SPAIN: NEW EMIGRATION POLICIES NEEDED FOR AN EMERGING DIASPORA

By Joaquín Arango
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Executive Summary

After experiencing two decades of high immigration, with the foreign-born population quadrupling from 1.5 million to 6.5 million between 2000 and 2008, Spain has once again become a country of net emigration as a result of the economic crisis. Between 2008 and 2014 nearly 2.6 million people left Spain (nearly half a million in both 2013 and 2014), and the total population declined by half a million in 2013. High unemployment levels, particularly among immigrants and youth, coupled with a lack of professional opportunities and low wages are driving many people to seek work overseas. In 2014, 53 percent of all youth and 33 percent of immigrants were unemployed, compared with 25 percent among the general population. Though many of those emigrating are immigrants—who are either returning to their country of origin or moving on to a third country—the public imagination has been captured by the narrative of Spain losing a generation of young, talented, native-born Spaniards to opportunities overseas. Gaps in official data collection, meanwhile, make it difficult to precisely evaluate how many people are leaving Spain, or to identify their socioeconomic background, reasons for leaving, and plans (if any) for return.

Earlier waves of emigrants were predominantly male, had low levels of education, and often ended up as low-skilled laborers elsewhere in Europe or Latin America. Available data suggest many of those emigrating overseas today, by contrast, are highly skilled in valued fields such as science, medicine, and academia. Many nurses and other health professionals, engineers, architects, scientists, and academics have left, sparking shortages that are difficult to fill. Continuing budget cuts and still high unemployment rates mean that this exodus of talent is unlikely to slow anytime soon.

The public imagination has been captured by the narrative of Spain losing a generation of young, talented, native-born Spaniards to opportunities overseas.

It is unclear what the longer-term consequences of today’s emigration will be. In the short term the departure of underemployed graduates may serve as a safety valve, relieving pressure on an underperforming labor market and allowing young people to acquire valuable skills and experience overseas. However, prolonged emigration has yet to impact unemployment levels; this could have worrying implications for Spain’s economic growth in the long term, potentially slowing economic growth, threatening the repayment of public and private debt, and placing additional strain on Spain’s social security system.

The Spanish government’s reaction to this emigration has been muted. Many of the government’s emigration and diaspora engagement policies date back to earlier waves of emigration, prior to the 1980s. Thus, these policies are not tailored to today’s outflows or context, and consequently risk missing out on opportunities to build and maintain strong links with Spain’s growing diaspora. There are, however, some promising policy directions on the horizon. The Secretary General of Immigration and Emigration (SGIE) now provides information online on job opportunities overseas for unemployed young people, and is beginning to fund initiatives through Spanish consulates to help integrate Spaniards at destination. Another recently funded SGIE initiative encourages Spanish citizens living abroad to return—on a temporary or permanent basis—to set up businesses. Spain is also signatory to approximately 20 bilateral agreements on the portability of social security benefits, as well as the Latin America–wide Multilateral Agreement on Social Security, which enables Spanish citizens to preserve and eventually transfer their benefits upon return.

Nevertheless, Spain can keep building on its efforts by taking full advantage of the possibilities for diaspora engagement offered by modern technology, and incorporating valuable lessons in successful diaspora
engagement from other high-income countries.

I. Introduction

As in many of its European neighbors, the recent economic downturn has transformed migration patterns in Spain. An impressive immigration boom was replaced by a new reality: negative net migration. Those leaving have included both immigrants returning home or moving to a third country, and Spanish-born emigrants.

Even though immigrants comprise a substantial share of outflows, the Spanish public has been most interested in the departure of native-born Spaniards. Since 2011 their emigration has overshadowed that of immigrants—or the reality that more than 6 million foreign born remain in the country. Frequent media references to a “lost generation” of talented young Spaniards and brain drain contribute to the pessimistic, gloomy atmosphere that has followed the economic crisis and astronomical levels of unemployment.

Yet, the true volume of current outflows and their future significance are uncertain. While there is expert consensus that official data underestimate how many people are leaving Spain, media estimates and public perception are probably exaggerated. The statistical portrait of the new emigrants is no less hazy. It is uncertain whether this emigration is a temporary, short-term trend that will recede as the economy recovers—something that is already happening—or a longer-term phenomenon. Policymakers do not seem to share the public’s pessimistic outlook, but instead downplay the scale of emigration and frame it in the context of a new era of mobility, and as a safety valve that mitigates unemployment (especially among youth).

Meanwhile, most policies to engage Spaniards overseas date back to earlier waves of emigration—before the start of mass immigration to Spain in the 1980s—and thus are not tailored to the new outflows. Amid extensive media coverage and public debate on the recent wave of emigration and its potential consequences for Spain, policymakers have started to roll out some new initiatives. Yet systematic and sustained policy development is difficult amid sparse data.

