The President of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, recently signed into law a reform of the Organic Law on Human Mobility (LOMH) that imposes stricter immigration controls and seeks to speed deportations. This measure represents a first step in responding to the country’s rising violence and restoring social cohesion. However, it should not be the end of the discussion on how to guarantee security and strengthen Ecuador's social fabric.
While the reform seeks to strengthen national security, it appears to have misidentified the causes of the violence affecting Ecuador. By focusing its attention on the immigrant population as one of the main sources of insecurity, the government may be diverting institutional resources and fueling a narrative that does not solve the country’s underlying problem.
Ecuador is experiencing a deep and sustained security crisis. The homicide rate rose from 13.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2021 to almost 43 per 100,000 in 2023, a sharp increase that has transformed daily life, altered communities' relationship with public spaces, and generated an urgent demand for state responses.
During the same period, the Venezuelan population in the country increased from 72,000 in 2018 to more than 440,000 today—now representing close to 2.5 percent of the national population.
It is not surprising that some have linked the two phenomena. But the fact that two events occur simultaneously does not imply that one causes the other. This distinction between correlation and causation is essential to ensure the promotion and implementation of effective public policies. The available evidence shows that violence in Ecuador is a response to the expansion of illicit economies, territorial disputes between criminal groups, and institutional fragmentation—not the arrival of migrants.
A recent study by economist Dany Bahar at the Center for Global Development (CGD) shows that in 2024, just 1.3 percent of all arrests in Ecuador were of Venezuelan nationals, about half their share of the total population. Between 2019 and 2025, the proportion of arrests among the Venezuelan population remained stable—between 1 percent and 1.5 percent—even as Ecuador’s violence and homicide rates tripled. Furthermore, when a Venezuelan migrant is apprehended, formal detention occurs in just 10 to 15 percent of cases, compared to 35 to 40 percent in the case of Ecuadorian nationals. These data show that linking migration with crime is not supported by reality.
More than 40 percent of court cases involving Venezuelans relate to property crimes, generally linked to subsistence economies and vulnerability resulting from irregular migration. Involvement of Venezuelan migrants in homicides, kidnappings, or organized crime is minimal and shows no upward trend. In other words, although the new law reinforces the narrative that irregular migration constitutes a direct threat to national security, the evidence points to the contrary.
The new provisions—which seek to accelerate deportations, require criminal background checks, and tighten residency requirements—could divert institutional capacities and resources that the state needs to address the real causes of violence.
Focusing the debate on immigration controls may exacerbate the exclusion of a population that already lives in precarious conditions, without full access to education, formal employment, or health services. This marginalization not only violates rights but also weakens social cohesion and deprives the country of the talent and productivity of thousands of newcomers.
This is where the Noboa administration has an opportunity: not to declare the task complete after the enactment of the LOMH, but to promote an integration agenda that contributes to the security and development of the country.
The Need for a Phase Two
For security measures to be sustainable over time, Ecuador will need to move toward a second phase of its migration policy, one focused on integration. This means recognizing that a large part of the migrant population will remain in the country and that their social and economic inclusion is essential for national stability. A key element of this second-stage agenda would be the implementation of a regularization program that allows for the full integration of Venezuelan immigrants—benefiting not only those who migrate, but Ecuadorian society overall.
To be clear, regularization does not eliminate crime. No policy does that on its own. But it reduces the social base on which organized crime thrives, and that is precisely an effective security measure. Therefore, the question is not whether Ecuador should reform its migration policy, but how to do so. Now that the LOMH reform has been approved, the implementation stage comes next. Implementation based on the mistaken premise that migration is a threat would end up acting on a correlation that does not reflect reality.
Externally, the reform of the Organic Law on Human Mobility reveals a paradox: while Ecuador seeks to strengthen its defense and intelligence cooperation with the United States, its migration narrative aligned with Washington's rhetoric of control is not in sync with the underlying interests that guide its hemispheric policy. Ecuador is providing fewer resources to support regularization, integration, and voluntary return. In practice, this leaves the country with limited tools to manage the downstream effects of U.S. policies, especially if the large-scale deportations pledged by the Trump administration materialize.
