Rocking the (Small) Boat: Novel Options to Tackle Irregular Migration to the United Kingdom
With UK voters headed to the polls on July 4, one thing is clear: Whatever party wins the election will face the ongoing challenges of addressing irregular arrivals by boat and growing asylum claims. But this could also be an opportunity for novel policy approaches and collaboration with international partners in Europe and beyond, this commentary argues.
The UK election has been called for July 4, and there is a sense that all Labour needs to do to win is carry a rather full cup of tea down a corridor without spilling it. While most of its immigration policy pledges have been cautious, the Labour Party has made a notable commitment to jettison the Conservatives’ strategy to restrict access to asylum for people who arrive on small boats. But the party has not set out what could come in place of the much-bruited but yet-to-be-implemented UK-Rwanda plan to send asylum seekers to Rwanda for processing and ultimate settlement if their claim is recognized. Whatever party wins on July 4 will continue to face the challenge of addressing irregular arrivals by boat and figuring out what comes next for the UK-Rwanda arrangement.
The number of small boat arrivals has grown significantly in recent years, fueled in part by the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, which meant it left the Dublin system and thus can no longer return arrivals from France. The high visibility of Channel crossings, which have seen a steep rise in deaths, has made an outsized dent in public confidence. Both of the main parties have been clear they will seek to broker a post-Brexit agreement to facilitate returns to France, which could help deter people from crossing. For their part, however, EU Member States have for years been laser-focused on internal negotiations on the EU common asylum system and thus reluctant to prioritize mending ties with its estranged ex. But the recent agreement of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum—which includes a focus on reducing secondary movements—may open a window for the UK government to restart negotiations with EU Member States, especially if framed around broader cooperation, including in supporting migration and development objectives in Europe’s wider neighborhood.
A new UK government, whoever leads it next, has an opportunity, however, to advance a more ambitious agenda that could help create greater unity among the British public while also showing goodwill to international partners both in the European bloc and beyond. European countries and international organizations alike are exploring models that could stem chaotic arrivals and bring more order to the process. These include engaging with migrants earlier in their journeys, before they are fully in the hands of smugglers and at risk of considerable harm, to connect them with legal work, protection, and family unification pathways en route.
The UK government could commit to creating and facilitating legal pathways for people with protection needs or ties in the United Kingdom, building on its response to emergencies such as the war in Ukraine. And it could join EU countries interested in emulating the Safe Mobility Initiative being developed in the Americas by creating opportunities to connect people with such pathways to the United Kingdom along routes. One specific idea in this vein could be to refashion, rather than jettison wholesale, the relationship with Rwanda by exploring options to replace the plans for an external processing center with a hub for returns and reintegration alongside processing for alternative pathways for rejected asylum seekers. Such an option could appeal to EU countries seeking to increase returns, who could perhaps also use the infrastructure, and show the British public that it is possible to be both humanitarian and serious about enforcement and the rule of law.
Black Sheep or Pied Piper? New Externalization Proposals Swirl
The UK-Rwanda deal and other severe restrictions on territorial asylum clearly have to go. These policies violate the Refugee Convention, force asylum seekers further underground, cause undue harm, and undermine family unification. The deal with Rwanda is even eroding the relationship between the United Kingdom and Ireland, as recent court cases have made it hard to return asylum seekers moving from the United Kingdom to Ireland because of the risk of being dispatched to Rwanda.
But what should come in its place?
If Labour wins, it will face the challenge of explaining to publics frothed up by politicians and populist media about the need to “stop the boats”—and the idea that the Rwanda deal could prove the silver bullet—that there is no quick fix or ideal solution. Unwinding the labyrinth of legislation enacted in this area could itself be a political battle.
Moreover, while the UK-Rwanda deal is often presented as an outlier, several countries are pursuing similar solutions to deter people with marginal protection needs from seeking to access asylum systems or increase the rate with which unauthorized immigrants are returned. For instance, Austria and Denmark have toyed with similar models, and the EPP (the largest, right-leaning group in the European Parliament) included a similar proposal in its recent election manifesto. Germany’s conservative CDU party, currently in the opposition, visited Rwanda in May to explore options.
Currently, EU law prevents transfer to a country where would-be asylum seekers have no connection (through family ties or having transited), even if designated “safe.” This makes such options legally unfeasible, though in May, a group of 15 EU governments called for the European Commission to “identify, elaborate, and propose new ways” to address irregular migration, including through reviewing this requirement. These proposals have been controversial, with some Member States concerned they draw attention away from the newly agreed EU pact.