This report begins with a discussion of Spain’s changing migration patterns, including obstacles to accurately measuring them. It pays special attention to the emigration of young, native-born Spaniards and the possible effects of their emigration. The report goes on to describe policies geared toward engaging the increasing number of Spaniards abroad, distinguishing between those that address past emigrants and those suited to the new context emerging from the crisis.

II. From Boom to Gloom

Spain has experienced three extreme shifts since the start of the 21st century that have each shaped its policy approach to managing mobility: (1) sustained economic growth followed by a protracted recession; (2) vigorous job creation replaced by skyrocketing unemployment; and (3) massive inflows of migrants giving way to a balance of in- and outflows that, if anything, favors emigration.
A. Before the Crisis: Large-Scale Immigration and Economic Growth

Spain’s foreign-born population grew rapidly between 2000 and 2008, quadrupling from 1.5 million to 6 million. The foreign-born share of the total population rose from less than 4 percent to 14 percent in the same timeframe, a change that took 40 or 50 years in other countries. In those years Spain was the largest receiver of immigrants in the European Union (EU), and second among members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The immigration boom put Spain among the world’s top ten countries with the largest populations of foreign-born residents.

The main driver of the immigration boom was sustained economic growth between 1995 and 2007, at rates above the EU average, particularly in lower-skilled occupations such as construction. A building boom took place, facilitated by low interest rates; in 2006 more dwellings were built in Spain than in Germany, France, and Italy combined. Between 2000 and 2007 total employment increased at a yearly rate of 4.4 percent, creating 700,000 net new jobs every year, primarily in the construction and services sectors. In a country with an aging population, the result was a seemingly unquenchable demand for foreign labor.

B. Evaluating the Impact of the Recession

In 2008 the international financial crisis put an end to this sustained period of growth, and sparked a deep recession. Spain’s construction sector was the first and hardest hit as the property market collapsed, disproportionately affecting immigrant workers.

The major consequence of the recession in Spain has been high unemployment, particularly for young people and immigrants. Unemployment rates reached astronomical levels in 2013, before falling slightly in 2014: 25 percent for the general population and 33 percent for immigrants in 2014, and 53 percent among youth. The picture is, however, gradually improving: youth unemployment in 2014 was two percentage points lower than in 2013, and the share of young people not in education, employment or training fell slightly from 23 percent in 2013 to 21 percent in 2014.

The crisis disproportionately affected lower-skilled workers and men, as occupations in the service sector...
that employ higher shares of women proved more resilient.\textsuperscript{9} The foreign-born population suffered the largest loss of jobs among salaried workers and the largest increase in welfare recipients, when compared with precrisis years.\textsuperscript{10} Younger workers have also suffered; many had been employed only a short time or were on a temporary contract at the time of the crisis.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{Although immigration has not ceased, it has been overshadowed by the emigration of both immigrants and natives.}

As a result, migration patterns have undergone a drastic change since mid-2008, as inflows have decreased and outflows increased. According to official data 2,165,000 people left Spain between 2008 and 2013, of whom 289,000 were Spanish citizens (201,000 native born and 88,000 naturalized).\textsuperscript{12} Net migration was slightly negative in 2012, and more clearly so in 2013. In 2013 the total population declined by 358,000, of which 252,000 were accounted for by negative net migration.\textsuperscript{13} The emigration of foreign-born residents—mainly from Latin American countries (especially from the Andean region), Morocco, and Romania—peaked in 2010 but has continued in subsequent years, while emigration of native-born Spaniards has risen rapidly since 2010.\textsuperscript{14} Although immigration has not ceased, it has been overshadowed by the emigration of both immigrants and natives. This report focuses on the emigration of native-born Spaniards, which has captured public attention even as researchers struggle to quantify its extent.

\section*{III. What Is Known About the Emigration of Spanish Citizens}

Spanish citizens make up a small proportion of those who have left the country since the start of the crisis: officially not more than 13 percent,\textsuperscript{15} though this may be a substantial underestimate (see Box 1),

\textsuperscript{9} Josep Oliver Alonso, “La inmigración y la doble recesión del mercado de trabajo en España, 2011-2012,” in Inmigración y crisis: entre la continuidad y el cambio, Anuario de la Inmigración en España, eds. Eliseo Aja, Joaquín Arango, and Josep Oliver Alonso (Barcelona: Cidob Ediciones, 2013); Rodríguez-Planas and Nollenberger, A Precarious Position.


