Rebuilding Community after Crisis: Striking a New Social Contract for Diverse Societies

Council Statement

By Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Meghan Benton
REBUILDING COMMUNITY AFTER CRISIS

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The 20th Plenary Meeting of the Transatlantic Council on Migration

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Executive Summary

Countries on both sides of the Atlantic have entered a new age of migration—one characterized by large-scale spontaneous flows. From the ongoing crisis at the U.S. southern border to the 2015–16 European refugee and migration crisis, spikes in migrants fleeing social unrest, violence, and economic insecurity have caused bottlenecks in asylum adjudication systems and placed enormous stress on reception, housing, and social services. The political landscape, too, has changed dramatically as members of the public have lost faith in government’s ability to manage crises and nativist populists have capitalized on public disquiet to move into the political limelight.

While the 2015–16 crisis shook Europe to its core, it now looks more like a tipping point than a singular occurrence. This intense period of arrivals, the policy changes that followed, and newcomers’ closely watched integration outcomes can also be viewed as a large-scale natural migration experiment. Three years on, there is an important opportunity to take stock of what has been learned and consider the implications for states and regions continuing to face similar challenges. While some progress has been made, most newcomers are still struggling to find their place in Europe’s highly organized labor markets and skill-intensive economies, many while living in a protracted limbo as they wait for relocation to another EU country or for their asylum applications to be adjudicated.

Although the process of embracing diversity is never an easy sprint, it is a race well underway for most countries across Europe and the broader Atlantic space.

These challenges add up to more than the sum of their parts. A fear has taken root that the social contract—the shared principles that govern how people live together—is at a breaking point. The arrival of large numbers of immigrants, it is feared, has weakened the fundamental bonds of trust between governors and the governed. Particularly in Europe, the presence of swelling ranks of rejected asylum seekers who are not being returned to their origin countries has worn away at the legal and social order. And the fragile bedrock of social democracy, liberal democratic values, is under its own form of strain amid worries that many newcomers neither understand nor are willing to play by these established rules.

Viewing immigrant integration through the prism of the social contract makes clear what is at stake for societies and institutions—and the scale of the adaptations required. Although the process of embracing diversity is never an easy sprint, it is a race well underway for most countries across Europe and the broader Atlantic space. As the pace has picked up in recent years, however, rapid social change has unearthed some deep-rooted integration challenges and brought others to the fore. Addressing them will require a combination of strategies:

- **Shoring up economic security in a time of greater need.** Europe has become a laboratory for serious thinking and out-of-the-box ideas on labor market integration in the past several years, but the process of learning where to target investments to reap the greatest returns has been understandably lagging. A large number of policy and programmatic experiments were introduced simultaneously, leaving too little time to properly evaluate them. Where consensus has spread—for instance, in regard to the importance of skills assessments, vocational training, and credential recognition—questions linger about how to scale innovations. Since many advanced economies are facing similar challenges, there is an opportunity for mutual learning.
For instance, the best value (and socially and politically smartest) investments may be those that support all workers displaced by labor market change or left behind by globalization, as well as newly arrived refugees and immigrants.

- **Fostering social inclusion, especially for those on the margins.** The sense that immigrants are living on the margins or do not meaningfully contribute to their new societies erodes faith in the glue that holds societies together. Yet, realism demands that policymakers think beyond work as the only pathway to successful integration. Not all asylum seekers and refugees will find work, given their often limited education and/or literacy, lingering trauma, and displacement-induced mental and physical health problems. Many women with families and older migrants face additional hurdles. Innovations in recent years include efforts to incentivize volunteering as an alternative or stepping-stone into work, yet such approaches have struggled to find their footing. Moreover, there are significant questions over whether these should follow or replace mainstream integration programs. Policymakers will need new ways to measure the effectiveness of investments that hold social and economic value, and to communicate their importance to the broader public.

- **Building strong communities.** Where immigrants settle shapes their life chances; poor housing interferes with the organic process of settling in and developing social ties, with adverse consequences for newcomers and existing communities alike. But few housing systems are flexible enough to accommodate dramatically waxing and waning demand. Private sponsorship of new arrivals by individuals and community groups (whether a component of refugee resettlement or asylum systems, and as an addition to or part of a country’s resettlement quota) can help address immediate housing issues and, more broadly, offer community-driven approaches to integration. But while sponsorship can alleviate some housing pressures and settlement costs, it requires resources and infrastructure to support sponsors and ensure their choices do not, in effect, socialize these costs. Innovative uses of data could help pinpoint community needs and cohesion challenges at the local level and prescribe targeted interventions.

- **Strengthening common values.** Common values are perceived as under attack from multiple quarters. While many fear that newcomers do not understand the rules of the road, others worry about values being eroded by the backlash against immigration and diversity. Governments cannot force emotional affiliation through legislation, but they can require newcomers to take part in compulsory integration courses—yet the devil is in the details. Values courses are difficult to deliver in a way that will strengthen social connections and understanding rather than stigmatize difference, and there is no easy way to “test” their efficacy. Moreover, courses that are true to the spirit of liberalism—encouraging lively debate and tolerance of different viewpoints—are rare. As a result, the most promising practices are those that cultivate debate and critical thinking, with a focus on the skills that everyone, not just newcomers, will need to live in irrevocably diverse societies.

Many advanced economies are confronting rapid and fundamental change from deepening labor market disruption, demographic change, aging, thinning supply of new workers, and fast-growing diversity. Meanwhile, the capacity and institutions to solve such problems have become weaker and unequal to the tasks facing them, leading to the breakdown of consensus and deepening loss of trust. Widening social and regional disparities have become fertile ground for political divisions, and the cacophony of new media forms has created ample opportunities for extreme voices to be heard, and at times even dominate. Yet dynamic societies are always reimagining themselves and can still find the new equilibrium point that allows them to rebuild consensus: sometimes crisis gives rise to solutions that can lay the groundwork for future resilience.
To manage mixed migration smartly and thus turn immigration to advantage in the mid-term and beyond, governments must navigate between platitudes that emphasize diversity as an asset and heavy-handed policies that try to change society overnight. To do so effectively, they will need to muster elbow grease and smart thinking that takes into account both on-the-ground conditions and the delicate political context when it comes to different forms of migration. Governments must also prepare themselves and their constituents to view integration “success” as something that unfolds over a longer timeframe and to understand that the costs of non-investment will be much more expensive in social and political terms, as well as economic ones. A more ambitious approach would be to engage the whole of society in rethinking the rights and responsibilities that living in diverse societies entails. Governments will also need to engage communities (from the private sector to large philanthropies) in both designing and delivering integration services. To deliver on this vision, political leaders at the highest levels need to put their name to integration strategies and demand buy-in from all policy portfolios.

The future is upon us. Natives and newcomers alike live in societies characterized by relentless and disruptive economic, social, demographic, and cultural change. Helping all residents develop the skills to thrive in this environment, and helping communities develop the resilience to manage change, will reap returns that extend well beyond migration and integration.

1. **Introduction**

Advanced economies in Europe, North America, and elsewhere have in recent years grappled with large mixed flows of humanitarian and other migrants that are forcing communities to adapt to rapid change and unanticipated pressures on public services. Spikes in asylum requests have overwhelmed reception and adjudication systems and swelled case backlogs, casting doubt on whether these systems are fit for purpose. And many localities are struggling to help newcomers find appropriate housing and to manage tensions over the allocation of always scarce public resources.

As governments ... begin to forge a roadmap for rebuilding communities, they must do so against a political backdrop that is radically changed.

Despite the attention it garners, Europe’s migration and refugee crisis in 2015–16 was neither the beginning nor the end of such challenges. Yet, it marked a turning point, especially alongside concurrent crises, such as pressures on the U.S. southern border. It created both unprecedented challenges for communities on the receiving end of large-scale arrivals and sparked intensive investments by governments and the private sector, creative experiments in service provision, and forays into untrodden policy territory. The lack of preparedness also helped galvanize opposition parties, destabilizing the political landscape in dozens of countries. As governments reflect on what has been learned from this period—one of the world’s largest natural experiments in how migration flows and policies shape integration outcomes—and begin to forge a roadmap for rebuilding communities, they must do so against a political backdrop that is radically changed.
Understanding the enduring effects of the massive and relatively sudden jump in spontaneous migration requires more than a fiscal audit. Challenges to countries’ political stability, the solvency of social support systems, and community wellbeing are more than the sum of their parts: they are testing the social contract itself, forcing a re-examination of this shared set of principles that governs how people live together in liberal democracies.

