As fighting rages on in Ukraine and the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion nears its third year, refugees who sought safety across Europe face mounting questions about their longer-term futures. Support in some host countries is waning and the European Union has yet to outline a cohesive long-term vision to address what has been the biggest displacement on the continent since World War II. Further, the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States has opened new questions on the future of U.S. support for Ukraine. Amid these uncertainties, a significant number of Ukrainian refugees already have returned to Ukraine—an estimated 1 million as of August.
For some, these visits are brief—reconnecting with loved ones, tending to family, homes, or businesses—before departing again for the security found abroad. But for others, the desire to return home is stronger, and the choice to stay signals a long-term commitment to rebuild lives in Ukraine, despite ongoing risks.
While there is significant uncertainty regarding the motivations and factors that impel people to return or stay, a recent study from Migration Policy Institute Europe (MPI Europe) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) seeks to fill the gap by exploring the extent to which host-country support shapes return considerations, and what role personal circumstances and the broader economic and security conditions in Ukraine and in host countries play. The findings, which draw from MPI Europe analysis of IOM surveys of more than 60,000 people displaced from Ukraine, suggest that comprehensive housing, educational, health, and social service support in host countries plays a vital role in refugees’ return intentions. This is an important finding for European policymakers and civil society: Host-country support may simultaneously promote meaningful integration and provide stability and resources for families to make the decision to return once conditions allow—a potential win-win for refugees, host countries, and Ukraine alike.
The Impact of Host-Country Support
While several prior studies have focused on whether Ukrainians intend to return, the MPI Europe-IOM study takes a deeper look at what drives these decisions. Analyzing conditions across ten Central and Eastern European countries, the study finds that robust host-country support may be beneficial not only for refugees seeking stability in the short term but also for those looking to eventually return home.
Return intentions were stronger in host countries with more favorable economic conditions, such as lower poverty rates and higher GDP. This finding challenges the common assumption that refugees in less supportive or economically strained environments would be more inclined to return home. Instead, it appears that strong social and economic support equips refugees with the stability and resources needed to plan a return, indicating that well-supported refugees are better positioned to eventually reintegrate in Ukraine.
However, the researchers also found that certain types of support can affect return intentions differently. Employment, for instance, is a critical factor: Ukrainians who secured formal employment in their host country were, on average, 12 percentage points less likely to say they planned to return to Ukraine in the near term compared to those without jobs. This suggests that while health care, housing, educational, and social support bolster refugees’ capacity to return, economic integration—particularly through employment—may decrease the likelihood of a swift return.
These insights challenge the commonly held assumption that those facing the most acute poverty are the most likely to return to Ukraine. Instead, they reflect a complex decision-making process that takes into account multiple factors, including safety, access to needed services in Ukraine, and refugee household composition (with those having children or older dependents less likely to state an intention to return to Ukraine).
In a clear sign for European policymakers, though, the study shows that efforts to curtail host-country support for Ukrainian refugees may ultimately backfire, increasing risks of poverty and exclusion among refugees without necessarily driving higher return rates.
A Changing Landscape
As of October, approximately 6.1 million Ukrainians remained displaced across Europe, with many concentrated in Ukraine’s wider neighborhood, including Poland, Czechia, and the Republic of Moldova. What began as an unprecedented, unified EU response in support of Ukrainian refugees after the Russian Federation’s invasion in February 2022 has fractured into a patchwork of policies that vary widely across Member States. Despite the historic activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) in March 2022, giving Ukrainians access to residence permits, housing, social welfare, health care, education, and the labor market, its implementation has been uneven and available support varies significantly, creating disparities in access to services. This shift to a more piecemeal approach, along with uncertainty about their legal status going forward, has left many Ukrainians questioning their long-term prospects in Europe. Public and political fatigue has also started to show, as countries such Hungary and Norway recently introduced restrictions on the entry of Ukrainians and the support available to them. These developments and the expiration of TPD in March 2026 constitute a changing landscape with implications for the mobility choices refugees make.
