigrant workers employed in sectors such as domestic work and construction. Positive steps to close these gaps include recent initiatives to draft a code of conduct and standard operating procedures for private employment agencies and a training manual for predeparture and postarrival orientation of labor migrants.
Diaspora Engagement Policy (2023)
The launch of the Diaspora Engagement Policy in 2023 marked another important milestone in Ghana's migration governance. Building on the momentum generated by the 2019 Year of Return and the subsequent Beyond the Return initiative, the policy seeks to strengthen Ghana's relationship with its global diaspora by promoting investment, mobilizing remittances, transferring knowledge, advancing cultural diplomacy, and enhancing scientific collaboration.35
The policy recognizes that the diaspora’s contributions extend well beyond financial remittances. It explicitly promotes skills exchange, the assertion of cultural heritage, entrepreneurship, technology transfer, philanthropy, and professional networking as mechanisms for supporting national development. In doing so, it reflects an understanding of diaspora engagement as a form of transnational development partnership rather than simply a source of foreign exchange.
Nevertheless, debates continue regarding the scope of diaspora members’ rights and political participation. Proposals relating to expanded political rights, including allowing Ghanaians abroad to vote, generated significant political debate and were ultimately not fully incorporated into the final policy. These discussions illustrate broader tensions between efforts to strengthen the diaspora’s inclusion without diluting the political influence of Ghanaians in the country.
Box 1. Additional Migration Policies
In addition to the three main policies described above, Ghana has several complementary policies for migration governance.
Those on immigration include the Immigration Act 2000 (Act 573); the Citizenship Act 2000 (Act 591); the Immigration Regulations 2001 (LI 1691); the Immigration (Amendment Act) 2012 (Act 848); and the Immigration Service Act of 2016 (Act 908), which repealed the Immigration Service Law 1989 (PNDCL 226).
Immigration and diaspora-relations laws include the Dual Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1996 (Act 527), allowing Ghanaians to hold multiple nationalities; the Citizenship Regulations 2001 (L.I. 1690); and Representation of People’s Amendment Act 2006 (Act 669).
Human trafficking laws and policies include the Human Trafficking Act of 2005 (Act 694) and the Human Trafficking (Amendment) Act of 2009 (Act 784), the 2015 Human Trafficking Prohibition Regulations (L.I. 2219), Human Trafficking Standard Operating Procedures of 2015, and the National Plan of Action for the Elimination of Human Trafficking in Ghana (2022-2026).
The primary law on asylum seekers and refugees is the Refugee Law of 1992 (PNDC Law 305D).
Regarding emigration and internal migration, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana guarantees the rights of Ghanaians to emigrate and the right of all persons to circulate freely within Ghana.
Policies covering labor migration include the Labour Act of 2003 (Act 651), Labour Regulations of 2007 (LI 1833), and the Labour (“Domestic Workers”) Regulations of 2020 (LI 2408).
Finally, issues related to climate change and migration are considered in the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy of 2012 and the National Climate Change Policy of 2013.
Brain Drain, Brain Gain, and Brain Circulation
Public debate about migration in Ghana continues to be shaped by concerns over the emigration of highly skilled workers, particularly health professionals. Persistent shortages of doctors, nurses, and others have intensified concerns about the costs of outward migration, especially following increased international recruitment around the COVID-19 pandemic.
At the same time, some scholars have viewed Ghana’s migration trends as signs of temporary brain circulation, rather than permanent brain drain. For instance, the diaspora’s contributions to the country are substantial, yet scholars have argued these resources primarily support household consumption, education, health care, and housing, rather than broader development and investment. As a result, leaders have placed greater emphasis on promoting state-led labor export of professionals through bilateral labor agreements, to ensure the circulation of workers in a coherent manner.