It has become a cliché to refer to the social contract as “broken.” Commentators have called for a new social contract to address issues as diverse as political polarization and the anger of those left behind by globalization, digitization and the untrammeled spread of data collection and abuse, and the threats of large-scale labor market disruptions. Yet in many countries, the connections—both real and imagined—between cultural angst, the cost and long-term viability of social welfare systems, growing inequality, poverty, and immigration are at the heart of public anxiety about the pace and direction of social change. The reasoning at the heart of the social contract—that everyone must both do their part and share in the rewards—is perhaps the best avenue for addressing these anxieties, by inspiring a vision of societies and futures that benefit everyone.

This report explores how the framework of the social contract undergirds the main institutions of liberal democracies, and, as a result, why large-scale spontaneous migration is so unsettling to these institutions. Next, it analyses the received wisdom in several main areas of integration—labor markets, social infrastructure, housing, and common identity and values. The discussion concludes with a blueprint for a new “grand bargain” that has the potential to bolster the diverse societies of today, and tomorrow.

II. Large-Scale Spontaneous Migration and the Social Contract

The lens of the social contract is a powerful explanatory tool for unpacking why large-scale migration flows have weakened the fundamental bonds of trust between governors and the governed. Migration crises allow grievances to bubble to the surface about how scarce resources of all forms should be allocated across society, especially in countries grappling with existing economic challenges such as the aftereffects of the global economic crisis. In the process, concerns about recent mass migration become entangled with old questions about equity and fairness.

Different dimensions of the social contract are tested in some way by the sudden arrival of large numbers of migrants not selected and admitted through formal immigration channels, including:

- **Safety and security.** The presence of people living outside the bounds of society or working in the informal economy undermines the role of government as the guardian of public

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order and the enforcer of rules that advance the broader society’s wellbeing. Growth in the population of unauthorized immigrants living in legal “limbo” as a result of various migration crises—or increased attention on their existence—thus fuels a sense of insecurity, creating an environment in which social and mainstream media reports on loss of control or crime can easily spark discontent. All it takes is one act of violence committed by an unauthorized immigrant or rejected asylum seeker to trigger a crisis of trust, despite evidence suggesting that immigrants, on the whole, are low perpetrators of crime.

- **Social protection and the welfare state.** At the heart of the welfare state is the idea of a society of “mutual obligation,” where individuals invest a portion of their income throughout their lives in return for social protections at times when they are in greater need. The perception that newcomers are “cutting in line” to access social housing or public services has long contributed to anti-immigration sentiment, despite numerous formal econometric studies suggesting that immigrants as a whole tend to be small net contributors to the public purse. In response, some governments are further restricting immigrants’ access to benefits or making admission or residency conditional on not drawing from public funds.

- **Political membership in a community of equals.** While immigration almost by definition creates a situation in which people with different legal statuses and associated rights live side by side, the increased prevalence of precarious status such as “tolerated persons” or “temporary protected status” raise new questions about how to include people in a society where they do not have work or residence rights. In some countries, the backlash against immigration has diluted the idea of universal citizenship—that all who lives in a society share

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4 The original social contract theorists saw the role of government as preventing chaos, instability, and war. Systems of law and governance enable individual citizens and families to plan their lives in the knowledge that they will not have their property stolen or their persons threatened—at least not with impunity. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994).

5 For instance, the murder of a German man by two asylum seekers sparked protests by the far right, and comments from the Alternative for Germany linking unauthorized migrants to a rise in violent crime. In fact, the picture is more complex. While crime has increased in Germany, this partly reflects an increase in violations of immigration law, and the demographic makeup of the newly arrived population, many of whom are young men, a group with a higher-than-average propensity to crime even among the native born. Other factors such as poverty and inadequate housing also play a role. See BBC News, “Reality Check: Are Migrants Driving Crime in Germany?” BBC News, September 13, 2018, [www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45419466](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45419466). In the United States, immigrant men ages 18–39 are imprisoned at a rate one-quarter of that of native-born men of the same age. See National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Integration of Immigrants into American Society (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2015), 328, [www.nap.edu/catalog/21746/the-integration-of-immigrants-into-american-society](http://www.nap.edu/catalog/21746/the-integration-of-immigrants-into-american-society).


8 For example, immigrants are ineligible for most public benefits in the United States, and the “public charge” rule issued in August 2019 by the Trump administration makes it harder for immigrants to obtain legal permanent residence or adjust their temporary legal status if they are deemed likely to avail themselves of an expanded range of benefits or tax credits. For more details, see Jeanne Batalova, Michael Fix, and Mark Greenberg, “Millions Will Feel Chilling Effects of U.S. Public-Charge Rule That Is Also Likely to Reshape Legal Immigration” (commentary, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, August 2019), [www.migrationpolicy.org/news/chilling-effects-us-public-charge-rule-commentary](http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/chilling-effects-us-public-charge-rule-commentary).

9 In Germany, for instance, 12 percent of the 1.5 million individuals with a “refugee background” (asylum seekers, people holding protection status, and rejected asylum seekers) have been granted “tolerated status,” which means they have been granted a temporary reprieve from deportation. See Herbert Brucker, Philipp Jaschke, and Yuliya Kosyakova, Integrating Refugees and Asylum Seekers into the German Economy and Society: Empirical Evidence and Policy Objectives (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2019), [www.migrationpolicy.org/research/integrating-refugees-asylum-seekers-germany](http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/integrating-refugees-asylum-seekers-germany).
equal status—further, as in the case of intermittent debate over whether the U.S.-born children of unauthorized migrants “deserve” to automatically be citizens (as they are constitutionally entitled to be) or, in Italy, the furor over proposals to give citizenship to children born in the country to noncitizens who are long-term residents.10

The concept of a social contract echoes throughout the institutions of liberal democracy, from social protections to democratic processes. It is the source material for shared values and a sense of identity and belonging, yet it can also lead members of a society to react more strongly to perceived transgressions by newcomers than empirical evidence would dictate. Despite its rhetorical force and historical legacy, the social contract may thus be out of step with this age of growing mobility. This paradox at the heart of the social contract both explains why globalization and immigration are so disruptive, and points to the need for a fundamental rethink of what it means to live together amid diversity.

III. Integration Challenges Old and New

The disruptive effects of large-scale mixed migration in recent years have generated new policy challenges but also sparked considerable policy experimentation and innovation. Some of the fundamental tenets of integration policy have been challenged—and recalibrated; understanding of what works has evolved, as has the definition of “success.”

A. Economic Security and the Welfare State

One of the deepest and most politically salient questions raised by the large-scale spontaneous migration of recent years is financial cost. Specifically, it is unclear whether newcomers will become net contributors or net drawers of public assistance; whether job markets (particularly in Europe) are sufficiently dynamic to absorb large numbers of newcomers; and when they will be able to put their skills to productive use.11

Many countries are investing heavily in integration programs in the hope that they will eventually pay off and enable most immigrants to work.12 The concern is not that current costs are unmanageable per se, but that this cohort of immigrants will contribute to the share of the population that is dependent on government support at a time when population aging is already tipping the balance away from

10 In late 2017, the Democratic Party in Italy dropped its proposed reform of citizenship laws—which would have allowed access to citizenship for children born to long-term residents, or after completion of their education—because it was concerned it would appear too pro-immigrant. See Costanza Hermanin, Immigration in Italy Between Two Elections: Myths and Reality (Rome: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2019), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/rom/15603.pdf.
11 Studies of immigrants’ fiscal impact often rely on snapshots rather than lifecycle calculations, both overstating and understating the benefits of migration. They overstate the benefits if migrants arrive later in life and have few years in which to contribute taxes before they enter retirement—and in the case of parents of citizens, they may be able to access certain benefits without having made any contributions. Such calculations underestimate the benefits if migrants arrive after completing their education, provided their qualifications are recognized and in demand in the receiving community, meaning the destination country receives most of the tax income of their working life without paying for their initial education and training. The major exception is the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2017), www.nap.edu/catalog/23550/the-economic-and-fiscal-consequences-of-immigration. For a discussion of this and other approaches, see Meghan Benton and Paul Diegert, A Needed Evidence Revolution: Using Cost-Benefit Analysis to Improve Refugee Integration Programming (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2018), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/cost-benefit-analysis-refugee-integration-programming.
12 In Germany, social payments to migrants and refugees are projected to be 21 billion euros from 2018–22, with a further 13 billion euros spent on integration measures, 5.2 billion on housing and processing asylum seekers, and 8 billion transferred to state and local communities to cover their costs, according to a 2018 report. See Reuters, “Germany Sees Migration-Related Spending of 78 Billion Euros Through 2022: Report,” Reuters, May 19, 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-budget-migrants/germany-sees-migration-related-spending-of-78-billion-euros-through-2022-report-idUSKCN11K0EG.
an affordable equilibrium. There is, however, some hope that migration could help offset the old-age dependency ratio, provided newcomers can be integrated into host societies' labor markets.\(^\text{13}\)