It is clear that these ideas—now a part of the bloodstream in many countries—will not go away even with a change of UK administration. But these models should not all be tarred with the same brush, and not all offshore processing restricts access to protection. Pre-entry processing in the Safe Mobility Offices facilitates access to alternative pathways to the United States and other countries, even though it is paired with Biden administration efforts to restrict territorial asylum for unauthorized crossings between ports of entry at the U.S. border. Italy’s deal with Albania, which would send asylum seekers intercepted in international waters to Albanian processing centers, also has important differences to the UK-Rwanda process. While the current UK government planned to remove asylum seekers to Rwanda before processing and give successful claimants protection status in Rwanda—rather than in the United Kingdom—the Italy-Albania deal plans to conduct processing in Albania under Italian jurisdiction, with asylum ultimately offered in Italy to those whose claims are approved. This arrangement will also, in theory at least, exempt vulnerable groups and only apply to those intercepted in international waters, not individuals already in Italy. And it acknowledges the need to share responsibility rather than shift it onto neighbors; indeed, to make the deal work, Italy will need to expand its search-and-rescue operations and assume responsibility for asylum seekers in international waters.
The devil is in the details, however, and the opening of processing centers in Albania has already been delayed. One challenge will be making “on-water” vulnerability assessments to determine whether people should be transferred to Italy or Albania; such assessments can subject people who have just gone through a traumatic experience to additional stress, making it difficult to assure the validity of the assessment. The centers will also be subject to a maximum capacity of 3,000 individuals, and if processing and outward transfers do not keep pace, especially if appeals processes are to be in line with EU law, that cap could quickly be reached. As a result, the centers could fail to get off the ground or become waystations for the desperate, with the risk that asylum seekers either abscond or are detained in overcrowded conditions with limited prospects.
Options for Humane Enforcement
Without any clear silver bullets at hand, governments must continue to make the hard, but essential, investments in properly functioning and timely asylum processes and in support for protection and integration options in regions where crises are unfolding, through humanitarian and development assistance. But left-of-center parties in many destination countries will also need to engage with the fuzzier grey area of models outside of their comfort zones, including on enforcement and returns.
Along these lines, the UK government might explore returns hubs, an idea floated by some EU Member States to return rejected asylum seekers who cannot be returned to their country of origin to third countries. This model is currently unworkable under EU law, which requires that returns occur to a country of origin, transit, or another country voluntarily selected by the returning individual. Since the United Kingdom is not bound by EU constraints, it could offer its support by testing the viability of this model. As described above, this could be a way to make the best of the millions of pounds and immeasurable diplomatic capital invested in the agreement with Rwanda, especially if most returns are voluntary and connect returnees up to reintegration support or screening for alternative pathways.
Another option would be for the United Kingdom to offer solidarity with the responsibility-sharing elements of the Italy-Albania arrangement, for instance by offering support for search-and-rescue operations or providing pathways for asylum seekers disembarked in Albania to enter the United Kingdom, including through seasonal worker programs and family unification. Such an approach would take inspiration from the Safe Mobility Offices, which seek to divert irregular migrants along key routes to other, safer pathways. Such an approach would run the risk of creating a pull factor for further boat journeys, and thus the new UK government would wish to complement such efforts with expanding regional capacity along migrant routes to provide people with opportunities for local protection and integration or pathways earlier on in their journeys. Wherever it seeks to invest, a new UK government could play an important role in promoting protection-enhancing and responsibility-sharing elements of offshore processing models.
Options for UK-EU Cooperation
However, much of the fertile ground for UK-EU cooperation will come from less splashy but equally important efforts such as programs for assisted voluntary return and reintegration to countries of origin, anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking efforts, response to refugee situations in countries of first asylum, support for development and stability in origin countries, and labor mobility.
Clearly, the main priority for a new UK government would be negotiating a UK-EU admissions deal, since asylum cooperation was not in the original Brexit withdrawal and trade agreements. This would allow the United Kingdom to return people crossing the Channel illegally to France, and thus deter arrivals. But there are many questions about the form that such cooperation could take.
A classic safe third country agreement would likely not work, as the European Union has few incentives to sign up for a deal that means it would have to take back large numbers of people from the United Kingdom. Instead, the United Kingdom could seek an arrangement informed by the principles of responsibility sharing, as articulated in the newly agreed EU pact, whereby the United Kingdom would accept transfers of asylum seekers with UK family ties from EU Member States, perhaps in return for EU Member States accepting back individuals with no right to remain in the United Kingdom. Such an arrangement could achieve greater parity of numbers transferred in either direction, and could be more palatable for governments.
The new EU pact may create a solid foundation for such an arrangement. The border procedures provision, which will apply to most individuals who arrive irregularly, would provide preliminary screening to identify manifestly unfounded cases, and as a result anyone transferred to the United Kingdom after screening would be more likely to have a valid protection claim.
Though their situations differ, many destination countries are increasingly singing the same tune on irregular migration. While a UK-EU readmissions deal to replace the Dublin system of old will surely be a priority for a new UK government, it will need to draw outside these lines to better sync with partners in Europe and beyond.
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The Global Program bridges policy advice, research, and candid dialogue to design effective migration policies, drawing on global evidence and anticipating the forces reshaping how people move.
