One month on from the early-January capture of Nicolás Maduro that prompted celebration among Venezuelans in Caracas and abroad, and concern among governments in the Americas, questions remain about what this latest turn in Venezuela’s long-running political crisis will mean for the nearly 8 million Venezuelans who have moved to other countries. Are these developments likely to prompt Venezuelan migrants and refugees to return to their country in meaningful numbers? Or will Venezuelan migration continue for the foreseeable future, remaining a defining feature of mobility in the region, as it has been for a decade?
For now, the answer is uncertain. The political situation inside Venezuela remains fluid, and the direction of change—toward deeper instability, prolonged stalemate, or a negotiated transition—remains unclear. As a result, most Venezuelans outside the country are not yet ready to make a definitive decision about return. Instead, most are in wait-and-see mode, closely tracking political signals, economic conditions, and security developments before reassessing their options.
Still, the scale of this question cannot be overstated. The exodus from Venezuela has been the largest displacement crisis in the history of the Western Hemisphere. Of the roughly 8 million Venezuelans abroad, nearly 3 million live in Colombia, the principal host country, followed by Peru, with around 1.5 million. Significant populations are also present in Brazil and Chile (roughly half a million Venezuelans each) as well as Ecuador (around 450,000). The United States—home to nearly 1 million Venezuelans, a population that has more than doubled since 2019—now ranks as one of the top destinations, as does Spain (with another 600,000 Venezuelans), but the overwhelming majority of Venezuelans continue to reside in South America.
The U.S. government’s heavy emphasis on immigration enforcement and deportations, affecting Venezuelans and other nationalities alike, is a wildcard. There is a clear tension between efforts to stabilize Venezuela and policies that would accelerate returns in the near term. With more than 91 percent of Venezuela’s population living below the poverty line; access to housing, education, health care, and formal employment severely constrained; and reports of continued political repression, the large-scale return of Venezuelans is unlikely to be sustainable. In practice, forced or premature return risks exacerbating fragility inside Venezuela—overstretching already-weak institutions and deepening socioeconomic stress—while also fueling irregular mobility across the region rather than reducing it.
These contradictions are not limited to U.S. policy. In South America, discussions between Chilean President-elect José Antonio Kast and Peruvian and Ecuadorian leaders have included proposals aimed at facilitating Venezuelans’ return to their country of origin. While framed as orderly, humanitarian corridors, such initiatives risk generating instability if pursued before conditions inside Venezuela meaningfully improve. And for many Venezuelans—particularly those who have spent nearly a decade in another country and have established deep social and economic roots there—return is neither immediate nor inevitable. Together, these dynamics underscore why well-rounded migration governance, rather than a sole focus on returns, is central to hemispheric stability.
Why Large-Scale Return Remains Unlikely
Under virtually all plausible political trajectories in Venezuela, large-scale return in the near term is likely to be untenable. A fracture within the ruling coalition could generate renewed instability, internal displacement, and outward movement. Continuation of the status quo without a democratic transition would likely preserve the conditions, including economic fragility and weak public services, that drove displacement in the first place, offering few incentives to return. Even under a more favorable scenario—one involving a negotiated democratic transition—return would almost certainly be gradual, selective, and contingent on improvements to employment, housing, and services, rather than political change alone.
These scenarios help explain why Venezuelans abroad remain cautious. Some may explore return if signs emerge of economic improvements, often through short visits to test conditions. Others are likely to wait for a clearer democratic transition before considering return at all. And still others, after years abroad, have established deep roots in their host countries. Families have grown, children have been born and raised outside Venezuela, and migrants have invested in jobs, education, and social networks elsewhere. For this growing group, even if conditions improve, return may be a distant possibility, and if it does occur, it may be only partial, with Venezuelans moving back and forth between lives in two countries.
Recognizing this diversity of intentions is essential. Migrants do not passively respond to policy signals; they actively weigh risks, opportunities, family considerations, and legal status options when deciding whether to stay, move onward, or return. Policies premised on rapid, mass return underestimate this decision-making and risk increasing irregular movement if the reality of life in Venezuela fails to meet expectations.