Whether and how much these investments will pay off remains an open question. While a sizable portion of the post-2014 arrivals have huge potential, energy, and skills, some have very limited education and/or are illiterate; those who are elderly or have considerable physical and mental health needs, including some triggered or exacerbated by trauma in their origin countries or during arduous journeys, are also likely to face limited job prospects.\(^\text{14}\) Many northern European countries, the ultimate destination for many spontaneous arrivals in Europe in recent years, have highly regulated labor markets, limited low-skilled work opportunities, and generous social benefits systems—a constellation of factors that has in the past slowed labor market integration, especially for migrants who were not selected for admission on the basis of their skills, such as refugees and family migrants.\(^\text{15}\)

While data are still limited on the integration outcomes of post-2014 arrivals, the “natural experiment” of the European migration crisis has already revealed some key lessons. There are both positive and negative stories. In Germany, a new longitudinal dataset suggests that labor market integration for recent refugees and asylum seekers has been swifter than for previous cohorts.\(^\text{16}\) While data are not yet available for the most recent cohorts of asylum seekers to arrive in Scandinavia, data on earlier groups show a promising trend; in Norway, 54 percent of those who arrived in 2012 were employed three years later (compared to 39 percent of the 2008 cohort), and the picture is similar in Sweden.\(^\text{17}\) These improvements point to some success in recent innovations in integration policy. Yet huge challenges remain, especially as relate to women—especially those with child-care responsibilities and/or from cultures where women do not usually work—and newcomers with low levels of education.

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\(^\text{13}\) The old-age dependency ratio measures people ages 65 and over relative to those of working age (15 to 64). See Papademetriou, Benton, and Hooper, *Equipping Immigrant Selection Systems for a Changing World of Work*.


\(^\text{16}\) This dataset tracks outcomes for people of “refugee background”: asylum seekers, people granted protection, resettled refugees, and rejected asylum seekers. Despite their lower educational levels and high levels of trauma, about 40 percent of working-age adults who arrived from 2015 onward were in work in late 2019, in part because of the country’s strong economy. Progress on language acquisition was equally promising; the share of refugees and asylum seekers reporting good or very good German skills was 41 percent after three years of residence in Germany. See Brücker, Jaschke, and Kosyakova, *Integrating Refugees and Asylum Seekers into the German Economy and Society*.

The de facto tolerance of large numbers of rejected asylum seekers, whose cases were deemed not to merit protection but who cannot be returned to their origin countries, also raises difficult questions about how to handle integration for groups who lack the formal right to stay and whose future is unclear. Some countries have reduced labor market restrictions for failed asylum seekers or those with pending applications, with the aim of avoiding marginalization and encouraging economic self-sufficiency; others have pushed back by limiting their rights, for instance by restricting asylum seekers’ access to apprenticeships, as has been done in Austria. Governments face a difficult tradeoff: delaying access to the labor market can contribute to poverty and public anxiety about immigration and have a long-term scarring effect on the employment and wages of immigrants who stay in the country. At the same time, governments wish to avoid creating policies so generous that they become a pull factor for future flows. A common compromise—offering temporary protection status or a reprieve from deportation—can cast people into a state of almost indefinite uncertainty, with ramifications both for their own economic prospects and those of their children.

High levels of spontaneous migration could elevate skills and locational mismatches to the defining challenge of the next decade.

These challenges are likely to persist, if not grow. The future health of advanced economies depends on near-full employment—especially given the rising costs of supporting aging populations. Many of these countries are facing labor shortages across the skill spectrum, but especially in high-skilled (and high-growth) sectors that require both a considerable level of technical proficiency and advanced communication and other “soft” skills, all of which take time to develop. It is not clear that newcomers will slot easily into these high-wage jobs, even after considerable training, or that they will have settled in a region where these opportunities exist (something shaped by housing policies, as discussed in Section III.C.). Since many advanced economies already have a combination of unemployment among vulnerable groups and skills shortages, high levels of spontaneous migration could elevate skills and locational mismatches to the defining challenge of the next decade.

All told, the skills profile and legal status of many newcomers to Europe, combined with recent economic trends, could push more immigrants and their families into the informal economy or precarious, low-paid or “gig” jobs, with risks for families’ living standards and social cohesion. Moreover, a “hollowing out” of

19 In 2000, a court ruling in Germany prompted the government to allow asylum seekers to work after one year in the country, creating a natural experiment in the form of two otherwise-similar cohorts: one whose members were made to wait one year to access work, and another group who waited an average of one year and seven months. Five years after, those who had to wait an additional seven months to enter the labour market had employment rates that were 20 points lower; it took ten years for the difference to disappear. See Moritz Marbach, Jens Hainmueller, and Dominik Hangartner. “The long-Term Impact of Employment Bans on the Economic Integration of Refugees,” Science Advances 4, no. 9 (2018), https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/9/eaap9519/tab-pdf.
20 Papademetriou, Benton, and Hooper, Equipping Immigrant Selection Systems for a Changing World of Work.
21 The gig economy, for instance, offers limited opportunities for learning the language or building social relationships with colleagues—some of the main secondary benefits of work. People performing “gig” or “platform” work are often overqualified for the work they are doing, and training to build additional skills is rare, making the risk that such jobs become a trap more significant. See Willem Pieter de Groen, Zachary Kilhoffer, Karolien Lenaerts, and Irene Mandl, Employment and Working Conditions of Selected Types of Platform Work (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), www.europarl.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef18001en.pdf. For a discussion of possible future scenarios for platform work, see Meghan Benton and Liam Patuzzi, Jobs in 2028: How Will Changing Labour Markets Affect Immigrant Integration in Europe? (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2018), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/jobs-2028-changing-labour-markets-immigrant-integration-europe.
the labor market as fewer jobs are available to mid-skilled workers, alongside labor market disruptions associated with automation, de-industrialization, and globalization, could further fuel discontent about migration and exacerbate anxieties among low-income and marginalized groups.

Creative Approaches to Economic Inclusion

Work is the engine of immigrant integration, and immigrants and refugees can be a source of dynamism in destination labor markets. But many countries have struggled to find the right policy mix to help newcomers fill immediate labor needs and become self-sufficient, while also supporting them to develop their skills over time. While this policy area has seen huge investment and innovation in recent years, there is no silver bullet to address these issues, as governments know well. Progress has been made through several strategies:

- **Unlocking potential in skilled workers.** Some countries have expanded programs to support newcomers into skilled work faster. These include innovative approaches to credential recognition that not only enable immigrants to capitalize on degrees and qualifications earned abroad, but also to have their practical competences assessed and to plug gaps in their skills and experience without having to retrain from scratch. Canada has a host of well-developed skills-bridging and job-matching programs for highly skilled newcomers—including refugees—such as the Career Paths for Skilled Immigrants program in British Columbia, which provides work experience, additional skills development and certification, and language training tailored to a migrant’s background and occupational entry requirements. Sweden has been implementing intensive “fast-track” programs that combine vocational training, work-focused language training, and mentoring for recent immigrants who will work in shortage sectors, such as meat-cutting or as chefs. Despite early positive results, however, the Swedish program is having difficulty recruiting participants, among declining numbers of new arrivals, and some tracks have had a high attrition rate. While some other European countries are trying to emulate them, it is an open question whether such program models will be able to spread and scale, especially given their cost—both in financial terms and the need to develop strong relationships with social partners to get these off the ground.

- **Creating more flexible pathways to work for newcomers.** Governments are also adapting introductory and orientation programs to the diverse needs of asylum seekers and refugees to encourage work as early as possible for those who are ready. With more universal coverage and at a larger scale, repointing these programs away from a one-size-fits-all (and generally, “language first”) model could have a large impact. For instance, in 2016 Denmark replaced its three-year integration program with an intensive one-year program (which can be extended for

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22 For instance, in Germany, applicants who lack formal evidence of their qualifications can choose to have these credentials analyzed through work samples, interviews, or presentations as part of the German Federal Institute for Vocational and Professional Education (BIBB) Prototyping Transfer project, which is trying to scale up lessons from its pilot phase. See German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), *2017 Report on the Recognition Act* (Berlin: BMBF, 2017), [www.anerkennung-in-deutschland.de/images/content/Medien/2017-anerkennungsbericht-en.pdf](http://www.anerkennung-in-deutschland.de/images/content/Medien/2017-anerkennungsbericht-en.pdf).


