Southern Africa’s Migration Integration Is Undermined by Rising Tensions and Changing Trends

Southern African countries have struggled to adapt to changing mobility patterns. Traditionally, migration in the subregion was driven by labor demands, such as for mining operations in South Africa as well as family ties and trade. However, trends have become more complex, involving forced displacement in response to factors including political instability and increasing environmental hazards, irregular migration, and urban-rural shifts.1

While the foreign-born share of the overall population is lower than in some other regions (ranging from about 10 percent in the Seychelles to less than 1 percent in Madagascar, Lesotho, Tanzania, and Malawi), much of the migration is intra-regional: 56 percent of the nearly 6.5 million international migrants as of mid-2024 (about 3.6 million people) were from elsewhere within Southern Africa.2 Leaders have called for smoother migration within the subregion to boost development and for humanitarian purposes. If properly managed, mobility can help Southern African countries fill labor shortages, expand cross-border trade, and mobilize skills and investment, while migrant remittances and business networks may contribute to poverty reduction and regional value chains. The regional Southern African Development Community (SADC) has promoted policies such as the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons, which was adopted in 2005 and calls for Member State nationals to be able to travel visa-free for up to 90 days and have easier access to legal residence and the right to work. Mobility-driven integration has been described as having the potential to transform Southern Africa from a collection of states into a cohesive community with shared economic, social, and cultural spaces, ultimately strengthening the foundation for political cooperation and collective security.

Yet persistent tensions over migration have undermined this effort. The dynamic is clearest in South Africa, by far the subregion’s largest destination country, where high employment, large wealth inequality, and unmet promises of the end of apartheid have contributed to periods of pronounced anti-immigration sentiment over the years. Violence and protests targeting immigrants returned in 2026, resulting in several deaths and spurring government efforts to repatriate approximately 73,000 foreign nationals in June and July.3 Reports of irregular migration through places such as the Beitbridge border crossing from Zimbabwe have captured public attention and spurred government action to tighten the border. In part due to these kinds of issues, the SADC protocol has been ratified by only six of the 16 Member States, short of the two-thirds necessary for it to enter into force.

Still, countries have made clear they want to look forward. South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, told other African leaders in July: “If we are to realize this vision of African unity and integration, we need to collectively attend to the challenges and opportunities of migration.”4 That same month, Malawi became the tenth country to sign the SADC free-movement protocol,5 bringing it a step closer to ratifying the document and underscoring that, although the free-movement protocol has stalled for 20 years, leaders continue to focus on it. Governments have also advanced other rights-based migration agendas, including the 2006 AU Migration Policy Framework for Africa and the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, which promote capacity-building to manage different forms of migration and highlight the developmental benefits of migration for both sending and receiving countries. Progress is also occurring at the bilateral level: In 2023, Botswana and Namibia signed a free-movement agreement allowing nationals to cross their shared border without a passport, the first such arrangement in Southern Africa.6 While systemic evidence of its impact is not available, the agreement represents an important step towards easing cross-border mobility in the subregion.

The overall picture is one of a subregion moving in diverging directions. This article discusses Southern Africa’s mobility trends and the opportunities and challenges facing the SADC free-movement agenda.

Mobility Trends and Demographics

The number of international migrants in Southern Africa is estimated to have grown by more than 52 percent since 2000 (see Figure 1). Some of this increase has been driven by rising economic disparities between countries in the region: The per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) of countries such as Botswana and South Africa exceeds tenfold the GDP of Malawi and Mozambique.7 Because legal pathways for migration remain limited, many migrants travel irregularly, often leaving them in precarious positions. The subregion also contends with significant international displacement, hosting nearly 1.2 million refugees and asylum seekers, more than half of whom are in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).8

With an estimated 2.6 million immigrants as of mid-2024, according to UN data, South Africa is by far the subregion’s top destination, hosting about 41 percent of all international migrants in Southern Africa; most come from neighboring countries.9 South Africa also has Africa’s largest economy. Botswana and Namibia are other attractive destinations for migrants from neighboring countries, due to their relatively strong economies, employment opportunities and reputations for being safer and more predictable places to work and live than many other countries in the region. However, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and the DRC host more migrants (see Figure 2). The oil sector in Angola and the mining industry in Zambia are also magnets for skilled and unskilled laborers from within the region and beyond. Yet irregular and informal migration is widespread, so the true number of subregional migrants may be higher than what is officially reported.