Three Policy Priorities for Stabilization
Sustain regularization and integration efforts. As conditions inside Venezuela evolve, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean—alongside the United States—should maintain and adapt temporary and humanitarian regularization mechanisms rather than withdraw them abruptly. For example, while the U.S. government cancelled Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Venezuelans in 2025, the move has faced legal challenges, and there is a case to be made for reinstating this protection to prevent large-scale returns from upsetting parallel efforts to stabilize Venezuela. In South America, it means preserving regularization policies that have proven effective in supporting Venezuelans’ labor market participation and access to basic services, preventing sudden irregularity and onward movement. There is a growing body of evidence that most regularized Venezuelans have become successfully integrated into local communities and contribute to their economies, so reinforcing these efforts helps not only migrants but also the countries in which they have settled.
Colombia offers an interesting example of how these policy tools, if paired with international cooperation, could yield an alternative mid-term option for Venezuelans in the United States. The Colombian government issued approximately 330,000 regularization permits that were never physically delivered, often because Venezuelans had moved onward, some eventually to the United States. Those who left were typically disqualified from regularization. With cooperation, Colombian and U.S. authorities could identify Venezuelans in the United States who had begun this regularization process in Colombia and wished to resume it, and facilitate their move there. This would offer temporary stability in a country closer to home, easing pressure on U.S. immigration enforcement while avoiding forced return to Venezuela under unsafe conditions. Similar logic could apply elsewhere in the region.
Coordinate through regional dialogue. Stabilization cannot be achieved through unilateral or bilateral approaches that force governments to react to one another’s decisions amid uncertainty and under political pressure. Instead, a regional conversation that involves Latin American countries and the United States—rather than a series of parallel bilateral negotiations—offers a more sustainable path forward. Platforms such as the Quito Process, the South American Conference on Migration, the Cartagena Declaration+40 Process, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States provide spaces in which governments can build shared objectives, define common metrics, and sequence policy responses in ways that reduce volatility. Used effectively, these forums can help governments develop consensus-based coordination, ensuring that migration governance supports regional stability rather than shifting pressure from one country to another. The challenge is not choosing between Venezuelans’ local integration versus return, but sequencing policies so that mobility is well-governed while conditions evolve.
Secure predictable financing for shared stability objectives. Many of the regularization, integration, and municipal-support efforts that helped stabilize migration across South America over the past decade were funded primarily by the United States. During the first Trump administration, substantial U.S. resources—channeled through bilateral assistance, multilateral trust funds, and international organizations—helped host countries respond to Venezuelan displacement, regularize newcomers, and expand access to services and labor markets. This support was a key reason why most Venezuelans remained in South America, even as some moved onward.
Reductions in U.S. foreign assistance and support for international organizations have disrupted many of these stabilization efforts. At the same time, the region is better positioned to absorb renewed investment from various sources. International cooperation structures are in place, multilateral development banks are ready to scale financing, the private sector is increasingly engaged, and civil-society organizations have stronger operational capacity. What is needed is renewed alignment between the policy objectives of partners (whether the United States or others) and regional stabilization efforts, ensuring that migration-management financing functions as a proactive investment rather than a reactive response to crisis—much like an insurance system that invests upfront in risk mitigation to avoid far higher costs once damage has occurred.
Looking Ahead
Maduro’s capture, far from resolving questions about Venezuela’s political future, has raised new ones. While some Venezuelans may explore return over time, large-scale return will not happen yet, and many will continue to build their lives elsewhere. The challenge for governments is not to wait for clarity, but to govern mobility in ways that absorb uncertainty—recognizing that integration, circularity, and delayed return are likely to define Venezuelan migration for years to come. In this context, migration policy is not peripheral; it is central to hemispheric stability.