Regional Mobility and International Cooperation
Migration to and from Ghana is shaped by a rapidly evolving regional environment. While human mobility can be a driver of economic integration and development, the country also faces geopolitical, security, and demographic pressures. Recent developments, including growing insecurity across the Sahel and renewed efforts to deepen intra-African integration, illustrate the increasingly complex policy landscape within which the government operates.36
West African mobility is anchored in the ECOWAS free-movement protocol. For Ghana, the protocol remains one of the most significant legal instruments governing cross-border migration, facilitating trade, labor mobility, and social interaction with neighboring countries.37
In practice, however, implementation across the subregion has remained uneven. Administrative bottlenecks, inconsistent application of immigration procedures, informal border charges, and periodic border closures have constrained the full realization of free-movement rights.38 Recently, political tensions following the early 2025 withdrawal from ECOWAS of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger introduced new uncertainties, although transitional arrangements have sought to preserve freedom of movement for citizens of these countries. These developments highlight the extent to which West Africa’s regional migration governance remains closely intertwined with broader political and security dynamics. The expansion of violent extremist organizations, including Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State-Sahel, has increased fears of instability spilling into coastal West Africa.39
At the same time, Ghana’s government has continued to support regional dialogue on the AU Free Movement of Persons Protocol, reflecting its longstanding commitment to continental integration. This agenda complements Ghana’s role implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area, whose secretariat is based in Accra, by linking greater economic integration with efforts to facilitate people’s movement across African borders. Policy developments such as Ghana’s new e-visa system for African nationals illustrate this orientation toward easier intra-African mobility. The system replaced the previous visa-on-arrival arrangement and took effect on Africa Day (the annual celebration of the African Union’s founding), May 25, 2026.40
While leaders acknowledge potential security challenges, the anticipated benefits of greater intra-African integration are substantial. Easier mobility is expected to facilitate trade, stimulate tourism, attract investment, strengthen educational and professional exchanges, and improve business connectivity across the continent. Greater mobility may also enhance Ghana's attractiveness as a regional commercial and logistics hub.
Looking Ahead
Ghana is simultaneously a hub for emigration, a destination for migrants from both near and far, and a transit space. This evolving configuration reflects broader transformations in West African mobility systems, shaped by economic differentiation, regional integration, and shifting global labor demand. In this context, migration is a structural feature of Ghana’s social and economic life, embedded within livelihood systems, urbanization, and transnational networks.41
Despite substantial policy development over the past decade, implementation has been a persistent challenge, especially at the subnational level. District assemblies and local governance institutions remain weakly integrated into national structures, resulting in a disconnect between policy intent and lived realities, particularly in areas of migrant settlement, reintegration, and service delivery. Strengthening policy coherence between national institutions and local authorities remains essential for translating migration into tangible development outcomes.
Across Ghanaian society, migration has also become increasingly politicized. Rising nationalist narratives such as calls for “Ghanaian jobs for Ghanaians” reflect growing anxieties over labor-market competition and economic precarity. Similarly, episodic anti-immigrant sentiments have included hostility towards groups such as Nigerian traders and entrepreneurs who have been accused of taking business opportunities away from Ghanaians. Also, there has been friction between refugees and host communities over access to land, water, forest resources, and livelihoods in some refugee-hosting areas, illustrating the fragility of social cohesion in contexts of economic stress and uneven development. These dynamics point to the importance of integrating migration governance with broader social policy and inclusive development strategies.
Regional insecurity further compounds these dynamics, with instability in the Sahel region increasing the likelihood of displacement and mixed migration towards Ghana. These trends suggest that migration pressures will not diminish but rather become more complex, requiring adaptive, coordinated, and forward-looking governance frameworks. The critical challenge for Ghana lies in aligning institutional capacity, social inclusion, and rights-based protection within a rapidly evolving migration environment.
Sources
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Gyesaw, Stephen. 2025. The Power of Remittances: How Ghana's Expatriates Are Supporting the Economy and What More Can Be Done. Modern Ghana, Jun 7, 2025.
Ibrahim, Zainab, Mohammed Alenezi, Abdul-Jalil Iddrisu, and Emmanuel F. Amankwanor. 2024. Impact of Foreign Remittances on Ghanaian Economic Growth: An Assessment of the Mediating Role of Mobile Phone Technology. In Business, Management and Economics: Research Progress Vol. 7, ed. Olusegun Felix Ayadi. London: BP International.
International Council of Nurses (ICN). 2024. International Council of Nurses Report Submitted to the World Health Organization in July 2024 as Part of the Latest Reporting Round on Implementation of the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment. Geneva: ICN.
International Labor Organization (ILO), Trade for Decent Work. N.d. Ghana. Accessed July 31, 2026.
International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2025. 2024 Annual Report. Accra: IOM Ghana.
International Organization for Migration (IOM), Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). 2026. DTM Round 62 Internal Migrant Dataset. Updated April 2026.
Kandilige, Leander, Joseph Teye, Cathrine Talleraas, and Anna Gopsill. 2023. National and International Migration Policy in Ghana. EFFEXT background paper, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Bergen, Norway, 2023.
Kpogli, Beyonce Diamond. 2026. Ghana Rescues Over 2,300 Human Trafficking Victims in 2025 as the Government Declares War on Sports Trafficking. Modern Ghana, May 27, 2026.
Lejeune-Kaba, Fatoumata. 2011. Togo and Ghana Receiving More Ivorian Refugees as Crisis Spreads. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), March 29, 2011.