24 Fast-track agreements in Sweden have been established with 14 industries, covering 40 shortage occupations. See Akademikerförbundet SSR, “Snabbspår,” accessed December 11, 2018, [https://akademesssrr.se/snabbspar](https://akademesssrr.se/snabbspar).


26 Other countries including Austria, Belgium, and Norway are exploring the fast track model. See FastTrack Integration in European Regions (FIER), “#FIERProjectEU” (presentation, FIER, March 2019), [https://drive.google.com/file/d/145fwg6iA5nrSjUr8_Huhohk36HgymH_2/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/145fwg6iA5nrSjUr8_Huhohk36HgymH_2/view).
Rethinking the relationship between legal status and labor market access. Some European countries have also expanded access to labor markets and employment-focused programming for newcomers before they are granted asylum. But the extra strain on the capacity of organizations already overwhelmed by increased demand for their services has brought new difficulties, such as teacher shortages and long wait times for integration courses. A new German law grants rejected asylum seekers in possession of a vocational training contract or who have been in work for 18 months the right to stay for up to five years. However, the legal uncertainty and the discretion held by authorities to decline requests for this kind of temporary protection means that employers many remain reluctant to hire these groups or to offer them apprenticeships in the first place.

Improving newcomers’ access to jobs. Governments have sought to encourage employers to hire refugees and other vulnerable migrants without local work experience through wage subsidies, relaxed labor rules, and vouchers. For instance, the Danish and Swedish governments have brokered agreements with trade unions and employers’ associations to create traineeships for refugees with lower wages or state subsidies. Denmark’s two-year Basic Integration Education (Integrationsgrunduddannelsen, or IGU) scheme places refugees in short-term jobs at an apprenticeship salary level. And Sweden’s leading public sector union agreed to establish a new “care assistant” position to allow newcomers to work in elder care with only nine months of training. However, such initiatives have had mixed results; the German Integration Measures for Refugees (Flüchtlingsintegrationsmaßnahmen), a program that was to create 100,000 subsidized

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27 As of March 2018, 1,386 jobs had been registered in 92 of Denmark’s 98 municipalities. See Ramboll Management Consulting, Evaluering af Integrationsgrunduddannelsen (IGU) (Copenhagen: Ramboll, 2018), https://integrationsbarometer.dk/tal-og-analyser/filer-tal-og-analyser/arkiv/evaluering-af-integrationsgrunduddannelsen. While municipalities, employers and refugees all show satisfaction with the program, evidence is still lacking on its long-term benefits and concerns have been raised about the low wages of apprentices.


29 Germany has responded to these challenges by increasing the number of participants per class, increasing teacher salaries, and lowering training requirements, which added a considerable number of new teachers and courses; it has also worked to improve the efficiency of the process by which newcomers are matched to courses. See OECD, International Migration Outlook 2018 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018), 101, https://doi.org/10.1787/c3e35ecc-en; OECD, Finding Their Way, 39; German Federal Ministry for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), "Geschäftsstatistik zum Integrationskurs 2018," updated May 3, 2019, www.bamf.de/DE/Infopunkt/Statistiken/IntG/inge-node.html.

30 Currently rejected asylum seekers who cannot be returned are granted temporary reprieve from deportation, usually for around six months. The new proposals grant those in vocational training contracts the right to stay for three years, the usual length of a training period, plus another two if they receive an employment contract. People in work can receive the right to stay for 30 months. Both of these provisions are subject to a range of conditions. See Brücker, Jaschke, and Kosyakova, Integrating Refugees and Asylum Seekers into the German Economy and Society.

31 Brücker, Jaschke, and Kosyakova, Integrating Refugees and Asylum Seekers into the German Economy and Society.

jobs for asylum seekers, was massively undersubscribed, in part because of perceived red tape. The buy-in of social partners is a key ingredient of success—for unions, it is a chance to address concerns about undermining labor standards and undercutting wages, and for employers, it is an opportunity to ensure that the benefits of hiring subsidized workers outweigh the administrative and training costs.

- **Engaging employers to help newcomers build new skills.** Enlisting employers is vital to helping people upskill while on the job, resolving the often-discussed tradeoff between entering work as swiftly as possible and building host-country human capital. Multinationals and companies in sectors experiencing labor shortages, ranging from postal work to hospitality, have actively recruited refugees and offered on-the-job training. But many initiatives have been either small in scale or more of a positive PR exercise. Companies’ good intentions to open up their hiring processes to newcomers can also collide with legal barriers and bureaucracy, especially for small- and medium-sized businesses with limited resources. Meanwhile, government outreach tends to focus on organizations that are already engaged in refugee integration, potentially missing out on the chance to take a more creative approach. For instance, government could play a greater role in demonstrating to employers that supporting refugees is in their self-interest (e.g., by showing how this can appeal to consumers) or encourage gig-economy businesses to offer more in-work training and support services (such as financial planning).

It is clear that public confidence in integration policy depends on newcomers finding jobs quickly. At the same time, policymakers face the challenge of ensuring that this work offers family-sustaining wages and opportunities to learn the host-country language and make professional and personal connections. Moreover, as many of the jobs of the future will require a more complex set of skills, countries can ill afford to waste human capital. Enabling skilled immigrants and refugees to take up the jobs for which they were trained is thus a no-brainer, but governments must design skill-building initiatives for a much broader set of newcomers. Promoting on-the-job training is one way governments can help low-wage or precarious work function as a stepping-stone rather than a trap; however, countries should simultaneously seek to improve their labor market enforcement regimes and crack down on unscrupulous employers, both to protect immigrants from exploitation and to reassure receiving communities that immigration is not driving down labor standards.

Finally, many of the challenges immigrants face in this changing world of work are shared by the native born. As labor markets evolve, many workers will find themselves with the wrong skillset for the jobs on

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33 Approximately 32,000 total asylum seekers took up these jobs from 2016 to 2019, compared to the 100,000 per year quota. See Ricarda Breyton, “Flop mit den 100,000 Asylbewerber-Jobs,” Welt, July 1, 2019, www.welt.de/print/welt_kompakt/print-politik/article196142867/Flop-mit-den-100-000-Asylbewerber-Jobs.html.


35 BPost and PostNord, postal companies in Belgium and Scandinavia respectively, have been recruiting refugees. Scandic Hotels supports credential recognition for chefs, offers internships in hotels, and uses innovative approaches to overcome language barriers (e.g., working with pictures describing tasks) for migrant and refugee staff. Governments in several countries are partnering with IKEA to help newly arrived refugees gain work experience, for instance in furniture assembly. Comments by participants at private-sector dinner hosted by Canada’s Ambassador to the European Union on the margins of the Social Innovation for Refugee Inclusion: A Sense of Home conference, Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Europe, Brussels, January 24, 2019.

36 The European Partnership for Integration, supported by the European Commission in conjunction with business and trade union representatives, seeks to share good practices and improve the feedback loop between business and public authorities.

37 A survey found that European consumers, and especially young consumers, were more likely to buy from brands supporting refugees. See Tülin Erdem, Çağdaş Şirin, Vishal Singh, and Poppy Zhang, *How Helping Refugees Helps Brands: An Analysis of French, German, and Italian Consumer Perceptions* (New York: New York University, Stern School of Business and Tent Partnership, 2019), www.tent.org/resources/helping-refugees-helps-brands-europe/


39 Benton and Patuzzi, *Jobs in 2028*. 
offer locally. Mainstream programs that help career-changers retrain or translate their experience for a new occupation or sector could benefit both natives and newcomers, potentially generating greater returns on investments through economies of scale. But stronger coordination between integration and employment policymakers—especially those involved in long-term strategic planning for labor market disruption—will be needed to realize these benefits. Equally, such policy development should be tied to regional economic growth strategies and efforts to support internal mobility so that displaced workers can move to where there are opportunities (if they are able) or adjust their skills to the jobs on offer (if they are not).

**Mainstream programs that help career-changers retrain or translate their experience for a new occupation or sector could benefit both natives and newcomers.**

### B. Rethinking Inclusion for the Most Vulnerable

Compared to the intense focus on economic integration, social inclusion has often been an afterthought. Policymakers, perhaps unconsciously, have assumed that if newcomers enter work swiftly, then all else will follow. But many asylum seekers—regardless of whether they eventually are granted international protection—have experienced trauma and may have significant physical or mental health problems; others have been outside the bounds of work, school, or ordinary community life for some time, have low levels of education and literacy (even in their own languages), or are simply nearing the end of their working life. Certain groups of women are also susceptible to social isolation, especially if they have child-care responsibilities or come from communities with entrenched cultural norms against women working. These groups may never enter the labor market at all but should nonetheless be supported in becoming full members of society, suggesting the need for alternative pathways to integration.