considering mismatches with official sources in select destination countries. For example, the increase in the number of native-born Spaniards of working age registered in British or German sources is between four and seven times higher than corresponding numbers in the Register of Spaniards Living Abroad (PERE). The same sources suggest that Spanish emigration to the United Kingdom and Germany has grown faster than that from other countries affected by the crisis, including Greece, Portugal, and Italy.18

**Figure 1. Total Migration to and from Spain, by Nationality and Place of Birth, 2003-14**

![Graph showing total migration to and from Spain, by nationality and place of birth, 2003-14](source)


Though data are limited, evidence suggests that most native-born Spaniards who leave are ages 25 to 35, and have relatively high levels of education: this reflects the greater propensity of the highly skilled to migrate. It is estimated that around half of the recent emigrants are university graduates. Though the increasing international mobility of college graduates predates the start of the recession, there is little doubt that the crisis gave a powerful push to the preexisting trend.

Native-born Spaniards tend to emigrate to traditional countries of destination and, to a lesser extent, to emerging economies or faster-growing middle-income countries. The most popular destinations for the native born are the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Germany, and Switzerland. For naturalized

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17 It is important to note, however, that under the Ley de Memoria Histórica, children and grandchildren of Spanish citizens who left Spain during the Franco regime may apply for citizenship without ever having lived in Spain—but will still be counted as Spanish citizens living overseas by consulates. See Antonio Izquierdo, ed., La migración de la memoria histórica (Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2012).


19 Domingo and Sabater, “Crisis económica y emigración.”


21 INE, “Estadísticas de Variaciones Residenciales.”
Spanish citizens, popular destination countries also include several in Latin America. Foreign nationals residing in Spain tend to emigrate to Romania, Morocco, Bolivia, Ecuador, Germany, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, France, and the United Kingdom. In a number of cases it is onward migration to a third country; in most cases return to the country of origin.

Box 1. The Challenges of Accurately Measuring Emigration from Spain

Though Spain has a reasonably good statistical system for measuring immigration, quantifying emigration is a greater challenge, as in many other countries. This is particularly so in the case of Spanish citizens.

The foremost source of both immigration and emigration data is the Padrón, a municipal registry. All persons, regardless of their citizenship and legal status, are required to register in the municipality in which they reside, and a number of incentives entice them to do so, including free access to health care and to public education. Registration in the Padrón also serves as proof of residence when applying for legalization—but accounting for those who leave is fraught with difficulties. Foreigners who are not long-term residents are legally required to renew their inscription in the Padrón every two years, and all others every five. If they fail to do so they are counted as emigrants, but this creates a substantial time lag between residents’ actual departure and when it appears in the data.

Measuring the emigration of natives is much harder. Spanish nationals are not required to renew their inscription in the Padrón, and are only removed when they register in a Spanish consulate abroad and are then included in the Register of Spaniards Living Abroad, or PERE (Padrón de Españoles Residentes en el Extranjero). But many Spaniards living in another country do not register in a consulate and therefore are not added to the PERE. Registration in the consulate conveys little or no advantage; meanwhile, those removed from the Padrón lose their health card and other subsidies or benefits, and may find it harder to exercise their voting rights in Spain. In addition, registering in a consulate may not be convenient, or easy, and requires producing an official document attesting that the emigrant will stay for more than a year. A bill passed in 2012 that cancels the health cards of Spaniards living abroad for more than three months may have increased the reluctance to register with the consulate.

Because of these issues, it is likely that the PERE underestimates the number of Spanish emigrants, particularly the native born. The proportion of consular under-registration has been estimated at 50 percent in the period 2008-12—rising to 60 percent for those living in EU countries—on the basis of a 2012 survey of more than 4,000 Spaniards living abroad (Juan Manuel Romero Valiente y Antonio Luis Hidalgo-Capitán, “El subregistro consular: magnitudes y efectos en las estadísticas de emigración españolas,” Obets, Revista de Ciencias Sociales, vol. 9, no. 2 (2014): 377-407. Naturalized Spaniards, meanwhile, have greater incentive to seek inclusion in the PERE (e.g., to retain their citizenhip rights).

The source used here—the Statistics of Residential Changes (Estadísticas de Variaciones Residenciales)—is based on inscriptions and cancellations in the Padrón, and therefore suffers from the difficulty of accounting for those who leave the country without registering at a consulate. Yet, the EVR counts as emigrants those previously registered at a municipality who no longer live there, and who have not registered at another municipality.

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22 Top destinations are Ecuador, the United Kingdom, Argentina, Venezuela, France, the United States, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Brazil, and Peru; the ranking varies slightly depending on the source used, whether PERE or the Statistics on Residential Changes.