By narrowing its focus to control and enforcement, Ecuador adopts the language of Washington without becoming the strategic partner the United States actually needs. For the U.S. government, reliable allies in the region are those capable of receiving deportees and returnees, advancing regularization and integration efforts, and offering alternatives to irregular movement. Without investments in these capacities, Ecuador risks heightened pressure on already strained systems, rising anxiety in skeptical communities, and the potential for social tension—particularly in a context where security concerns already dominate the national debate. A more balanced approach to migration governance could not only help Ecuador mitigate these risks but also open doors to support from the United States and international donors for sustainable reintegration and even broader priorities such as security and conflict stabilization.
Furthermore, human mobility in Ecuador is not limited to entry. In recent years, more than half a million Ecuadorians have left the country, many following irregular routes northward, often in mixed households with Venezuelans or other nationalities. Rising deportations from the United States and Mexico could generate new waves of return and mixed transit that the country will need to manage urgently. An integration and reintegration agenda in Ecuador would not only be more consistent with Washington's interests but would respond to the country’s own migration governance needs.
Regional evidence shows that this approach can translate into greater security, stability, and development. In Colombia, between 2018 and 2022, large-scale regularization programs attracted international cooperation—mainly from the United States—and contributed to modernizing health, education, and rural productivity systems, strengthening sectors such as coffee production and horticulture. In Chile and Peru, labor integration policies and temporary permits for Venezuelan migrants helped reduce informality and social tension. A similar approach would allow Ecuador to transform its current situation into an opportunity: moving from a reactive, control-focused policy to a strategy that combines security, integration, and sustainable development.
For this reason, the human mobility agenda must become a catalyst for the National Development Plan, and its focus on productive transformation, territorial development, and the strengthening of social protection systems. A policy that combines integration, diaspora engagement, the retention and development of talent, and labor mobility can translate into a real productive boost. Integration—through regularization, a focus on reducing employment informality, and improved access to services—broadens the tax base, strengthens health and education systems, and stimulates investment and consumption. At the same time, links with the diaspora and the attraction of foreign talent expand capabilities and innovation, while remittances and labor mobility generate new flows of income and cooperation. Remittances alone now account for more than 6 percent of Ecuador’s GDP—more than traditional sectors such as bananas or cocoa—and their potential can be expanded if the country manages to connect this agenda with its vision of productive and territorial development.
Transforming the Migration Management Architecture
The current institutional architecture for migration management in Ecuador remains fragmented. Responsibilities are distributed among different ministries and levels of government without a clear coordination mechanism or common public messaging. This dispersion has made it difficult to translate evidence into concrete decisions and align migration policy with national security and development priorities.
Therefore, Ecuador should consider institutional adjustments that strengthen coordination at a strategic level—close to the presidency—to articulate efforts, unify discourse, and improve communication with the public, civil society, and the private sector. This is not a matter of taking away powers from existing institutions, but rather of organizing and strengthening their work under a single vision.
What comes next will be crucial. This second phase—which should go beyond the regulation and implementation of the new law and seek to move toward long-needed integration solutions—will determine whether Ecuador succeeds in turning a reactive reform into a modern and sustainable migration policy.
If anchored in evidence, dialogue, and a long-term vision, the new law can be a starting point for a model that sees migration not as a threat but as an opportunity. Its success will depend on political leadership, messaging clarity, and the support of the private sector and civil society, which can be key allies in achieving labor market integration and social cohesion.
A mobility policy that recognizes the economic and social contributions of those who migrate—as well as those who return—and the potential of the diaspora and the foreign talent that Ecuador can attract, can strengthen the social fabric, boost the economy, and contribute to the country's stability.
Investing in (re)integration is, in this sense, investing in security, prosperity, and the future.