Post-Maduro, a Measured Approach to Venezuelan Migration Is More Essential than Ever
One month on from the early-January capture of Nicolás Maduro that prompted celebration among Venezuelans in Caracas and abroad, and concern among governments in the Americas, questions remain about what this latest turn in Venezuela’s long-running political crisis will mean for the nearly 8 million Venezuelans who have moved to other countries. Are these developments likely to prompt Venezuelan migrants and refugees to return to their country in meaningful numbers? Or will Venezuelan migration continue for the foreseeable future, remaining a defining feature of mobility in the region, as it has been for a decade?
For now, the answer is uncertain. The political situation inside Venezuela remains fluid, and the direction of change—toward deeper instability, prolonged stalemate, or a negotiated transition—remains unclear. As a result, most Venezuelans outside the country are not yet ready to make a definitive decision about return. Instead, most are in wait-and-see mode, closely tracking political signals, economic conditions, and security developments before reassessing their options.
Still, the scale of this question cannot be overstated. The exodus from Venezuela has been the largest displacement crisis in the history of the Western Hemisphere. Of the roughly 8 million Venezuelans abroad, nearly 3 million live in Colombia, the principal host country, followed by Peru, with around 1.5 million. Significant populations are also present in Brazil and Chile (roughly half a million Venezuelans each) as well as Ecuador (around 450,000). The United States—home to nearly 1 million Venezuelans, a population that has more than doubled since 2019—now ranks as one of the top destinations, as does Spain (with another 600,000 Venezuelans), but the overwhelming majority of Venezuelans continue to reside in South America.
The U.S. government’s heavy emphasis on immigration enforcement and deportations, affecting Venezuelans and other nationalities alike, is a wildcard. There is a clear tension between efforts to stabilize Venezuela and policies that would accelerate returns in the near term. With more than 91 percent of Venezuela’s population living below the poverty line; access to housing, education, health care, and formal employment severely constrained; and reports of continued political repression, the large-scale return of Venezuelans is unlikely to be sustainable. In practice, forced or premature return risks exacerbating fragility inside Venezuela—overstretching already-weak institutions and deepening socioeconomic stress—while also fueling irregular mobility across the region rather than reducing it.
These contradictions are not limited to U.S. policy. In South America, discussions between Chilean President-elect José Antonio Kast and Peruvian and Ecuadorian leaders have included proposals aimed at facilitating Venezuelans’ return to their country of origin. While framed as orderly, humanitarian corridors, such initiatives risk generating instability if pursued before conditions inside Venezuela meaningfully improve. And for many Venezuelans—particularly those who have spent nearly a decade in another country and have established deep social and economic roots there—return is neither immediate nor inevitable. Together, these dynamics underscore why well-rounded migration governance, rather than a sole focus on returns, is central to hemispheric stability.
Why Large-Scale Return Remains Unlikely
Under virtually all plausible political trajectories in Venezuela, large-scale return in the near term is likely to be untenable. A fracture within the ruling coalition could generate renewed instability, internal displacement, and outward movement. Continuation of the status quo without a democratic transition would likely preserve the conditions, including economic fragility and weak public services, that drove displacement in the first place, offering few incentives to return. Even under a more favorable scenario—one involving a negotiated democratic transition—return would almost certainly be gradual, selective, and contingent on improvements to employment, housing, and services, rather than political change alone.
These scenarios help explain why Venezuelans abroad remain cautious. Some may explore return if signs emerge of economic improvements, often through short visits to test conditions. Others are likely to wait for a clearer democratic transition before considering return at all. And still others, after years abroad, have established deep roots in their host countries. Families have grown, children have been born and raised outside Venezuela, and migrants have invested in jobs, education, and social networks elsewhere. For this growing group, even if conditions improve, return may be a distant possibility, and if it does occur, it may be only partial, with Venezuelans moving back and forth between lives in two countries.