23 INE, “Estadísticas de Variaciones Residenciales.”
Spanish emigration seems to be viewed quite favorably by destination countries in the European Union and Latin America. In Europe policymakers at national and EU levels cite the ideal of increased internal mobility within the European Union.\(^{24}\) In Latin America—particularly Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Ecuador, and Chile—Spanish emigrants are filling demand in the education and science sectors; some of these countries actively recruit teachers from Spain.\(^{25}\)

There are little data available on rates of return, since the departures are recent; what evidence does exist suggests that the number of those returning to Spain is on the rise.\(^{26}\)

### IV. Assessing the Effects of the New Emigration Trends

Recent emigration, especially of native-born Spaniards, has attracted considerable popular attention.\(^{27}\) Although only a small portion of total outflows, the emigration of the native born is a particularly emotive issue amid fears that Spain is losing its best and brightest. But the lack of reliable data makes it difficult to assess the impact and implications of emigration.

There is no evidence that emigration has resulted in skills gaps, or that it has had any destabilizing effect on rural areas so far. It does not seem to have impacted other domestic policy areas or external relations, nor has it changed the country’s relations with other states.

Meanwhile, given that many who leave are jobless, the opportunity cost for the Spanish labor market is very low indeed. Emigration leads to an increase in remittances to Spain, and enables otherwise unemployed people to acquire experience and build up professional networks overseas. The many foreign-born emigrants who have acquired Spanish nationality will have the option of returning to Spain once the economy improves, bringing with them new skills and contacts.

*There is no evidence that emigration has resulted in skills gaps, or that it has had any destabilizing effect on rural areas so far.*

But emigration can have negative effects on domestic consumption, fiscal revenues, birth rates, and household formation, not to mention the national mood. Despite the high number of recent departures, unemployment rates remain well above pre-crisis levels—though it is reasonable to assume they would be even higher in the absence of large-scale emigration. The labor force has become older since the start of the crisis, reflecting the disproportionate impact of the shrinking labor market on young workers.\(^{28}\) If young people continue to emigrate at current levels, the aging rate of the population—and Spain’s is already among the fastest in the world\(^ {29}\)—will accelerate. This has troubling, long-term consequences for paying back the country’s debt—public and private—and sustaining the pension and welfare systems.

\(^{24}\) Since the Schengen Agreement was signed in 1996, the promotion of internal mobility in the Schengen area has been a prominent policy goal in the European Union (EU).


\(^{26}\) González Ferrer, “La nueva emigración española.”

\(^{27}\) It is often compared with the earlier wave of emigration in the 1960s, although the two have little in common. The current one is smaller in size, better educated, and more balanced in terms of gender.

\(^{28}\) Oliver Alonso, “La inmigración y la doble recesión;” Domingo and Sabater, “Crisis económica y emigración.”

However, the recovery of the economy and of job creation since 2014 seems to dispel the fear that the sustained departure of young workers will put a brake on economic growth.

1. **Highly Skilled Emigration**

Though often depicted in the media and public space as a cause for concern, the emigration of highly skilled young workers does not appear to have any particularly harmful effects in the short term. Spain has a large number of graduates—in 2014, 32 percent of younger adults ages 25-34 in Spain were higher education graduates (the averages for OECD and the European Union were 33 percent and 29 percent, respectively). Young emigrants compose only a small fraction of these numbers. Higher education provision in Spain has considerably expanded in recent decades, resulting in a legion of underemployed graduates in the current economic climate. Given current underemployment rates, in the short term the opportunity cost of most who leave is very low.

Yet losses of valuable human resources in strategic fields may be taking place. Young, native-born emigrants tend to work either in skilled professions—as nurses, physiotherapists, other health professionals, and engineers—or in low-skilled occupations such as waiters or laborers. A growing number of medical doctors are applying for certification to work in other EU countries. Surveys suggest that many architects have left, or are considering leaving, following the collapse of the property market. Young scholars, scientists, technicians, and otherwise highly educated persons are leaving in search of better opportunities in the United States, Europe, and Australia—a particularly relevant group for an economy aspiring to be knowledge based. In recent years severe budget cuts have reduced expenditure on research—which, prior to the crisis, had been increasing—and cut a large number of positions in Spain’s universities and research centers. These budget cuts are blocking the career advancement of many young scholars or researchers by reducing high-skilled employment opportunities and therefore pushing some to look for better opportunities abroad. In this strategic area of higher education and research the driving force behind emigration is not so much unemployment—as is the case in many other sectors—as the combination of low pay, status below qualifications, job insecurity, and lack of career prospects.