Security Reforms in Ecuador Should Not Be the Last Word
The President of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, recently signed into law a reform of the Organic Law on Human Mobility (LOMH) that imposes stricter immigration controls and seeks to speed deportations. This measure represents a first step in responding to the country’s rising violence and restoring social cohesion. However, it should not be the end of the discussion on how to guarantee security and strengthen Ecuador's social fabric.
While the reform seeks to strengthen national security, it appears to have misidentified the causes of the violence affecting Ecuador. By focusing its attention on the immigrant population as one of the main sources of insecurity, the government may be diverting institutional resources and fueling a narrative that does not solve the country’s underlying problem.
Ecuador is experiencing a deep and sustained security crisis. The homicide rate rose from 13.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2021 to almost 43 per 100,000 in 2023, a sharp increase that has transformed daily life, altered communities' relationship with public spaces, and generated an urgent demand for state responses.
During the same period, the Venezuelan population in the country increased from 72,000 in 2018 to more than 440,000 today—now representing close to 2.5 percent of the national population.
It is not surprising that some have linked the two phenomena. But the fact that two events occur simultaneously does not imply that one causes the other. This distinction between correlation and causation is essential to ensure the promotion and implementation of effective public policies. The available evidence shows that violence in Ecuador is a response to the expansion of illicit economies, territorial disputes between criminal groups, and institutional fragmentation—not the arrival of migrants.
A recent study by economist Dany Bahar at the Center for Global Development (CGD) shows that in 2024, just 1.3 percent of all arrests in Ecuador were of Venezuelan nationals, about half their share of the total population. Between 2019 and 2025, the proportion of arrests among the Venezuelan population remained stable—between 1 percent and 1.5 percent—even as Ecuador’s violence and homicide rates tripled. Furthermore, when a Venezuelan migrant is apprehended, formal detention occurs in just 10 to 15 percent of cases, compared to 35 to 40 percent in the case of Ecuadorian nationals. These data show that linking migration with crime is not supported by reality.
More than 40 percent of court cases involving Venezuelans relate to property crimes, generally linked to subsistence economies and vulnerability resulting from irregular migration. Involvement of Venezuelan migrants in homicides, kidnappings, or organized crime is minimal and shows no upward trend. In other words, although the new law reinforces the narrative that irregular migration constitutes a direct threat to national security, the evidence points to the contrary.
The new provisions—which seek to accelerate deportations, require criminal background checks, and tighten residency requirements—could divert institutional capacities and resources that the state needs to address the real causes of violence.
Focusing the debate on immigration controls may exacerbate the exclusion of a population that already lives in precarious conditions, without full access to education, formal employment, or health services. This marginalization not only violates rights but also weakens social cohesion and deprives the country of the talent and productivity of thousands of newcomers.
This is where the Noboa administration has an opportunity: not to declare the task complete after the enactment of the LOMH, but to promote an integration agenda that contributes to the security and development of the country.
The Need for a Phase Two
For security measures to be sustainable over time, Ecuador will need to move toward a second phase of its migration policy, one focused on integration. This means recognizing that a large part of the migrant population will remain in the country and that their social and economic inclusion is essential for national stability. A key element of this second-stage agenda would be the implementation of a regularization program that allows for the full integration of Venezuelan immigrants—benefiting not only those who migrate, but Ecuadorian society overall.
To be clear, regularization does not eliminate crime. No policy does that on its own. But it reduces the social base on which organized crime thrives, and that is precisely an effective security measure. Therefore, the question is not whether Ecuador should reform its migration policy, but how to do so. Now that the LOMH reform has been approved, the implementation stage comes next. Implementation based on the mistaken premise that migration is a threat would end up acting on a correlation that does not reflect reality.
Externally, the reform of the Organic Law on Human Mobility reveals a paradox: while Ecuador seeks to strengthen its defense and intelligence cooperation with the United States, its migration narrative aligned with Washington's rhetoric of control is not in sync with the underlying interests that guide its hemispheric policy. Ecuador is providing fewer resources to support regularization, integration, and voluntary return. In practice, this leaves the country with limited tools to manage the downstream effects of U.S. policies, especially if the large-scale deportations pledged by the Trump administration materialize.