At the same time, there are growing numbers of immigrants living on the margins of society, who raise complex issues around inclusion. These include rejected asylum seekers; migrants whose residence rights are tied to employment and have lost their jobs (and thus become unauthorized); people who entered a country illegally or stayed after their visas expired; immigrants living in shanty towns and informal settlements; or unaccompanied minors going missing in the system. Unauthorized immigrants often work in the informal economy or may resort to petty crime and begging, further undermining public trust, and they may face barriers to a host of public and private services (including, for instance, housing and mobile phone ownership). This stratification risks entrenching, potentially for generations to come, the marginalization of a subset of the immigrant population.

**New Approaches to Social Inclusion**

A comprehensive approach to social inclusion could hold considerable value if it can help prevent long-term social exclusion and restore public trust. Ideally, it would also provide alternative opportunities for immigrants not in the mainstream labor market to contribute to society in ways that still have a positive economic impact. In recent years, extensive social innovations have been developed that try to connect with hard-to-reach groups. For instance, several social enterprises have been launched to help refugees
(usually women) use their cooking, craft, or child-care skills without requiring formal qualifications, and in the process, help them develop such skills as time management and host-country language proficiency. But these programs are still primarily small in scale (typically run by nongovernmental organizations) and disconnected from mainstream integration services. Moreover, their scale means they can serve only a limited audience; pressure to demonstrate success may also lead some to pick and choose among prospective participants, with dis incentives to work with the most disadvantaged, leaving these groups chronically underserved.

While governments have been less active in this area, there are still a number of promising approaches:

- **Addressing barriers to services.** Even where integration services and supports exist for newcomers, systemic barriers can prevent some of the most vulnerable from accessing them. Strategies to overcome these barriers include offering child care to enable parents and guardians to participate in language training, or offering "second chance" integration programs for those who previously dropped out of such programs for child-rearing reasons. Understanding the touchpoints of how newcomers use different services, such as education or health care, can help unlock the value of alternative systems (and sometimes different funding sources to support them); for instance, by viewing children’s schools as an opportunity to provide language training to mothers. This approach is central to the Mama lernt Deutsch language training program in Austria that targets parents through schools. Creating one point of contact for families can help explain the wealth of initiatives available to them and better target supports to their specific needs. While most integration programming has focused on certain groups (namely, refugees, asylum seekers, high-skilled workers, and sometimes families), governments need to consider how to reach people beyond these target populations, including those in low-skilled work or who arrive through family unification channels, whose visas may restrict their access to social benefits and related services.

- **Offering alternative ways to contribute.** Governments are making greater use of volunteering and subsidized work experience as a stepping-stone to work for vulnerable groups. For instance, in Switzerland, the federal government and cantons are discussing plans to enable people without a work permit to access volunteer opportunities, which could serve as a bridge to work. Volunteering can also promote social integration. For newcomers, it can help build social ties and a sense of dignity and belonging, and it can demonstrate to existing residents that immigrants are playing a valuable part in the community. It could even enable rejected asylum seekers who are unable to work to contribute, or alleviate pressures on in-demand public services, such as elder care. Still, there are a host of practical, legal, and ethical challenges to greater use of volunteering to promote refugees’ integration; many likely lack the necessary host-country language skills or field-specific qualifications, and background checks

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41 These include From Syria with Love, a Belgian social enterprise that employs Syrian housewives for catering jobs; and Bread & Roses, a British social enterprise that helps refugee and asylum-seeking women gain skills, confidence, and language through training in floral arrangement. While economic self-sufficiency can sometimes be achieved, the primary aim of these programs is to support newcomers to feel a sense of self-esteem and connection to their new communities. See Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, *Beyond Work: Reducing Social Isolation for Refugee Women and Other Marginalized Newcomers* (Washington, DC: MPI, 2020).


44 See, for example, Station Wien, “Mama lernt Deutsch,” accessed October 2, 2019.

45 Eduard Gnesa, “Improving the Labor Market Integration of Refugees in Switzerland” (paper produced for the 20th meeting of the Transatlantic Council on Migration, Rebuilding Community after Crisis: An Updated Social Contract for a New Migration Reality, MPI, Vienna, February 11–12, 2019).
on non-nationals can be more difficult. Another key consideration is whether participation in volunteer opportunities should be required in return for social support, such as social benefits or housing, as is done in the Curing the Limbo project in Athens.\(^46\) Policymakers should also consider whether the integration benefits of offering resource-intensive services to rejected asylum seekers outweigh the risk that they could encourage illegal entry or stay.

- **Citizens’ service programs.** Some countries have experimented with making volunteering a more routine part of the integration trajectory of new arrivals who do not quickly find their footing in the formal labor market. Austria’s Integration Year Act required out-of-work newcomers to volunteer with a charity for a year, but the funds for this program were not renewed when the administration changed later in 2017.\(^47\) Few community organizations were willing to invest the considerable resources required to train and manage volunteers, so results from the Austrian program were mixed. Compulsory volunteering programs are also controversial: efforts to introduce a similar program for refugees in Germany were negatively received and painted as bringing back military conscription.\(^48\) Mainstream forms of civic service, such as the United Kingdom’s National Citizen Service, could be an alternative, non-compulsory model since they are open to all 15–17 year olds and pursue the primary goal of helping young people develop social ties with people from different backgrounds.\(^49\)

Many social integration programs may not achieve returns on investment, at least as traditionally understood in the form of immediate increased revenue and savings. Yet, volunteering could help mitigate some localized pressures, for instance, if newcomers help elderly neighbors with chores or provide informal child care. This type of added value is rarely recognized as a public good, though it could indirectly reduce government spending. But there is a fine line between using volunteering to encourage everyone to play a part in building strong societies, and stigmatizing newcomers. The most effective programs are likely those that serve everyone, and thus reduce stigma. Furthermore, some “workfare” programs have been accused of exploitation, especially if participants cannot quit.\(^50\) To be successful, volunteering and citizen service programs alike need to provide extensive training and support and hold sufficient value for participants to voluntarily sign up for them.

More importantly, perhaps, governments need to make the case for social integration, which requires knowing how to measure it.\(^51\) While several countries have sought to adapt their mainstream programming


\(^{50}\) For instance, the National Citizen Service in the United Kingdom aims to promote social cohesion, social mobility, and social engagement through programs that develop skills, encourage volunteering, and bring different groups together. A 2018 evaluation of its role in promoting social integration found that positive effects were especially significant for those from isolated communities. See James Laurence, *Meeting, Mixing, Mending: How NCS Impacts Young People’s Social Integration* (N.p.: University of Oxford and University of Manchester, 2018), [www.ncyes.co.uk/sites/default/files/2018-10/Social%20Integration%20Report.pdf](http://www.ncyes.co.uk/sites/default/files/2018-10/Social%20Integration%20Report.pdf).

\(^{51}\) Many studies that track social integration are limited in scope. For instance, the OECD report *Settling in 2018* highlights citizenship acquisition, voter participation, natives’ attitudes and interactions with immigrants, attitudes towards gender equality, sense of belonging, perceived discrimination, and life satisfaction as indicators of civic and social integration. There is no measure, however, of the social ties developed by immigrants and refugees themselves. For a discussion of ways to measure and understand the value of social integration, see Benton and Diegert, *A Needed Evidence Revolution*. 
to make it more consistent with the needs of vulnerable groups, including women. None have a well-articulated social integration strategy that explains the potential returns on investments of inclusion efforts and what role social integration plays vis-à-vis labor market integration. Policymakers may currently have limited data to guide investments, but one thing is certain: failing to invest in the wellbeing of future communities can be costly in the long run if it drives crime or undermines social cohesion.

C. Housing and Community Cohesion

The physical neighborhood in which people settle overwhelmingly determines how smoothly and effectively they integrate. Without access to affordable housing close to economic opportunities and services, newcomers can end up either socially isolated and struggling to find work (if they are housed where housing is plentiful) or in overcrowded or substandard accommodation and paying a large proportion of their income on rent (if they house themselves where housing is scarce). The locations in which newcomers live also shape their social ties, which in turn help them access job opportunities and settle in.

For governments faced with the need to find housing for newly arrived refugees, there are several issues at play. First, as migration flows to Europe have fluctuated wildly in recent years, governments have found themselves in need of initial housing options that can flex up and flex down, depending on demand. This could be termed the “Olympic Effect,” since it replicates the well-noted challenge cities face when hosting the Olympics—a need to create temporary large-scale athletic facilities and housing that can later be repurposed for long-term use by the community. Makeshift housing built for newcomers on short notice has often been inadequate for people with special needs, such as victims of trafficking and children and families, and there is a risk that it can become semi-permanent.