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Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford. 2023. Migration and the Health and Care Workforce. June 27, 2023.
Nettey, Nerteley and Emmanuel Oppong. 2025. 2024 Remittances Hit $6.65bn, Four Times Higher than FDIs - BoG. Citi Newsroom, February 21, 2025.
Osei, Lydia, Thomas Yeboah, Emmanuel Kumi, and Ernestina Fredua Antoh. 2021. Government's Ban on Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining, Youth Livelihoods and Imagined Futures in Ghana. Resources Policy 71: 102008.
Rahman, Md Mizanur and Mohammed Salisu. 2023. Gender and the Return Migration Process: Gulf Returnees in Ghana. Comparative Migration Studies 11 (1): 1-21.
Ratha, Dilip, Sonia Plaza, and Eung Ju Kim. 2024. In 2024, Remittance Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries Are Expected to Reach $685 Billion, Larger than FDI and ODA Combined. World Bank blog post, December 18, 2024.
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Yeboah, Thomas, Leander Kandilige, Amanda Bisong, Faisal Garba, and Joseph Kofi Teye. 2021. The ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol and Diversity of Experiences of Different Categories of Migrants: A Qualitative Study. International Migration 59 (3): 228-44.
Notes
- 1
International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2024 Annual Report (Accra: IOM Ghana, 2025).
- 2
UN Population Division, “International Migrant Stock 2024 by Destination and Origin,” 2024.
- 3
Ewout Frankema, “From Integration to Repatriation: Flight, Displacement, and Expulsion in Post-Colonial Africa,” in Migration in Africa, eds. Michiel de Haas and Ewout Frankema (London: Routledge, 2022).
- 4
Faisal Garba and Thomas Yeboah, “Free Movement and Regional Integration in the ECOWAS Sub-Region,” in Migration in West Africa: IMISCOE Regional Reader, ed. Joseph Kofi Teye (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2022)
- 5
Leander Kandilige, Joseph Teye, Cathrine Talleraas, and Anna Gopsill, “National and International Migration Policy in Ghana” (EFFEXT background paper, Chr. Michelsen Institute [CMI], Bergen, Norway, 2023).
- 6
UN Population Division, “International Migrant Stock 2024 by Destination and Origin,” 2024.
- 7
Ghana Citizenship Team, “Ghana Work Permit Requirements Guide (2026 Guide),” Ghana Citizenship, February 17, 2026.
- 8
Abeeku Essuman-Johnson, “Immigration to Ghana,” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 4, no.1 (2006): 59-77.
- 9
Thomas Yeboah, Leander Kandilige, Amanda Bisong, Faisal Garba, and Joseph Kofi Teye, “The ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol and Diversity of Experiences of Different Categories of Migrants: A Qualitative Study,” International Migration 59, no. 3 (2021): 228-44.
- 10
Ghana Citizenship Team, “Ghana Work Permit Requirements Guide (2026 Guide),” Ghana Citizenship, February 17, 2026.
- 11
James Boafo, Sebastian Angzoorokuu Paalo, and Senyo Dotsey, “Illicit Chinese Small-Scale Mining in Ghana: Beyond Institutional Weakness?” Sustainability 11, no.21 (2019): 5943.
- 12
Lydia Osei, Thomas Yeboah, Emmanuel Kumi, and Ernestina Fredua Antoh, “Government's Ban on Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining, Youth Livelihoods and Imagined Futures in Ghana,” Resources Policy 71 (2021): 102008; Emmanuel Ameyaw, “Gold Rush: Illegal Mining Fuelled by Chinese Nationals in Ghana,” The Climate Insight, February 28, 2023.
- 13
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Rights Mapping and Analysis Platform: Ghana,” updated April 2025.
- 14
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Rights Mapping and Analysis Platform: Ghana,” updated April 2025.
- 15
Isaac Yeboah Addo and Augustine Tanle, “Rethinking Solutions for Protracted Refugee Situation: A Case Study of the Buduburam Refugee Camp Closure in Ghana,” Scientific African 21 e01746 (2023).
- 16
Thomas Yeboah, Leander Kandilige, Amanda Bisong, Faisal Garba, and Joseph Kofi Teye, “The ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol and Diversity of Experiences of Different Categories of Migrants: A Qualitative Study,” International Migration 59, no. 3 (2021): 228-44.
- 17
African Nurses, “Ethical Migration for African Nurses: Navigating the 2026 WHO “Red List” and Your Right to Move,” February 1, 2026.
- 18
Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, “Migration and the Health and Care Workforce,” June 27, 2023; International Council of Nurses (ICN), International Council of Nurses Report Submitted to the World Health Organization in July 2024 as Part of the Latest Reporting Round on Implementation of the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment (Geneva: ICN, 2024).