Zimbabwe is the subregion’s largest country of emigration, with an estimated 1.3 million nationals living elsewhere in Southern Africa, accounting for about 36 percent of all intra-subregional migrants as of mid-2024, followed by Mozambique (about 605,000) and Malawi (424,000; see Figure 3). The Zimbabwe-South Africa migration corridor has long been among the busiest in the subregion, and movements have fluctuated markedly in recent years, from tens of thousands of crossings in July 2025 to just a few thousand in May 2026.10 This and other key transit corridors have become arenas for both informal trade and migrant smuggling, often facilitated by digital platforms.11

While labor migration persists across Southern Africa, mobility has also been shaped by new challenges, and governments face an ongoing struggle to balance border management with the economic and humanitarian cases for freer movement.12 Intersecting economic disparities, sociopolitical fragility, and conflict, all of which are compounded by extreme environmental and climatic events, are collectively reshaping Southern Africa’s migration landscape.

Labor Migration Routes Are Changing

Historically, labor migration in Southern Africa was structured around extractive industries. The late 19th-century diamond and gold rushes in South Africa drew waves of workers from countries including Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.13 Zimbabwe also attracted large numbers of migrant workers for its plantations and farms.14 Colonial and apartheid policies entrenched these patterns, establishing enduring cross-border labor networks that persist today.

Migration dynamics diversified in the postcolonial era and have continued to evolve. Contemporary labor migration is increasingly transnational, connecting households, labor markets, and care economies across borders. While South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, and Angola continue to attract workers in mining and other resource sectors, a growing numbers of migrants, particularly women, are moving into occupations that sustain urban economies and households across the subregion, including domestic work, caregiving, hospitality, retail, cross-border trade, health services, and education. At the same time, many migrant men work as gardeners, security guards, cleaners, construction workers, drivers, and other urban service and informal-sector workers. These changes reflect the expansion of transnational labor markets beyond extractive industries and the growing commercialization of care and household services across Southern Africa.

Notably, these movements follow established regional migration corridors and occur through both formal border crossings and informal routes. Informal crossings are often facilitated by smuggling syndicates that help migrants navigate documentation barriers, border controls, and transportation costs while sustaining livelihoods across borders.

Conversely, economic crises in labor-sending nations—such as hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, Malawi’s reliance on vulnerable subsistence farming, and uneven industrialization in Mozambique—have acted as push factors compelling migrants to seek work abroad.15 Simultaneously, educated youth have sought to leave their home communities to pursue opportunities in urban centers such as Gaborone, Harare, Johannesburg, and Windhoek. Together, these shifts illustrate how Southern African migration has evolved from predominantly extractive labor migration into increasingly interconnected transnational labor and care economies.

Conflict and Climate Extremes

Refugees and asylum seekers in the region come from countries including the DRC, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe.16 Southern Africa has also seen significant international and internal displacement of people fleeing protracted violence in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado region and the eastern DRC. Political instability and insecurity in these conflict zones can spill across borders, as armed groups exploit migration routes for recruitment and illicit trade.17

Climate variability and change has emerged as a critical driver of mobility, both internally and internationally, as people flee cyclones, droughts, floods, and other climate-related impacts.18 For instance, roughly 400,000 people were forced out of their homes by flooding in Mozambique earlier this year, many joining the hundreds of thousands already internally displaced by conflict.19

In some cases, tensions have emerged in destination areas over access to scarce natural resources, economic opportunities, and basic services. Communities have also clashed over differing agricultural and livelihood practices, as in the case of northern Zambia, where episodes of small-scale conflicts around cultivation systems have been reported between migrants and their host communities.20 In recent years, for instance, Zimbabwe and Malawi endured a series of devastating droughts which saw millions of communal farmers lose their livelihoods and income. This resulted in significant migration to urban areas, which challenged authorities’ capacity to respond and further strained the provision of public goods such as clean water and electricity.21 While some people may go to other countries, most people fleeing droughts and other extreme-weather events do not have the financial means to obtain travel documents or otherwise cross a border.

Women and Girls

A feature of this shifting migration landscape is the transition from male-dominated labor migration toward more diverse flows involving women, youth, and families.22 Today, women and girls dominate informal cross-border trade, which is estimated to account for up to 40 percent of trade within the subregion, valued at approximately U.S. $17.6 billion.23 Yet these women and girls often face exploitation and violence: Many report being forced to pay bribes or arbitrary taxes to authorities and having goods stolen or confiscated.24 This trend is closely linked to worsening economic precarity in origin countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Challenges to Orderly Migration

These shifting trends are raising concerns among Southern African countries about how to balance the economic benefits of migration with the need for enhanced security, social safety, and stability. As regional governance approaches have largely stalled, migration controls have been left to individual states, resulting in diverging policies and practices.

In some corners, immigration has been accused of straining public resources, infrastructure, and job opportunities in host countries such as South Africa and Botswana, fueling social tensions and xenophobic violence. Perceived competition for jobs, housing, and services has escalated into anti-migrant attacks, undermining social cohesion and creating volatile environments, challenging the capacity of governments and institutions to adequately respond. Many politicians have tended to blame migrants for a range of social ills and government failures, further aggravating the tensions.