Second, governments need to balance the economic goal of settling refugees and asylum seekers where they stand the best chance of economic success and have the strongest networks, against the desire to distribute them evenly across localities. In this regard, they must balance the needs of newcomers against

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52 Some of these focus on labor market integration, such as Germany’s Strong at Work program, which is funded by the European Social Fund and offers career orientation and individual support to mothers, or the Irish project Building Better Futures, which supports migrant entrepreneurship. But others focus on equipping women to be full members of society even without working. For instance, Germany enables women who are not able (for family or cultural reasons) to participate in regular introduction programs to instead participate in targeted courses for women or parents. And Flanders in Belgium has a specific program for women with small children. Austria’s national integration fund spent roughly 10 percent of its budget in 2017–18 on supporting women-focused projects, while Germany’s federal refugee integration budget has had a strong focus on the empowerment of female refugees, with more than 100 projects implemented by civil-society organizations in 2017. See Monica Li, “Integration of Migrant Women,” European Web Site on Integration, December 11, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/feature/integration-of-migrant-women.

53 One exception is the United Kingdom’s new integration framework, which sets out a framework that community groups and social enterprises could use to understand what successful integration looks like across different dimensions.


55 The United Kingdom’s new integration framework distinguishes between bonds (connections to people from the same background), bridges (connections to people from different backgrounds), and links (meaning access to services), arguing that an absence of each type of social capital creates different issues; a lack of social bonds can bring social isolation, lack of social bridges can mean social segregation, and lack of social links can lead to alienation. See UK Home Office, Home Office Indicators of Integration Framework 2019 Third Edition (London: UK Home Office, 2019), www.gov.uk/government/publications/home-office-indicators-of-integration-framework-2019.

56 Sweden initially increased the allowance for refugees to encourage municipalities to voluntarily take larger numbers, but as a result it was mainly big cities or rural, deprived municipalities in greatest economic need that responded. A subsequent law made the distribution of asylum seekers among municipalities mandatory. See Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Meghan Benton, Towards a Whole-of-Society Approach to Receiving and Settling Newcomers in Europe (Washington, DC: MPI, 2016), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/towards-whole-society-approach-receiving-and-settling-newcomers-europe.
those of existing populations, especially in regions with limited housing supply or rising rent prices. For example, the rise of platforms such as Airbnb has made housing in southern European cities less readily available, while in Canada and Germany the housing on offer is often the wrong size for newcomers, who tend to be single men or large families.

Finally, governments must grapple with residential segregation, a phenomenon that is multifaceted and poorly understood. While residential segregation is one of the most frequently cited concerns related to integration, under certain conditions it can have benefits. A high concentration of residents of a particular national or ethnic group can provide the “bonding social capital” to help newcomers find jobs, and can make it easier to tailor services for the populations they serve. Moreover, placing refugees or asylum seekers in areas they view as undesirable may result in high population turnover as they move elsewhere; in the meantime, such placements can undermine newcomers’ willingness to invest in their surroundings and develop social ties with their neighbors. Yet, high concentrations of people from the same background can also limit their “bridging social capital” to other groups and opportunities, especially economic ones.

Building Strong Communities

Population dynamics are at the heart of strong communities. Population churn and a perception of rapid social change can undermine the sense of “home” for newcomers and existing residents alike. They can also trigger extensive downstream effects, from crime and social unrest to limited economic opportunities and scope for social interaction. But challenges related to community cohesion do not operate in a vacuum. Countries need to address broader structural issues related to housing if they wish to address the growing sense of scarcity and competition, and related feelings of resentment towards newcomers.

The range of policy portfolios (at different levels of government) that affect refugee and immigrant housing—including urban planning, asylum and dispersal policies, social policy, economic development, and home ownership—make developing a stand-alone strategy to address all these goals difficult. For instance, since refugees are often housed away from places that would be optimal for their economic opportunities (based on the availability of affordable accommodations), rural economic development is also an important piece of this puzzle. Some areas with plentiful housing and facing population and economic decline (e.g., much of the Northeast and Midwest in the United States) have actively sought to


attract immigrants and welcomed refugees. However, there is a risk that newcomers will not find work in such areas, or that the jobs they will find disappear as the waves of economic disruption spread, so this strategy needs to be accompanied by proactive entrepreneurship and economic development policies.

Promising interventions fall into the following categories:

- **Community sponsorship of refugees.** Programs in which private individuals and community groups agree to provide some level of social and financial support to refugees during their first year(s) in a country do two important things. They improve newcomers’ access to existing housing and to the time, skills, and personal networks of their sponsors. They also increase the supply of housing, as some sponsors may host refugees themselves or help pay for housing that would otherwise be out of reach for this population. But these programs are not a guaranteed cost savings: to be effective, they must be managed well through strong partnerships between government and civil society, and have sufficient oversight and resource-intensive supports for sponsors. Governments will also need to be realistic, since any costs sponsors initially take on will revert to society after the sponsorship period. Recent attempts to expand sponsorship models beyond refugee resettlement would allow communities to play more of a role in supporting asylum seekers. But it is not yet clear when such interventions are most helpful—whether they should target asylum seekers or resettled refugees, whether sponsored resettled refugees should be admitted in addition to or as part of a country’s resettlement quota, and what responsibilities sponsors should be expected to take on.

- **Social innovation to expand and diversify housing options.** Creative approaches to increasing the supply of housing—for instance, by unlocking potential in existing dwellings (e.g., renting basements in family homes)—while also fostering social ties are especially promising. These include house-matching initiatives that pair retired “empty nesters” who have a spare room with newly arrived refugees, or co-housing arrangements in which young people from native and refugee backgrounds share student accommodation. For example, the City of Amsterdam houses a large number of refugee youth in co-housing accommodations. Another strategy is connecting youth and the elderly, as is done through Germany’s Multigeneration Houses (Mehrgenerationenhäuser), in which older residents may step in to fill temporary child-care gaps, while communal activities reduce social isolation for the elderly. This program now has houses in nearly every German municipality, more than 80 percent of which serve populations with a migration background.

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Innovative uses of data. Another approach seeks to understand where neighborhood challenges arise to help inform decisions about allocating resources. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Origins tool has been used to understand the profile of populations down to the postcode level, enabling local authorities to understand who is moving in and out of their jurisdictions and how best to deploy housing or police resources. Of course, detailed and highly localized data need to be used extremely carefully to avoid harm to already disadvantaged groups, with risks ranging from higher home insurance premiums in minority neighborhoods to targeted police strategies that could be perceived as discriminatory. Denmark’s designation of several local authorities as “ghettos,” for instance, with increased criminal sentences within certain zones, have been criticized for stigmatizing immigrant-heavy areas.

The “geography” of integration is one of its most complicated dynamics, since it touches on issues of housing supply and rental market regulation, service provision, community cohesion, and access to employment. Structural challenges that affect the housing needs of newcomers are embedded within a larger problem: how to design social infrastructure that can support cohesive communities and build public trust. Whatever housing models are selected, governments could be more active in helping foster social ties between newcomers and the native born, whether indirectly by reducing residential segregation or directly by supporting housing that brings new and existing communities into contact on an everyday basis (e.g., co-housing or community hubs such as libraries). In all of these pursuits, governments need a better understanding of what works and how to measure success in a way that puts social outcomes front and center.

Extreme destitution and homelessness could rise in coming years. Governments face a classic Hobson’s choice: tolerating the ill effects of segregation and marginalization or extending services to—or regularizing the status of—rejected asylum seekers. While the former would place individuals in harm’s way and erode public trust, the latter could create a pull effect for future mixed flows. Indirectly supporting housing providers instead, and working with them to prioritize the most vulnerable, could be one way out of this tradeoff.

D. Common Values

As governments struggle to adapt to new migration realities, one of the greatest challenges lies in regaining public confidence in the role of government itself. Countries must build a new sense of “we” that can transcend group boundaries, while protecting and shoring up the treasured institutions, customs, and traditions that define their political communities. But while trying to build a common

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67 The Origins tool, which uses name recognition analytics to assess the ethnic makeup of different neighborhoods and pace of change over time, is being used by the Campaign Company to support local authorities experiencing rapid social change to target interventions and develop bridges between different ethnic and national groups. See Chris Clarke, “A Long Read: What Do We Know about the Five Integrated Communities Councils?” The Campaign Company, April 3, 2018, www.thecampaigncompany.co.uk/community-cohesion/long-read-know-five-integrated-communities-councils/.