While a considerable number of Ukrainians hope to return permanently when conditions are safe (the reality is much different for third-country nationals who fled Ukraine and have little intention of returning), evidence suggests that return is rarely a simple, linear process. Increasingly, refugees are engaging in circular mobility, making short visits to Ukraine to reconnect with family, manage businesses, or tend to property before returning to their host country. In a recent IOM survey, almost three-quarters of respondents expressed the intention to visit Ukraine temporarily, with just one in ten committed to staying. These patterns underscore the need for flexible policies that support both temporary and longer-term return while also deepening integration for those who remain in the host country.
Lessons for Policymakers
With Czechia reducing free humanitarian accommodation for Ukrainian refugees from 150 to 90 days, Slovakia cutting in half financial support for those in short-term accommodation in nonresidential premises, Ireland dropping financial support from 232 to 39 euros per week for new arrivals, and Poland ending financial compensation for individuals offering accommodation to Ukrainian refugees, tangible support for Ukrainian refugees is dwindling. To ensure better outcomes for refugees, host countries, and Ukraine alike, policymakers should think twice. The MPI Europe-IOM study demonstrates that continued support for Ukrainian refugees will not undermine desires to return home—and if anything in many cases will equip individuals to make their own decisions to return when they perceive conditions are favorable. Furthermore, Ukrainians still are fleeing daily to find safety, as attacks continue and places become newly uninhabitable. Between January and August 2024, 400,000 new refugees fled from Ukraine to other European countries.
Shared Solutions: Provide Support to Refugees and Host Communities Alike
In a context of compassion fatigue and tight public budgets, continued support for refugees may not be self-evident and publics could grow restive over perceived favoritism in service provision. Governments should focus on investing in public services generally, such as housing or child care, that serve refugees and the broader population alike, based on need, not status. Investing in more inclusive support may prevent perceptions of unfairness that could spark public backlash, while also maximizing the utility of public funds by slowly retiring costlier one-off support measures. This could take the form of investments in housing that would accommodate refugees and others, or affordable child-care investments that could support the labor market participation of Ukrainian and host-country working parents alike. Moreover, Ukrainian refugees may generate more tax revenues than the cost of support measures, which may be the case in Czechia, for example.
Invest in Local Inclusion and Transferrable Skills Useful upon Eventual Return
Policymakers would do well to promote support measures that leave the way open for both robust local inclusion and a smooth return if desired by Ukrainians and when conditions allow—as well as in-between scenarios that are characterized by circular mobility. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) refers to such initiatives as dual-intent integration. Norway, for example, allows displaced Ukrainians to learn English instead of Norwegian if desired during their integration courses. In Switzerland, refugees from Ukraine have access to integration services even if their status foresees a temporary stay, and the country is promoting refugees’ employment in companies that operate in both Switzerland and Ukraine. These approaches are still in their early stages and more experimentation will be needed to fine-tune their processes and understand their impact. But they are useful trailblazers that deepen integration in the host country while investing in transferrable skills that could benefit refugees, host communities, and Ukraine.
Embracing Other Policy Innovations
Enabling refugees to engage in remote work for Ukrainian companies through host-country tax exemptions could foster self-reliance, contribute to the Ukrainian economy, and eventually allow for a smooth return for those who are so inclined. Host countries could learn from Lithuania, which exempts its Ukrainian refugees from paying taxes for remote work in Ukraine. Ireland did the same for a single tax year, 2022.
Achieving Win-Win Policies
Even as the war grinds on and host societies are beginning to show some signs of compassion fatigue, this is a time for policy dynamism and fresh ideas, not a retrenchment from the policies and programs that sprang up after the mass displacement from Ukraine in 2022.
As the MPI Europe-IOM study findings underscore, continued support for Ukrainian refugees could not only empower individuals but also bring shared benefits to host countries and Ukraine itself. Policymakers should build on the historic unity shown in the unprecedented TPD activation, recognizing that long-term solutions require decisive and coordinated action. Drawing on lessons from this initial solidarity, Europe has an opportunity to craft forward-looking policies that balance support with practical considerations, and that deepen local inclusion while also fortifying Ukrainians if they seek to return home. By prioritizing comprehensive and durable support systems now, leaders can lay the groundwork for a future that benefits both those who stay and those who eventually return.
The views here are the authors' own and should not be construed to represent those of IOM.
