ADVANCING OUTCOMES FOR ALL MINORITIES

EXPERIENCES OF MAINSTREAMING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

By Sundas Ali and Ben Gidley
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Kingdom has a large foreign-born population and a large native-born ethnic minority population. UK integration policy has made considerable effort to address ethnic minority needs—with an emphasis on antidiscrimination and good race relations. However, there has been less policy activity for immigrant integration.

Since 2010, the UK government has stepped back from a national integration strategy, and instead emphasised five key principles—shared values, social responsibility, active participation, social mobility, and rejection of extremism—promoted through minimally funded demonstrator projects, delivered in partnership with nongovernmental actors. Local authorities have considerable power (though limited resources) to set their own integration goals, and both policy and discourse vary widely by place.

UK integration policy has seen mainstreaming—an effort to reach people with a migration background through needs-based social programming and policies that also target the general population—in three key areas:

- From the 1960s, and especially from 1997 to 2010, the United Kingdom passed increasingly robust antidiscrimination legislation, initially providing a mechanism for redress for individuals experiencing discrimination, but increasingly turning towards a proactive approach that included a public duty to promote good relations.

- The 1997 to 2010 period saw large-scale, target-driven, strategic action to combat social exclusion for residents of all ethnicities in deprived neighbourhoods, based on mechanisms of cooperation between different levels and sectors of government. Since 2010, the emphasis has shifted from social exclusion to social mobility, including local and cross-sectoral actions aimed at children, young adults, and labour market participation. The prior centrally set targets have been replaced by a strong localist approach.

- Since 2001, there has been a practical and rhetorical rejection of funding and policy activity targeted at single ethnic groups. Instead, policymakers and local leaders promote shared spaces, shared values, and positive contacts—under the rubric of community cohesion.

Additionally, although youth have not traditionally been a central priority in UK integration discourse, recurrent moral panics about minority youth have meant that considerable policy activity has developed around them. Several case studies—Glasgow and London’s diverse boroughs—illuminate some of the opportunities available to local authorities in developing forms of mainstreamed, whole-community approaches to integration, especially for young people, while drawing on evidence to tackle areas of persistent disadvantage.

Local authorities have considerable power (though limited resources) to set their own integration goals.

Glasgow has worked to create bridges between settled communities and new migrants, within an overall context in which the municipality and Scottish government are committed to immigration as a solution to concerns about demographic decline. Grassroots organisations rooted in migrant communities have developed programmes to engage migrant and minority youth, while still working with migrants as part of communities rather than as discrete entities. These efforts include work through local ‘anchor organisations’ that involve both migrant and non-migrant residents.

Inner London’s ‘superdiverse’ boroughs have developed a variety of innovative approaches to mainstreaming, including work in Hackney to develop an evidence-based cohesion strategy; in Waltham Forest to engage diverse young people in civic life; in Lewisham to develop an intercultural approach to youth inclusion; in Tower Hamlets to develop an inclusive narrative of place; and in Southwark to bring Muslim residents and young people inside mainstream civic life.

Several factors drive this locally based approach to mainstreaming integration policy in the United Kingdom. First, integration issues are subsumed within a larger concern with equality and diversity, due to the societal reluctance to frame minorities as migrants. Second, an ideological commitment to localism at the national level, combined with a suspicion of top-down and regulatory antidiscrimination measures, has led to central government relinquishing responsibility and leadership in the field of integration and curtailing central guidance and funding for it. This might create space for the development of innovative local approaches in some areas, but also raises the risk of policy marginalisation. Third, austerity has further reduced the resources available for integration—but local-level case studies show that this has also driven some innovation in meeting integration and cohesion objectives through the mainstream. Local authorities have developed new approaches—based on whole communities rather than target populations, while
using the best evidence to work on persistent exclusions and disadvantages. However, this work is vulnerable to a lack of funding and has only been seen in relatively isolated cases.

The United Kingdom’s emphasis on mainstreaming integration policy at the local level should be welcomed, since integration happens locally and mainstream policy innovations can be effective for achieving integration goals. The main concern with the UK approach, however, is that it might obscure the strong evidence for the ongoing inequalities and disadvantages facing particular groups.

I. INTRODUCTION: THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Although the United Kingdom has long been a country of immigration, immigrant integration policies and initiatives mostly take place under the label of ‘minority’ policy, with an emphasis on antidiscrimination and good race relations rather than the explicit integration of newcomers.

One result of this orientation is that the UK central government has not set goals for the integration and inclusion of migrant and minority youth and, apart from a grant to schools that encourages ethnic minority achievement, there is no dedicated national budget for such work. Nor has there been consistent national-led evaluation of such policies.

Britain does, however, have policy instruments in closely related areas, which are often part of the integration agenda in other European Union countries. These include citizenship and naturalisation (termed civic integration in many other European countries), antidiscrimination, combating hate crime, combating violent extremism, ethnic minority business and employment support, and ethnic minority education.

Immigrant integration policies and initiatives mostly take place under the label of ‘minority’ policy.

On the local level, governments have considerable discretion but limited funds to develop immigrant integration initiatives. Consequently, most work that targets migrant-origin youth is delivered within the context of the mainstream population. Mainstreaming integration policy refers to the effort to reach people with a migration background through needs-based social programming and policies that also target the general population. This report offers detailed case studies of local-level initiatives that pursue ‘targeting within mainstreaming’ policies, analysing integration policy in Glasgow and in five London boroughs.

A. Migrants and minorities

At the 2011 Census, 13 per cent of the United Kingdom’s population was born abroad, of whom a little more than half arrived in the last decade. Of the foreign-born population, 15 per cent are from post-2001 EU accession states, 12 per cent from pre-2001 EU Member States, 34 per cent from the Middle East and Asia, and 18 per cent from Africa. India, Poland, Pakistan, and Ireland are the top origin countries for those born abroad.