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34 To work in other EU countries, doctors must apply for the Certificado de Idoneidad Profesional (Certificate of Professional Competence) from the Medical Colleges Organization (OMC). Between 2011 and 2013 OMC received applications from 7,378 doctors—nearly 50 percent (3,538) submitted in 2013. OMC, “En los últimos tres años, más de 7.000 médicos han solicitado el certificado de idoneidad para salir fuera de España,” (news release, February 18, 2014), www.cgcom.es/noticias/2014/02/14_02_18_certificado_idoneidad.
35 A survey conducted by the Union of Architects (Sindicato Arquitectos, or SARQ) in 2013 found that 12 percent of those surveyed had emigrated; another in 2010 found that 73 percent of those surveyed were considering moving abroad to find a job. See SARQ, “Presentación de la III Encuesta del Sindicato de Arquitectos, 2013,” accessed February 26, 2016, www.sindicatoarquitectos.es/descargas/iii-estudio-laboral-arquitectura-sarq-2013.pdf; SARQ, “Estudio sobre el Sector de la Arquitectura,” April 25, 2011, www.sindicatoarquitectos.es/descargas/Nd%20emigraci%C3%B3n%20de%20arquitectos_ENVIADA2.pdf.
36 The yearly number of licenses for the building of new dwellings fell from 737,000 in 2006 to 76,000 in 2011; INE, “Número anual de licencias municipales para construcción de viviendas nuevas.” According to a report from the architects’ branch of UGT (Unión General de trabajadores), a major trade union, in 2013 seven out of ten architects were jobless, earning less than 1,000 euros a month, or working without a contract.
37 Domingo and Sabater, “Crisis económica y emigración.”
38 This follows the Spanish government’s 2011 rule that only one out of ten vacancies in the public administration, including in public universities and research centers, could be filled with a new recruit. See Government of Spain, “Presupuestos Generales del Estado para el Año 2011,” Ley 39/2010, Gobierno de España, December 22, 2010, www.minhap.gob.es/Documentacion/Publico/SGT/LEYES/ONLINELT/25876.htm. The rule was renewed every year until 2014.
of professional opportunities at home. Without a robust research sector to employ them and offer career advancement opportunities, many of the scientists and academics who are leaving may not return to Spain.

V. Policy Responses to the New Wave of Emigration

Before becoming a country of net immigration in the 1980s, Spain had been a sending country for more than a century, as large numbers of Spanish citizens emigrated to first Latin America and, later, destinations in Europe. As a legacy of these movements, Spain has a sizeable diaspora abroad. Until 2004 the volume of remittances received outpaced those sent from Spain, despite Spain’s rank among the top senders in the world.

Many of today’s diaspora policies continue those developed decades ago, albeit with some minor adjustments. Yet there are notable differences between today’s emigrants and those of the past: the earlier emigration waves were much larger, more male dominated, and less educated. Policies to engage Spaniards abroad need to be tailored to the new demographic reality. While the government has begun several new initiatives to this end, a comprehensive strategy is needed to meet the Spanish diaspora’s changing needs.

A. Existing Emigration Management and Diaspora Engagement Structures

Policies developed to address earlier waves of emigration focused on facilitating the placement of Spanish workers in jobs abroad, and maintaining cultural and political ties with Spaniards abroad. While the surge in immigration to Spain in recent decades shifted the government’s attention away from the areas of emigration management and diaspora engagement, both have remained a part of the policy toolkit—albeit not always a priority one.

1. Managing Emigration

Over time, the Spanish government has developed several agencies and offices to manage emigration and relations with the Spanish diaspora, beginning with an emigration system set up in the 1950s to support Spaniards abroad. The system’s centerpiece was the Instituto Español de Emigracion (IEE, or the Spanish Emigration Agency), established in 1956, which facilitated the recruitment of Spanish nationals to work abroad on guestworker agreements and provided a number of services to emigrants abroad, mostly educational and cultural in nature. In 1985 IEE was replaced by the General Directorate for Migration, and a substantial part of its human resources—and its central headquarters in Madrid—were redirected toward managing immigration, which had become the government’s top priority in the realm of international mobility. Nevertheless, diaspora engagement remained part of its remit, and always occupied a place, if a secondary one, in the administrative apparatus charged with managing external mobility. In 2008 the General Directorate became the Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, which in 2012 was renamed the Secretaría General de Inmigración y Emigración (SGIE, or Secretary General of Immigration and Emigration), a nominal change which implied a lower administrative rank and a lower priority.