68 Concerns have been raised that algorithms and new data sources could revise the practice of “redlining,” where home insurance firms designated certain areas—often with high shares of minorities and low-income groups—as uninsurable. See Joi Ito, “Supposedly ‘Fair’ Algorithms Can Perpetuate Discrimination,” Wired, May 2, 2019, www.wired.com/story/ideas-joi-ito-insurance-algorithms/. A recent report by the civil liberties nongovernmental organization Liberty found that some predictive policing models in the United Kingdom were using pieces of data that act as “proxies for race” to decide whether people should be referred for custodial sentences. See Hannah Couchman, Policing by Machine: Predictive Policing and the Threat to our Rights (London: Liberty, 2019), www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/policy/report-policing-machine.


70 For a discussion of the complexities in measuring social cohesion, see Patuzzi, Benton, and Embiricos, Social Innovation for Refugee Inclusion.
understanding of the norms and values that underpin diverse societies has never been easy, it has recently become much more complex. There are several reasons for this. First, immigration has become highly politically reactive—and divisive: it is now cited as the main public concern across the European Union (and in all EU countries except Sweden and Portugal), according to the 2019 Eurobarometer.\(^1\) It has also become a centerpiece of the platforms (and victories) of populist politicians around the world.\(^2\) The political salience of migration, and the polarization it fuels, means that integration policymakers are under intense media scrutiny, alongside overwhelming pressure from colleagues in other departments and the public to deliver quick fixes.\(^3\)

Meanwhile, a changed media landscape enables like-minded people to create closed communities of thought and discount inconvenient information—“echo chambers” in which group views are rarely challenged. The effect is to reinforce boundaries between groups, lowering trust and weakening social cohesion. Against this backdrop, attempts to forge a new consensus on immigration have often backfired or provoked defensiveness from groups on all sides, leaving less and less space for compromise and finding a common ground.\(^4\)

The nature of spontaneous migration itself has chipped away at public trust. Faced with influxes of asylum seekers and migrants in very short periods of time, the institutions responsible for safeguarding order, safety, and security can buckle under pressure. At the community level, large numbers of visibly and religiously different newcomers arriving in places wholly unprepared for them can prompt discontent and even conflict. However, concerns about the different values held by newcomers are often overblown; a recent study found more alignment between the values of asylum seekers and refugees on the one hand and German natives on the other than is often thought.\(^5\)

The challenge to common values is thus twofold: it comes from both the perceived gulf between the values systems of natives and newcomers, and from the backlash against immigration itself.

**New Approaches to Defining and Promoting Common Values**

This has all caused publics to revisit the age-old question of what newcomers owe to society and what is owed to them. This question has long been the domain of citizenship courses, tasked with teaching potential citizens about the norms of coexisting and the tangible and intangible expectations a society has for its members. But large-scale spontaneous migration is forcing countries to reconsider this model, leading some to explore ways to share this information with all immigrants, even those who will only be temporary members of a society.

- **Citizenship and values courses.** Several countries have sought to expand access to civic education courses, so that new arrivals, not just citizenship applicants, can learn the rules

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\(^1\) Immigration is the top concern at the EU level, with one-third of respondents citing it as one of their top two concerns. See European Commission, “Standard Eurobarometer 91,” updated August 2019, [https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2253](https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2253).


\(^3\) Integration policymakers have discussed how their jobs have become more challenging, with the migration crisis thrusting them into the spotlight and placing more demands on them, but without necessarily an associated increase in their budgets. See Aliyyah Ahad and Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, *Communicating Strategically about Immigrant Integration: Policymaker Perspectives* (Brussels: MPI Europe, 2019), [www.migrationpolicy.org/research/communicating-strategically-immigrant-integration](www.migrationpolicy.org/research/communicating-strategically-immigrant-integration).


\(^5\) Based on the IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey analyzed in Brücker, Jaschke, and Kosyakova, *Integrating Refugees and Asylum Seekers into the German Economy and Society.*
of the road. The Austrian program, which was developed by a constitutional expert, aims to make even complex historical and legal content easily digestible, and recent reforms seek to ensure that vulnerable groups such as women are accessing these services. Many countries have also expanded civic education courses for school children, both in response to large-scale immigration and concerns about radicalization. However, courses that focus on values in the abstract without addressing the lived experience of students can undermine their goals and be perceived as disingenuous (e.g., describing the ideals of equality without recognizing the existence of discrimination). And if newcomers perceive the process as patronizing and disrespectful to their own value systems, or if it leaves insufficient room for debate, the endeavor can backfire.

- **Teaching the skills to live in diverse societies.** A paradox at the heart of liberalism is that it encourages debate and a plurality of views, but in the context of civic or citizenship courses, teachers may also face pressure to deliver a set curriculum that conveys specific information. Instead of using such courses to impart static information about a particular set of values, countries can use them to encourage dialogue, manage conflict, and confront extremist views. In a school in Ohio, for instance, students are taught how to engage with people who hold different beliefs, including by interacting with members of some of the United States’ most extreme political groups.

- **“Nudging” social cohesion.** Policymakers in a growing range of countries and policy fields are exploring how people make decisions in practice, drawing on findings from behavioral economics, psychology, and other disciplines, to improve how people interact with public services and with each other. The Behavioural Insights Team in London, for example, is experimenting with teaching a “growth mindset”—the belief that humans are malleable and capable of change—in order to reduce aggression and group divisions among peers. The massive adaptability and resilience required of newcomers, including the ability to manage change of all kinds and remain open to new perspectives, will be needed by natives and immigrants alike to thrive in modern societies. Approaches focused on fostering skills such as these that everyone will need are therefore especially promising.

Teaching values is not a straightforward process since it necessarily oversimplifies and likely presents an idealized version of a society. Initiatives to promote national dialogue on what values are most

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76 The Austrian integration program now includes a mandatory values and language component, which the government credits with increasing female participation rates. To ensure their values course was clear and focused on the most important liberal democratic values, the Austrian government engaged constitutional experts to help refine the material. For a more detailed discussion, see Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan and Meghan Benton, *In Search of Common Values amid Large-Scale Immigrant Integration Pressures* (Brussels: MPI Europe, 2017), [www.migrationpolicy.org/research/search-common-values-amid-large-scale-immigrant-integration-pressures](http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/search-common-values-amid-large-scale-immigrant-integration-pressures).


78 For a summary of the different models and their relative strengths, see Mouritsen and Jaeger, *Designing Civic Education for Diverse Societies*.


important have been criticized for engaging only a subset of the population, or even ridiculed. \(^{82}\) Moreover, even if it is possible to agree on a society’s common values, efforts to inculcate these among newcomers can easily fall into the trap of implying that immigrants are somehow deficient if they hold different values. At the end of the day, values are as much about the “body language” of civic initiatives—how information is communicated—as the content itself.

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**Rebuilding community may not require total agreement on common values, but it will require building stronger habits of engaging with people who hold views different from one’s own.**

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Governments would do well to examine the true threat to liberal societies: the growing inability to resolve conflict as it arises and engage wisely and productively with moral and emotional issues. Rebuilding community may not require total agreement on common values, but it will require building stronger habits of engaging with people who hold views different from one’s own—something that has become at once more challenging and more critical in the era of fake news and the easy dismissal of inconvenient facts.

### IV. Seven Steps to a New Social Contract for Diverse Societies

The ultimate costs of large-scale spontaneous migration may be more than the sum of their parts. Specifically, migration crises challenge core elements of the social contract: the role of the state as the guardian of law and order, the ideal of universal political membership, and the smooth and fair functioning of the welfare system. But viewing these challenges through the prism of the social contract may also offer new tools. Rather than experimenting with what works for particular groups as part of a stand-alone integration strategy, governments must focus on rebuilding institutions and striking a new “grand bargain.” Most importantly, such a lens shows that inclusion-focused policy solutions should seek to serve everyone, and that partners need to come from each corner of government, civil society, social partners, communities, and the private sector.

A new social contract for diverse societies could involve the following elements:

1. **Mainstream where possible, target where necessary.** To adjust to being both superdiverse and hypermobile, societies need to make broad-reaching changes. All services must be accessible to and appropriate for diverse groups, including those with limited host-country language proficiency and literacy or different cultural preferences. Governments will also need to identify blindspots and blockages that hinder policy effectiveness, such as a systematic underuse of vital or preventative services, such as health check-ups or early childhood education, by drawing on cutting edge data and analysis. However, while...
mainstream reforms to services that help multiple disadvantaged groups—such as expanding subsidized work experience for everyone—may hold the greatest returns on investment, some targeted services will be needed for recent arrivals, especially during episodes of large-scale immigration.