Recognizing this diversity of intentions is essential. Migrants do not passively respond to policy signals; they actively weigh risks, opportunities, family considerations, and legal status options when deciding whether to stay, move onward, or return. Policies premised on rapid, mass return underestimate this decision-making and risk increasing irregular movement if the reality of life in Venezuela fails to meet expectations.
Three Policy Priorities for Stabilization
Sustain regularization and integration efforts. As conditions inside Venezuela evolve, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean—alongside the United States—should maintain and adapt temporary and humanitarian regularization mechanisms rather than withdraw them abruptly. For example, while the U.S. government cancelled Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Venezuelans in 2025, the move has faced legal challenges, and there is a case to be made for reinstating this protection to prevent large-scale returns from upsetting parallel efforts to stabilize Venezuela. In South America, it means preserving regularization policies that have proven effective in supporting Venezuelans’ labor market participation and access to basic services, preventing sudden irregularity and onward movement. There is a growing body of evidence that most regularized Venezuelans have become successfully integrated into local communities and contribute to their economies, so reinforcing these efforts helps not only migrants but also the countries in which they have settled.
Colombia offers an interesting example of how these policy tools, if paired with international cooperation, could yield an alternative mid-term option for Venezuelans in the United States. The Colombian government issued approximately 330,000 regularization permits that were never physically delivered, often because Venezuelans had moved onward, some eventually to the United States. Those who left were typically disqualified from regularization. With cooperation, Colombian and U.S. authorities could identify Venezuelans in the United States who had begun this regularization process in Colombia and wished to resume it, and facilitate their move there. This would offer temporary stability in a country closer to home, easing pressure on U.S. immigration enforcement while avoiding forced return to Venezuela under unsafe conditions. Similar logic could apply elsewhere in the region.
Coordinate through regional dialogue. Stabilization cannot be achieved through unilateral or bilateral approaches that force governments to react to one another’s decisions amid uncertainty and under political pressure. Instead, a regional conversation that involves Latin American countries and the United States—rather than a series of parallel bilateral negotiations—offers a more sustainable path forward. Platforms such as the Quito Process, the South American Conference on Migration, the Cartagena Declaration+40 Process, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States provide spaces in which governments can build shared objectives, define common metrics, and sequence policy responses in ways that reduce volatility. Used effectively, these forums can help governments develop consensus-based coordination, ensuring that migration governance supports regional stability rather than shifting pressure from one country to another. The challenge is not choosing between Venezuelans’ local integration versus return, but sequencing policies so that mobility is well-governed while conditions evolve.
Secure predictable financing for shared stability objectives. Many of the regularization, integration, and municipal-support efforts that helped stabilize migration across South America over the past decade were funded primarily by the United States. During the first Trump administration, substantial U.S. resources—channeled through bilateral assistance, multilateral trust funds, and international organizations—helped host countries respond to Venezuelan displacement, regularize newcomers, and expand access to services and labor markets. This support was a key reason why most Venezuelans remained in South America, even as some moved onward.
Reductions in U.S. foreign assistance and support for international organizations have disrupted many of these stabilization efforts. At the same time, the region is better positioned to absorb renewed investment from various sources. International cooperation structures are in place, multilateral development banks are ready to scale financing, the private sector is increasingly engaged, and civil-society organizations have stronger operational capacity. What is needed is renewed alignment between the policy objectives of partners (whether the United States or others) and regional stabilization efforts, ensuring that migration-management financing functions as a proactive investment rather than a reactive response to crisis—much like an insurance system that invests upfront in risk mitigation to avoid far higher costs once damage has occurred.
Looking Ahead
Maduro’s capture, far from resolving questions about Venezuela’s political future, has raised new ones. While some Venezuelans may explore return over time, large-scale return will not happen yet, and many will continue to build their lives elsewhere. The challenge for governments is not to wait for clarity, but to govern mobility in ways that absorb uncertainty—recognizing that integration, circularity, and delayed return are likely to define Venezuelan migration for years to come. In this context, migration policy is not peripheral; it is central to hemispheric stability.
Latin America and Caribbean Initiative