Policy Paradox: How Robust Host-Country Support for Ukrainian Refugees Can Foster Integration and Return
As fighting rages on in Ukraine and the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion nears its third year, refugees who sought safety across Europe face mounting questions about their longer-term futures. Support in some host countries is waning and the European Union has yet to outline a cohesive long-term vision to address what has been the biggest displacement on the continent since World War II. Further, the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States has opened new questions on the future of U.S. support for Ukraine. Amid these uncertainties, a significant number of Ukrainian refugees already have returned to Ukraine—an estimated 1 million as of August.
For some, these visits are brief—reconnecting with loved ones, tending to family, homes, or businesses—before departing again for the security found abroad. But for others, the desire to return home is stronger, and the choice to stay signals a long-term commitment to rebuild lives in Ukraine, despite ongoing risks.
While there is significant uncertainty regarding the motivations and factors that impel people to return or stay, a recent study from Migration Policy Institute Europe (MPI Europe) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) seeks to fill the gap by exploring the extent to which host-country support shapes return considerations, and what role personal circumstances and the broader economic and security conditions in Ukraine and in host countries play. The findings, which draw from MPI Europe analysis of IOM surveys of more than 60,000 people displaced from Ukraine, suggest that comprehensive housing, educational, health, and social service support in host countries plays a vital role in refugees’ return intentions. This is an important finding for European policymakers and civil society: Host-country support may simultaneously promote meaningful integration and provide stability and resources for families to make the decision to return once conditions allow—a potential win-win for refugees, host countries, and Ukraine alike.
The Impact of Host-Country Support
While several prior studies have focused on whether Ukrainians intend to return, the MPI Europe-IOM study takes a deeper look at what drives these decisions. Analyzing conditions across ten Central and Eastern European countries, the study finds that robust host-country support may be beneficial not only for refugees seeking stability in the short term but also for those looking to eventually return home.
Return intentions were stronger in host countries with more favorable economic conditions, such as lower poverty rates and higher GDP. This finding challenges the common assumption that refugees in less supportive or economically strained environments would be more inclined to return home. Instead, it appears that strong social and economic support equips refugees with the stability and resources needed to plan a return, indicating that well-supported refugees are better positioned to eventually reintegrate in Ukraine.
However, the researchers also found that certain types of support can affect return intentions differently. Employment, for instance, is a critical factor: Ukrainians who secured formal employment in their host country were, on average, 12 percentage points less likely to say they planned to return to Ukraine in the near term compared to those without jobs. This suggests that while health care, housing, educational, and social support bolster refugees’ capacity to return, economic integration—particularly through employment—may decrease the likelihood of a swift return.
These insights challenge the commonly held assumption that those facing the most acute poverty are the most likely to return to Ukraine. Instead, they reflect a complex decision-making process that takes into account multiple factors, including safety, access to needed services in Ukraine, and refugee household composition (with those having children or older dependents less likely to state an intention to return to Ukraine).
In a clear sign for European policymakers, though, the study shows that efforts to curtail host-country support for Ukrainian refugees may ultimately backfire, increasing risks of poverty and exclusion among refugees without necessarily driving higher return rates.
A Changing Landscape
As of October, approximately 6.1 million Ukrainians remained displaced across Europe, with many concentrated in Ukraine’s wider neighborhood, including Poland, Czechia, and the Republic of Moldova. What began as an unprecedented, unified EU response in support of Ukrainian refugees after the Russian Federation’s invasion in February 2022 has fractured into a patchwork of policies that vary widely across Member States. Despite the historic activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) in March 2022, giving Ukrainians access to residence permits, housing, social welfare, health care, education, and the labor market, its implementation has been uneven and available support varies significantly, creating disparities in access to services. This shift to a more piecemeal approach, along with uncertainty about their legal status going forward, has left many Ukrainians questioning their long-term prospects in Europe. Public and political fatigue has also started to show, as countries such Hungary and Norway recently introduced restrictions on the entry of Ukrainians and the support available to them. These developments and the expiration of TPD in March 2026 constitute a changing landscape with implications for the mobility choices refugees make.