42 Luis M. Calvo Salgado, María José Fernández Vicente, Axel Kreienbrink, Carlos Sánchez Díaz, and Gloria Sanz Lafuente, Historia del Instituto Español de Emigración: La política migratoria exterior de España y el IEE del franquismo a la transición (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, 2009).
The Spanish government has also taken some steps to facilitate the portability of social security benefits, including bilateral agreements with around 20 countries and the Latin America–wide Multilateral Agreement on Social Security. These enable Spaniards to preserve, maintain, and transfer their social security benefits upon their return to Spain.\(^43\)

2. **Maintaining Ties with the Diaspora**

In the past Spain's diaspora policies emphasized maintaining cultural and political ties, rather than promoting skills circulation.\(^44\) Spain has long-established structures to engage with its diaspora, structures that include the General Council of Spaniards Abroad (attached to the Ministry of Employment and Social Security), and councils of Spaniards living abroad (attached to the Spanish consulates and their sections of employment and social security). These are consultative, participatory bodies that provide channels for emigrants to participate in matters of interest, voice their concerns and needs, and foster the cooperation of different government agencies in tending to those matters. Spaniards living abroad also have voting rights in national and European elections.

In addition, the government interacts with the diaspora through a number of associations of Spanish citizens living abroad. SGIE provides grants and subsidies—through the labor and social security attachés at Spanish embassies and consulates—for these associations' day-to-day activities and specific programs. Most emigrant associations are located in traditional destination countries, many of them in Latin America; some are also found in France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany. Some such associations are over a century old and boast a large membership. A few in Latin America offer services in high demand, such as medical support.\(^45\) European-based associations tend to be more geared toward broader cultural, educational, or social pursuits.

SGIE offers project grants to a wide range of diaspora organizations. Some such programs target young Spanish emigrants, supporting their training and social integration in their country of residence, or helping them plan a return to Spain. One notable diaspora organization, ALDEEU (Asociación de licenciados y doctores españoles en Estados Unidos) brings together Spanish university graduates living in the United States. It was established in 1980 by a group of Spanish professionals—doctors, engineers, university professors, artists, and entrepreneurs—in the United States to promote Spanish culture in North America and to build communications and exchange knowledge between Spain and the United States. ALDEEU’s scientific and academic profile is to some extent representative of the character of recent native-born emigrants.

**B. Policy Responses for New Emigration**

In light of new mobility trends, the Spanish government has introduced a number of policies that focus on promoting international mobility and integration at destination, and facilitate the return of foreign nationals wishing to leave Spain. Some initiatives offer training and return support to first- and second-generation young Spaniards living abroad. These recent policies complement—rather than replace—the existing emigration and diaspora engagement policy framework.

One impediment to developing new policies that are more tailored to recent emigrants is the lack of


\(^{44}\) Even today no references to skills circulation are to be found in the official documents of the Secretary General of Immigration and Emigration (SGIE).

\(^{45}\) Associations that offer specific services can be found in Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For example, La Española in Montevideo, Uruguay, is a prestigious chain of hospitals that provides medical services to 187,000 people, of whom 30,000 are Spanish citizens, and employs 8,000. It was founded by Spanish emigrants in 1853 as la Asociación Española Primera de Socorros Mutuos. Its president must have Spanish citizenship. See Asociación Española Primera en Salud, “Mas de 160 años de Historia,” accessed February 26, 2016, www.asesp.com.uy/ucvideo_161_1.html.
accurate data on who is leaving and where they are going (see Box 1). Spain’s Statistical Office (INE) is attempting to remedy this by (1) pursuing bilateral agreements with a number of destination countries to compare and integrate origin and destination data;46 (2) working to strengthen the data collected by Spanish consulates; and (3) enhancing coordination among the ministries of employment, interior, and foreign affairs. The results of these endeavors have not yet been published.47

1. Facilitating Mobility

One of Spain’s policy goals appears to be facilitating mobility as a means to alleviate unemployment. This is supported by a number of recent SGIE initiatives that promote international mobility and integration at destination.

One such initiative is Movilidad Internacional (International Mobility), a web portal set up in 2013 that offers information (both general and country specific) about travel, residence, employment, and opportunities for entrepreneurship or study to those who intend to live abroad.48 It focuses on providing information about job opportunities abroad, including a wealth of contextual information on topics such as work contracts, labor legislation, health care, social security, taxes, housing, crime, and transportation. It is primarily aimed at workers, though it may be useful to other groups such as students, travelers, and entrepreneurs. It also offers useful information for Spanish citizens abroad—including those considering returning to Spain—on international agreements relating to youth mobility, double citizenship, recognition of driver’s licenses, avoidance of double taxation, visas, and social security.