2. **A more explicit guide to the “rules of the road” of living in diverse societies.** While many countries’ constitutions embody the spirit of the social contract, few have been updated for modern realities. Easing the frictions inherent to living together in times of rapid change requires a new language of rights, duties, and fairness. Efforts to convey information about values to newcomers should eschew the “us versus them” frame and emphasize that we’re all in this together, while also being clear about expecting newcomers to play by the same rules as everyone else. As far as possible, documents about rights and duties should apply to everyone, and not just be given to newcomers on arrival; to be credible, members of the receiving society need to embody the values they hope to teach to others. Moreover, countries should be true to the spirit of pragmatic liberalism, which is comfortable with debate, even conflict, and pluralistic in the way it encounters difference. A more ambitious approach would thus be to revisit the “grand bargain” of political membership through an inclusive process of engaging the public. To do so, countries would need to navigate tricky questions about whom to involve, what mechanisms to employ, and how to design dialogue formats to include a diversity of voices without sparking conflict.

3. **A long-term plan to protect the public purse.** The long-term sustainability of welfare systems is not only an economic imperative, it is also a social one: people need to know their pensions and related protections are safe so they can regain a sense of security in times of flux. But few economic inclusion strategies take the long view. While strategies to help newcomers build skills and access work are increasingly well-developed, more extensive lifelong learning and in-work skills training programs could better equip workers for the knowledge-intensive jobs of the future. Since job growth will also be essential in fast-changing labor markets, more extensive entrepreneurship, incubation, and acceleration programs could also yield big dividends. Expected labor market disruptions are likely to place many existing residents in the same situation tomorrow as newly arrived immigrants are today: having to develop new skills and translate credentials and experience from one context to another. As a result, adjusting licensing requirements, enabling intensive retraining over short periods of time in preparation for career changers, and better systems for recognizing skills across occupational and geographical boundaries are important investments for everyone.

4. **Opportunities for everyone to contribute.** For those with limited prospects of finding work, one perhaps counterintuitive strategy might be to forego the costs and uncertainty of intensive labor market integration programs and instead support informal and volunteering programs. Opportunities in in-demand sectors, such as home aides and “light touch” elder care, can have indirect economic benefits both for the society and the workers involved. However, and where possible, greater use of volunteering should be truly voluntary rather than compulsory to avoid charges of social dumping and exploitation, and government should engage social partners and communities to ensure such programs generate genuine value. These programs should also have the goal of transitioning participants into remunerated work, for those who can. A more comprehensive social integration strategy should also consider how to mitigate the effects of economic trends, such as the rise of precarious work and the “gig” economy, to ensure vulnerable workers are not socially isolated or at risk of passing disadvantage on to their children. A useful tool for all of these calculations would be more sophisticated cost-benefit analyses capable of projecting what the possible returns on investment of different types of integration programming would be over a generation, if not longer.
5. **A community-driven approach to integration services.** Many corners of Europe and North America have in recent years seen a swell of energy and enthusiasm among new actors eager to help newcomers settle in, from social enterprises to tech start-ups and even some blue-chip corporations. This is challenging policymakers and civil society to rethink how best to deliver integration services. Such services have typically been provided by governments and their civil-society partners, and these mainstream services will remain important; however, engaging communities—including immigrants and refugees—in the design and delivery of services in organic ways can help them develop a stake in this process. This is already happening across the social innovation sector. Co-housing schemes that pair young refugees with young native-born students, for instance, and especially those where residents come together to deliberate and decide on the common rules they will all be bound by, are a microcosm of what such a decentralized, community-driven approach to integration services could look like. Governments and large philanthropies could support this by playing a convening, evaluating, and brokering role: reducing the risk of duplication, ensuring that effective solutions are sustained and scaled, and helping good ideas spread.

6. **Joined-up integration governance and strong political leadership.** Governments have long paid lip service to the idea of a “whole-of-government” approach to diversity and integration, but whether any have achieved this ideal in practice is highly questionable. Truly joined-up government is about more than mere working groups; it requires leadership from the highest levels to understand and embrace a program’s strategic vision and direction and make the case for investments in integration so that politicians and officials from different portfolios understand what it means for their work. Moreover, political leaders will have to think of integration policy as something that extends beyond newcomers alone, viewing it instead as a tool to address broader social maladies, such as inequality. This demands new ways of thinking and talking about these issues that may, perhaps paradoxically, outgrow the language and governance of integration itself.

7. **Smarter approach to innovation, evaluation, and policy transfer.** In all of this, there is a vital need for experimentation and evaluation—but within certain parameters. Within integration policy, the constant appetite for new projects and success stories, especially in this age of social media and the cacophony of news sources, is not conducive to patient and rigorous evaluation over the long term. Copying, the essence of policy transfer, can help spread learning, but countries need to be careful about how they extrapolate and apply lessons to different contexts and avoid transferring novelty for novelty’s sake. A more systematic and “scientific” approach to integration involves understanding ideas, the conditions under which they succeed, and how to adapt and employ them in a new context. An integration program for everyone must move beyond the by-now trite conceptualizing of integration as a two-way process and avoid comparing the outcomes of newcomers and natives as if they are monolithic groups. Integration should instead be recast as a process of collective and ongoing adaptation to change of all kinds—demographic, social, economic, and political—and one that involves multiple moving parts. To that end, it is time to stop talking about an integrated society as a mythical endpoint. Instead, the conversation should be focused on the skills that all residents need to develop to handle change, and the resilience that communities need to build to allow them to withstand shocks, including those related to migration. It is time for integration policy to cast off its skin and enter a new age of maturity.
Works Cited


About the Authors

**Demetrios G. Papademetriou** is a Distinguished Transatlantic Fellow at the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), which he co-founded and led as its first President until 2014 and where he remains President Emeritus and a member of the Board of Trustees. He served until 2018 as the founding President of MPI Europe, a nonprofit, independent research institute in Brussels that aims to promote a better understanding of migration trends and effects within Europe; he remains on MPI Europe’s Administrative Council and chairs its Advisory Board.

He is the convener of the Transatlantic Council on Migration, which is composed of senior public figures, business leaders, and public intellectuals from Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia. He also convened the Regional Migration Study Group in 2011–15, an initiative that has proposed and is promoting multi-stakeholder support for new regional and collaborative approaches to migration, competitiveness, and human-capital development for the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Central America.

Dr. Papademetriou co-founded *Metropolis: An International Forum for Research and Policy on Migration and Cities* (which he led as International Chair for the initiative’s first five years and where he continues to serve as International Chair Emeritus); and has served as Chair of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Migration (2009–11); Founding Chair of the Advisory Board of the Open Society Foundations’ International Migration Initiative (2010–15); Chair of the Migration Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Director for Immigration Policy and Research at the U.S. Department of Labor and Chair of the Secretary of Labor’s Immigration Policy Task Force; and Executive Editor of the *International Migration Review*.

He has published more than 270 books, articles, monographs, and research reports on a wide array of migration topics, lectures widely on all aspects of immigration and immigrant integration policy, and advises foundations and other grant-making organizations, civil-society groups, and senior government and political party officials, in dozens of countries (including numerous European Union Member States while they hold the rotating EU presidency).

Dr. Papademetriou holds a PhD in comparative public policy and international relations (1976) from the University of Maryland and has taught at the universities of Maryland, Duke, American, and New School for Social Research.

**Meghan Benton** is Director of Research for the International Program at MPI as well as for MPI Europe. Her areas of expertise are immigrant integration (especially labor market integration and integration at the local level) and the role of technological and social innovation in immigration and integration policy. She also has an interest in labor migration and mobility; she has written extensively on Brexit and free movement, as well as on how labor market disruption affects immigration and integration. She convenes MPI Europe’s Integration Futures Working Group, which seeks to develop a forward-looking agenda for integration policy in Europe.

Dr. Benton previously was a Senior Researcher at Nesta, the United Kingdom’s innovation body, where she led projects on digital government and the future of local public services. Prior to joining Nesta, she was a Policy Analyst at MPI from 2012–15, where she co-led an MPI-International Labor
Organization six-country project on pathways to skilled work for newly arrived immigrants in Europe. She also worked on Project UPSTREAM, a four-country project on mainstreaming immigrant integration in the European Union. Previously, she worked for the Constitution Unit at University College London and the Institute for Public Policy Research.

Dr. Benton received her PhD in political science from University College London in 2010, where her PhD research focused on citizenship and the rights of noncitizens. She also holds a master’s degree in legal and political theory (with distinction) from University College London, and a bachelor’s degree in philosophy and literature from Warwick University.
The Migration Policy Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank dedicated to the study of the movement of people worldwide. MPI provides analysis, development, and evaluation of migration and refugee policies at the local, national, and international levels. It aims to meet the rising demand for pragmatic and thoughtful responses to the challenges and opportunities that large-scale migration, whether voluntary or forced, presents to communities and institutions in an increasingly integrated world.

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