The recent demonstrations in South Africa are one manifestation of this concern, with immigrants taking much of the blame for high unemployment and other challenges. Somewhat similar displays have occurred elsewhere: For instance, unrest between locals and immigrants also broke out in Botswana earlier this year, although it attracted less political attention and media coverage.25 Elsewhere, deadly riots in Zambia in 2016 targeted Rwandan immigrants, who were blamed, based on rumors, for ritual killings.26

Public demonstrations and other protests over immigration can undermine the subregion’s integration agenda. Moreover, the resulting mistrust among SADC Member States threatens to weaken subregional cohesion and hinder sustainable development.

Crime and Security Concerns

Porous borders and strategic trade links in Southern Africa, particularly in South Africa, make the region an attractive transit zone for international criminal networks, fueling synthetic drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and illicit mineral supply chains, according to groups such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.27 Human trafficking syndicates are believed to be widespread, especially in South Africa, where approximately 158,000 people were living in modern slavery as of 2023, according to Walk Free.28 Yet public concerns linking migration to crime are often out of step with reality; foreign nationals make up about 5 percent of South Africa’s population but accounted for 3 percent of arrests in the last five years and just over 1 percent of arrests for violent crime, according to government data.29

In response to these security concerns, some Member States have tightened immigration controls. For example, South Africa established the Border Management Agency in 2023 to contain irregular migration; critics say the agency is part of a broader project to securitize the country’s migration system to be more like those in Europe and North America.30 More recently, in June 2026 the government unveiled a five-point plan for managing immigration, the first two points of which focus on increasing enforcement and tightening the border.31

Lack of Coherent Governance and Weak Capacity

Inconsistent approaches across the subregion create legal limbo for many migrants, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation and deportation. Compared to East Africa’s regional economic community, where free-movement policies have advanced considerably, SADC’s integration efforts lag.32

Economic disparities also strain the vision for greater integration, as wealthier nations resist unrestricted movement to avoid perceived labor-market saturation and welfare burdens. At the same time, climate-induced displacement is another form of unplanned migration that existing frameworks fail to address. The lack of harmonized immigration policies among SADC Member States can weaken collective security and create gaps that might be exploited by transnational criminal groups.

Weak institutional capacity further hampers implementation of the shared subregional goals that do exist. There is a paucity of reliable migration data in most countries, partly due to the irregular nature of many movements. Migration management is a resource-intensive process, and many governments lack sufficient funding and technical capacity. Limited investment in modern border management systems and data-tracking mechanisms leads to policies that are not adequately evidence-based. A lack of data also limits authorities’ ability to monitor and prevent the exploitation of vulnerable migrants. Poor cross-border data sharing and other governance gaps result in corruption at checkpoints and inadequate migrant protections.

Opportunities Ahead?

Without harmonized policies, enhanced security cooperation, and inclusive labor migration frameworks, the vision of greater SADC integration risks remaining purely aspirational, perpetuating inequality and social instability.

The lack of policy frameworks on novel challenges such as climate-induced migration is becoming a pressing issue for leaders and decisionmakers globally. Yet regions such as SADC, which are highly affected by climate change and therefore disproportionately exposed to climate-related displacement, may be particularly well-placed to pioneer new regional and continental frameworks. By drawing on their experience of recurrent shocks and the realities faced by climate-affected communities, subregional leaders have the opportunity to help shape more responsive and protective mobility regimes that could serve as models elsewhere.

Concurrently, digital migration tools, including mobile banking platforms, could enable innovative approaches to border governance that balance free movement with security needs. Digital connectivity, including the ability to send and access money across borders, allows migrants to maintain transnational ties, fostering a sense of regional community and boosting sustainable development. Students’ migration also builds regional human capital while creating lasting professional networks. By formalizing these organic integration processes through progressive policies such as the SADC free-movement protocol, the region could institutionalize these connective tissues.

Fostering social cohesion and trust-building in destination areas by including host communities in migration planning and service provision could reduce local tensions. Inclusive multistakeholder forums that include governments, civil-society organizations, and academic institutions could be helpful in spreading awareness about migration and correct negative stereotypes.

Addressing the challenges that Southern Africa faces requires updated approaches that recognize the new demographics of mobility, promote social cohesion, and safeguard migrants' rights. As regional dynamics continue to evolve, such approaches will be essential to realizing the developmental benefits of migration.

The authors’ research for this article was supported by the CGIAR Climate Action and the CGIAR Food Frontiers and Security (FFS) Science Programs. 

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