Regional and local governments have also taken steps to facilitate mobility; for example, immigrant service centers (Service Centers for Immigrants, Emigrants, and Refugees—SAIER) in Barcelona now provide individual guidance to intending emigrants, including information on how to gain foreign recognition for credentials and degrees.49

Meanwhile, Spain has signed reciprocal Working Holiday agreements with New Zealand and Canada, and is negotiating agreements with Australia and Japan. The existing agreements allow Spanish youth (ages 18 to 35 in the case of Canada, and up to 30 in New Zealand) to travel to these countries and work to support their stay for up to 12 months before returning home.50

On another topic, Spain has taken steps to facilitate the return of unemployed foreign nationals to their countries of origin. In November 2008 Spain’s Ministry of Labor introduced a program of assisted return (Plan de abono anticipado para la prestación a extranjeros—APRE) that offers unemployed legal migrants free transportation to their country of origin, and their accumulated unemployment benefits in two lump sums: 40 percent prior to departure, and the remaining 60 percent upon return. Returning migrants under the APRE program have to return all work authorization and residence permit documents, and are then barred from returning to work in Spain for three years.51

2. Engaging with the New Diaspora

Current diaspora engagement policies tend to focus on promoting cultural ties over encouraging transfers of resources. Regarding mobility in general, policy goals are less clear: while some official documents allude to a legal mandate to encourage the return of Spanish citizens from abroad, some recent policy initiatives

46 Author communication with INE General Director Gregorio Izquierdo, June 16, 2014.
47 Author communication with Secretary General of Immigration and Emigration Marina del Corral, May 21, 2014.
actively seek to facilitate (legal) international mobility.

One such initiative is the SGIE’s Youth Program, established in 2007, which finances programs in destination countries to support the education and employment success of young first- and second-generation Spaniards living abroad. Grants target four areas: career and employment advice, language learning, training and entrepreneurship, and return support (although substantially fewer grants have been made for return programs than for training or career guidance). In 2013 the program funded 79 projects in Latin America, Europe, the United States, and Canada. Direct beneficiaries of funded projects are NGOs and other nonprofit entities in Spain and abroad. Their final beneficiaries must be younger than 35 and living abroad for at least one month at the start of the funding cycle.

Initiatives such as the Youth Program represent a promising new development in Spanish diaspora engagement policy.

3. Promoting Retention and Return

Spain’s budget cuts resulting from fiscal austerity policies risk exacerbating the “push” factors that motivate young people to leave—particularly when cuts impact employment prospects or career opportunities. For example, drastic budget reductions at public universities and research centers have seriously undermined the careers of a significant number of young and midcareer academics and researchers, prompting some to seek better opportunities abroad.

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However, there have been recent institutional reforms to encourage job creation and facilitate entrepreneurship, including a law to support entrepreneurship and its internationalization, passed in 2013, which includes measures to encourage entrepreneurship (e.g., in school programs) and reforms to reduce financial burdens and liabilities for new entrepreneurs. A labor market reform passed in 2012 aims at addressing some factors thought to have contributed to the extensive use of temporary contracts by employers. Such contracts were used particularly for young and immigrant workers, leaving these groups especially susceptible to unemployment. In particular, the reforms reduced firing costs (especially for small firms), relaxed rules governing collective dismissals, and limited the coverage of collective bargaining agreements. Among other things, the reforms were intended to increase hiring and improve workers’ chances of moving out of unemployment or temporary work into a permanent contract, but it is still too early to fully evaluate their efficacy. As yet, the proportion of temporary contracts remains very high.

52 While the program, created in 2007, initially focused on developing and maintaining cultural ties with Spain, in 2012 and 2013 its focus was shifted to supporting the integration and labor market success of young Spanish workers abroad. See Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, “Movilidad Internacional: Proyectos para Jóvenes,” accessed July 6, 2015, www.empleo.gob.es/movilidadinternacional/es/menu_principal/programasjovenes/index.htm.
53 Grants are awarded to organizations running integration programs in destination countries, and to prospective entrepreneurs living overseas who wish to return to Spain and start an entrepreneurial project (the program stipulates that entrepreneurs must be Spanish citizens, under 35 years of age, who have lived in Europe, the United States, or Latin America for more than a month at the time of the annual call for submissions).
55 Rodríguez-Planas and Nollenberger, A Precarious Position.
56 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The 2012 Labour Market Reform in Spain: A Preliminary Assesement (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013), www.oecd.org/employment/emp/spain-labourmarketreform.htm. In its preamble the law states that the uncertainty that surrounds entry into the labor market, low salaries, and the state of the economy are pushing many educated youth to abandon the Spanish labor market and seek opportunities abroad.
Meanwhile, budget constraints limit the number and scope of reintegration or return programs: there are currently no large-scale initiatives to encourage the temporary or permanent return of Spanish nationals and their descendants.