While a considerable number of Ukrainians hope to return permanently when conditions are safe (the reality is much different for third-country nationals who fled Ukraine and have little intention of returning), evidence suggests that return is rarely a simple, linear process. Increasingly, refugees are engaging in circular mobility, making short visits to Ukraine to reconnect with family, manage businesses, or tend to property before returning to their host country. In a recent IOM survey, almost three-quarters of respondents expressed the intention to visit Ukraine temporarily, with just one in ten committed to staying. These patterns underscore the need for flexible policies that support both temporary and longer-term return while also deepening integration for those who remain in the host country.
Lessons for Policymakers
With Czechia reducing free humanitarian accommodation for Ukrainian refugees from 150 to 90 days, Slovakia cutting in half financial support for those in short-term accommodation in nonresidential premises, Ireland dropping financial support from 232 to 39 euros per week for new arrivals, and Poland ending financial compensation for individuals offering accommodation to Ukrainian refugees, tangible support for Ukrainian refugees is dwindling. To ensure better outcomes for refugees, host countries, and Ukraine alike, policymakers should think twice. The MPI Europe-IOM study demonstrates that continued support for Ukrainian refugees will not undermine desires to return home—and if anything in many cases will equip individuals to make their own decisions to return when they perceive conditions are favorable. Furthermore, Ukrainians still are fleeing daily to find safety, as attacks continue and places become newly uninhabitable. Between January and August 2024, 400,000 new refugees fled from Ukraine to other European countries.
Shared Solutions: Provide Support to Refugees and Host Communities Alike
In a context of compassion fatigue and tight public budgets, continued support for refugees may not be self-evident and publics could grow restive over perceived favoritism in service provision. Governments should focus on investing in public services generally, such as housing or child care, that serve refugees and the broader population alike, based on need, not status. Investing in more inclusive support may prevent perceptions of unfairness that could spark public backlash, while also maximizing the utility of public funds by slowly retiring costlier one-off support measures. This could take the form of investments in housing that would accommodate refugees and others, or affordable child-care investments that could support the labor market participation of Ukrainian and host-country working parents alike. Moreover, Ukrainian refugees may generate more tax revenues than the cost of support measures, which may be the case in Czechia, for example.
Invest in Local Inclusion and Transferrable Skills Useful upon Eventual Return
Policymakers would do well to promote support measures that leave the way open for both robust local inclusion and a smooth return if desired by Ukrainians and when conditions allow—as well as in-between scenarios that are characterized by circular mobility. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) refers to such initiatives as dual-intent integration. Norway, for example, allows displaced Ukrainians to learn English instead of Norwegian if desired during their integration courses. In Switzerland, refugees from Ukraine have access to integration services even if their status foresees a temporary stay, and the country is promoting refugees’ employment in companies that operate in both Switzerland and Ukraine. These approaches are still in their early stages and more experimentation will be needed to fine-tune their processes and understand their impact. But they are useful trailblazers that deepen integration in the host country while investing in transferrable skills that could benefit refugees, host communities, and Ukraine.
Embracing Other Policy Innovations
Enabling refugees to engage in remote work for Ukrainian companies through host-country tax exemptions could foster self-reliance, contribute to the Ukrainian economy, and eventually allow for a smooth return for those who are so inclined. Host countries could learn from Lithuania, which exempts its Ukrainian refugees from paying taxes for remote work in Ukraine. Ireland did the same for a single tax year, 2022.
Achieving Win-Win Policies
Even as the war grinds on and host societies are beginning to show some signs of compassion fatigue, this is a time for policy dynamism and fresh ideas, not a retrenchment from the policies and programs that sprang up after the mass displacement from Ukraine in 2022.
As the MPI Europe-IOM study findings underscore, continued support for Ukrainian refugees could not only empower individuals but also bring shared benefits to host countries and Ukraine itself. Policymakers should build on the historic unity shown in the unprecedented TPD activation, recognizing that long-term solutions require decisive and coordinated action. Drawing on lessons from this initial solidarity, Europe has an opportunity to craft forward-looking policies that balance support with practical considerations, and that deepen local inclusion while also fortifying Ukrainians if they seek to return home. By prioritizing comprehensive and durable support systems now, leaders can lay the groundwork for a future that benefits both those who stay and those who eventually return.
The views here are the authors' own and should not be construed to represent those of IOM.