- 19
Md Mizanur Rahman and Mohammed Salisu, "Gender and the Return Migration Process: Gulf Returnees in Ghana,” Comparative Migration Studies 11, no. 1 (2023): 1-21.
- 20
Emmanuel Ebo Hawkson, “Recruitment of Domestic Servants to Work in Gulf States Suspended,” Graphic Online, June 1, 2017.
- 21
International Organization for Migration (IOM), Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), “DTM Round 62 Internal Migrant Dataset,” updated April 2026.
- 22
Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), “GIS Warns of Abuses in the Implementation of the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol,” June 11, 2026.
- 23
U.S. State Department, 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Ghana (Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, 2025).
- 24
Beyonce Diamond Kpogli, “Ghana Rescues Over 2,300 Human Trafficking Victims in 2025 as the Government Declares War on Sports Trafficking,” Modern Ghana, May 27, 2026.
- 25
Daniel Sackitey, “BoG Governor: Remittance Inflows Near $7.8bn in 2025, Surpass FDI,” Citi Newsroom, April 20, 2026; Nerteley Nettey and Emmanuel Oppong, “2024 Remittances Hit $6.65bn, Four Times Higher than FDIs - BoG,” Citi Newsroom, February 21, 2025.
- 26
Nerteley Nettey and Emmanuel Oppong, “2024 Remittances Hit $6.65bn, Four Times Higher than FDIs - BoG,” Citi Newsroom, February 21, 2025.
- 27
Stephen Gyesaw, “The Power of Remittances: How Ghana's Expatriates Are Supporting the Economy and What More Can Be Done,” Modern Ghana, June 7, 2025.
- 28
Zainab Ibrahim, Mohammed Alenezi, Abdul-Jalil Iddrisu, and Emmanuel F. Amankwanor, “Impact of Foreign Remittances on Ghanaian Economic Growth: An Assessment of the Mediating Role of Mobile Phone Technology,” in Business, Management and Economics: Research Progress Vol. 7, ed. Olusegun Felix Ayadi (London: BP International, 2024).
- 29
Daniel Sackitey, “BoG Governor: Remittance Inflows Near $7.8bn in 2025, Surpass FDI,” Citi Newsroom, April 20, 2026.
- 30
Ghana Ministry of the Interior, National Migration Policy for Ghana (Accra: Ministry of the Interior, 2016); International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2024 Annual Report (Accra: IOM Ghana, 2025).
- 31
Ghana Ministry of the Interior, National Migration Policy for Ghana (Accra: Ministry of the Interior, 2016).
- 32
Leander Kandilige, Joseph Teye, Cathrine Talleraas, and Anna Gopsill, National and International Migration Policy in Ghana (EFFEXT background paper, Chr. Michelsen Institute [CMI], Bergen, Norway, 2023); Ghana Ministry of the Interior and National Coordination Mechanism on Migration, National Implementation Plan for the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) in Ghana (Accra: Ministry of the Interior and National Coordination Mechanism on Migration, 2025).
- 33
Ghana Ministry of the Interior and National Coordination Mechanism on Migration, National Implementation Plan for the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) in Ghana (Accra: Ministry of the Interior and National Coordination Mechanism on Migration, 2025).
- 34
Ghana Ministry of the Interior and National Coordination Mechanism on Migration, National Implementation Plan for the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) in Ghana (Accra: Ministry of the Interior and National Coordination Mechanism on Migration, 2025).
- 35
Ghana Office of the President, Diaspora Affairs Office, Diaspora Engagement Policy for Ghana (Accra: Government of Ghana, 2023).
- 36
Soufan Center, “Jihadist Spillover Impact and Deteriorating Security in Coastal West Africa,” November 20, 2024.
- 37
Thomas Yeboah, Leander Kandilige, Amanda Bisong, Faisal Garba, and Joseph Kofi Teye, “The ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol and Diversity of Experiences of Different Categories of Migrants: A Qualitative Study,” International Migration 59, no. 3 (2021): 228-44.
- 38
International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2024 Annual Report (Accra: IOM Ghana, 2025).
- 39
UN Security Council, Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General (S/2024/871) (New York: United Nations, 2024).
- 40
James Amoh Junior, “Mahama Unveils Ghana’s E-Visa Regime to Boost Trade, Tourism,” Ghana News Agency (GNA), May 25, 2026.
- 41
M. Awumbila, “Drivers of Migration and Urbanisation in Ghana,” African Review of Economics and Finance 9, no. 1 (2017): 81-104.