VI. Conclusions

After a long history of emigration, followed by a recent surge in immigration, Spain has now become a country in which both immigration and emigration are highly relevant. Inflows of immigrants continue to be substantial, though in recent years marked by financial crisis they have been superseded by outflows of foreign- and native-born Spaniards, and temporary migrants. The emigration of native-born Spaniards has captured the public imagination in particular. The perceived flight of talent is emerging as a key issue in light of the high unemployment rates following the economic crisis. But the long-term trajectory of emigration and its effects remain unclear.

The time has come to think seriously about policy responses to emigration.

In the short run emigration may act as a safety valve to mitigate unemployment; but in the long term, the emigration of mid- or highly skilled young workers may reduce the competitiveness of the Spanish economy. Though many of these emigrants may return home once economic recovery settles in, there are concerns that Spain may permanently lose some of its valuable researchers, scientists, and academics.

The time has come to think seriously about policy responses to emigration. The sociodemographic characteristics of those currently leaving are quite different from those of earlier waves of emigrants, and that reality calls for policies tailored to the needs of today. In a context of continuing austerity and high unemployment—particularly among youth—emigration is likely to continue. Spain's policies toward emigration and its diaspora should be more attuned to that reality. Spain’s priorities should aim at facilitating international mobility, integration at destination, and at encouraging cultural ties with the diaspora. A few recent policy initiatives (e.g., the Youth Program) point in that direction.

There are a number of steps policymakers can take to update and attune emigration and diaspora policies to the needs of recent emigrants:

- **Improve data on emigration flows and diaspora populations.** It is difficult to develop effective, targeted policies without a sufficient understanding of how many people are leaving, who they are, and where they are going. While collecting data on emigration flows is inherently difficult, existing mechanisms such as PERE and Padrón in Spain have the potential to provide extensive data if scaled up correctly. Policymakers should consider how registration in PERE can be made easier (by removing barriers such as proof of at least one-year residence abroad) and more enticing (by attaching new or existing benefits to registration). Efforts by INE and SGIE to improve coordination within the government and with destination countries on data collection are a step in the right direction.

- **Enable mobility in both directions.** Spain has already embraced greater mobility as a means to ease the unemployment crisis in the short term, and has taken a number of steps to facilitate the employment of Spanish workers abroad (such as an online jobs portal). But in order to fully capture the benefits of new mobility, policymakers should coordinate across government departments and agencies to ensure that those who have left are able to return and put their
skills to effective use. Relevant efforts might include facilitating job matches and the recognition of experience and credentials gained abroad.

- **Perform a systematic review of diaspora policies.** A number of proven strategies exist for tapping into the knowledge, skills, and resources of diaspora members. The higher skill levels of recent emigrants suggest they have much to offer their country of origin, whether they eventually return or choose to stay abroad. Policymakers would do well to consider which mechanisms may be appropriate for use in Spain, and how various government agencies and departments can collaborate to encourage recently emigrated Spanish nationals (whether foreign or native born) to maintain meaningful ties with Spain and invest their time, skills, and resources in supporting Spain’s economic competitiveness.

A new reality calls for new policies. The extent to which the new Spanish emigration results from the high levels of unemployment and the loss of opportunities brought about by the economic and fiscal crisis, and the degree to which it reflects a new era of mobility is as yet unclear. But there can be little doubt that a new Spanish diaspora is taking shape, one which widely differs from the pre-existing one and which is likely to persist. Exploiting the potential inherent in such a diaspora requires a set of new policies that are only starting to emerge and a civic conversation less emotional than the one that has taken place until now.

57 Such strategies include, for example, enabling return through flexible visa and citizenship laws; creating meaningful ways for the diaspora to have a voice in policy decisions (whether through overseas voting or more formal consultation bodies); encouraging diaspora entrepreneurship and investment through networking opportunities and information sharing; and creating opportunities for diaspora members to put their skills to use at home, either virtually or through volunteer or temporary return programs. See Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland, *Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries* (Washington, DC and Geneva: Migration Policy Institute and International Organization for Migration, 2012), [www.migrationpolicy.org/research/developing-road-map-engaging-diasporas-development-handbook-policymakers-and-practitioners](http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/developing-road-map-engaging-diasporas-development-handbook-policymakers-and-practitioners).
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The Migration Policy Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank dedicated to the study of the movement of people worldwide. MPI provides analysis, development, and evaluation of migration and refugee policies at the local, national, and international levels. It aims to meet the rising demand for pragmatic and thoughtful responses to the challenges and opportunities that large-scale migration, whether voluntary or forced, presents to communities and institutions in an increasingly integrated world.

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