By narrowing its focus to control and enforcement, Ecuador adopts the language of Washington without becoming the strategic partner the United States actually needs. For the U.S. government, reliable allies in the region are those capable of receiving deportees and returnees, advancing regularization and integration efforts, and offering alternatives to irregular movement. Without investments in these capacities, Ecuador risks heightened pressure on already strained systems, rising anxiety in skeptical communities, and the potential for social tension—particularly in a context where security concerns already dominate the national debate. A more balanced approach to migration governance could not only help Ecuador mitigate these risks but also open doors to support from the United States and international donors for sustainable reintegration and even broader priorities such as security and conflict stabilization.
Furthermore, human mobility in Ecuador is not limited to entry. In recent years, more than half a million Ecuadorians have left the country, many following irregular routes northward, often in mixed households with Venezuelans or other nationalities. Rising deportations from the United States and Mexico could generate new waves of return and mixed transit that the country will need to manage urgently. An integration and reintegration agenda in Ecuador would not only be more consistent with Washington's interests but would respond to the country’s own migration governance needs.
Regional evidence shows that this approach can translate into greater security, stability, and development. In Colombia, between 2018 and 2022, large-scale regularization programs attracted international cooperation—mainly from the United States—and contributed to modernizing health, education, and rural productivity systems, strengthening sectors such as coffee production and horticulture. In Chile and Peru, labor integration policies and temporary permits for Venezuelan migrants helped reduce informality and social tension. A similar approach would allow Ecuador to transform its current situation into an opportunity: moving from a reactive, control-focused policy to a strategy that combines security, integration, and sustainable development.
For this reason, the human mobility agenda must become a catalyst for the National Development Plan, and its focus on productive transformation, territorial development, and the strengthening of social protection systems. A policy that combines integration, diaspora engagement, the retention and development of talent, and labor mobility can translate into a real productive boost. Integration—through regularization, a focus on reducing employment informality, and improved access to services—broadens the tax base, strengthens health and education systems, and stimulates investment and consumption. At the same time, links with the diaspora and the attraction of foreign talent expand capabilities and innovation, while remittances and labor mobility generate new flows of income and cooperation. Remittances alone now account for more than 6 percent of Ecuador’s GDP—more than traditional sectors such as bananas or cocoa—and their potential can be expanded if the country manages to connect this agenda with its vision of productive and territorial development.
Transforming the Migration Management Architecture
The current institutional architecture for migration management in Ecuador remains fragmented. Responsibilities are distributed among different ministries and levels of government without a clear coordination mechanism or common public messaging. This dispersion has made it difficult to translate evidence into concrete decisions and align migration policy with national security and development priorities.
Therefore, Ecuador should consider institutional adjustments that strengthen coordination at a strategic level—close to the presidency—to articulate efforts, unify discourse, and improve communication with the public, civil society, and the private sector. This is not a matter of taking away powers from existing institutions, but rather of organizing and strengthening their work under a single vision.
What comes next will be crucial. This second phase—which should go beyond the regulation and implementation of the new law and seek to move toward long-needed integration solutions—will determine whether Ecuador succeeds in turning a reactive reform into a modern and sustainable migration policy.
If anchored in evidence, dialogue, and a long-term vision, the new law can be a starting point for a model that sees migration not as a threat but as an opportunity. Its success will depend on political leadership, messaging clarity, and the support of the private sector and civil society, which can be key allies in achieving labor market integration and social cohesion.
A mobility policy that recognizes the economic and social contributions of those who migrate—as well as those who return—and the potential of the diaspora and the foreign talent that Ecuador can attract, can strengthen the social fabric, boost the economy, and contribute to the country's stability.
Investing in (re)integration is, in this sense, investing in security, prosperity, and the future.
Latin America and Caribbean Initiative