A large proportion of migrants are naturalised, with just 7.4 per cent of people in England and Wales holding non-UK passports. In England and Wales, 14 per cent of the population noted an ethnicity other than White British in their 2011 Census responses. Of these, the largest ethnic group (6.8 per cent) is Asian or Asian British, including Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis, and others; 3.4 per cent are black or black British; and 2.2 per cent are mixed race.1

Britain has a longer history of migration than many European countries. In the mid-20th century, Britain encouraged mass labour migration from its colonies and former colonies, and the children and grandchildren of these migrants slowly entered the British mainstream. Due to strong historical links to the empire and Commonwealth, and the British tradition of conferring citizenship by birthplace \textit{(jus soli)}, policymakers and the general public have considered the country’s migrant-origin population as ethnic minorities rather than immigrants for many decades.

In addition, British (as opposed to English, Welsh, Scottish, or Irish) identity is typically considered civic rather than ethnic, and thus open to ethnic diversity. Indeed, the 2011 Census showed that black Caribbean and South Asian people had much higher levels of identification as British than those of a white British ethnicity. Consequently, the concept of ‘second-generation migrant’ is not used in the United Kingdom, and migrants and especially their descendants often identify as ‘black British’, ‘British Asian’, and so on. As a result, there is no straightforward correlation between ethnicity and migration status. Analysing the population based on the 2006 Labour Force Survey, Rosemary Sales and Alessio D’Angelo show, for example, that one-tenth of UK nationals do not list white British as their ethnicity while around the same percentage of non-nationals do.\footnote{Paul Gilroy, (London: HarperCollins, 1998).}

\section*{B. The history of UK integration policy}

However, the emphasis on minorities rather than migrants has had the effect of inhibiting the development of migrant integration policies in the United Kingdom. The debate has focused instead on strong borders to keep newcomers out, alongside the promotion of good ‘race relations’ and multicultural and equality policies for the ‘minorities’ within. Integration first appeared in UK government policy in the 1960s, when then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins famously declared, ‘I define integration... not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’.\footnote{Anthony Lester, ed., Essays and Speeches by Roy Jenkins (London: Collins, 1967), 267.}

The emphasis on minorities rather than migrants has had the effect of inhibiting the development of migrant integration policies in the United Kingdom.

Jenkins was operating in the migration context of the Windrush era, the period of mass labour migration to Britain from its colonies and former colonies after World War II, so known because of the symbolic importance of the Empire Windrush, a passenger ship whose arrival from Kingston, Jamaica in June 1948 came to symbolise the start of the mass migration of (post) colonial people to the imperial metropolis.\footnote{Tariq Modood, ‘British Asian Identities: Something Old, Something Borrowed, Something New’ in British Cultural Studies: Geography, Nationality, Identity, eds. David Morley and Kevin Robins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Geraldine Connor and Max Farrar, ‘Carnival in Leeds and London, UK: Making New Black British Subjectivities’ in Carnival in Action: The Trinidad Experience, ed. Milla C. Riggio (London: Routledge, 2003).} Most migrants to Britain in this period, although ethnically distinct from most of the settled population already in the country, were British or Commonwealth citizens, subjects of the Crown, with all or most of the rights of the settled population. They tended to speak English as their first language and maintained strong cultural links to what many of them considered the mother country.

While the government in which Jenkins served, along with almost every subsequent UK government, legislated to tighten immigration control, there was also a strong recognition for the rights of those who had made their home in the United Kingdom. Legislation against discrimination was encoded in a series of acts of Parliament starting in 1965. The 1976 \textit{Race Relations Act} was particularly important, protecting people from discrimination on the basis of national origin. The 2000 \textit{Race Relations Amendment Act} created a general duty on public authorities to actively promote equality of opportunity and good relations between people of different racial groups. There were also reasonably clear routes for overseas-born residents in the United Kingdom to gain citizenship. For example, in 2006 some 43.5 per cent of foreign-born residents had UK citizenship, with some long-settled communities having particularly high proportions of British nationality, such as two-thirds of those born in Bangladesh.\footnote{Geraldine Connor and Max Farrar, Migrants Integration Territorial Index (MITI), United Kingdom National Report (London: Middlesex University, 2008), 38, https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/5542/1/MITI_Report_UK.pdf.}
From the late 1960s, academics, antiracist activists, civil-society groups, and migrant organisations increasingly asserted the Britishness of minority ethnic communities, refused to label them as immigrants, and rejected the concept of integration, seeing it as too close to old-fashioned assimilation. Alternative ideas of antiracism, then multiculturalism, and later diversity and equality became more prominent in mainstream politics.

From this period on, providers of public services increasingly saw it as a duty to take account of (or even positively value) cultural diversity. Some government funding was available for services in the mother tongues of migrants and their children, and schools taught about the United Kingdom’s diverse cultures. This has led to the country performing fairly well in the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which ranks Britain’s policies highly based on long-term residence, access to nationality, and antidiscrimination measures that are fairly close to best practice. On the latter, the United Kingdom scores fourth of 31 countries.

As a result of these developments, much of the literature describes Britain as having a ‘multiculturalist’ model of integration, meaning a model that positively respects and promotes minority cultural identity and difference. It is probably more accurate, however, to describe British multicultural policies as incompletely developed, and implemented primarily at a local rather than national level. The policies associated with this period, particularly the strong antidiscrimination framework discussed below, represented a form of mainstreaming in policies. This is because mainstream services had to ensure equal access to all sections of the community. Alongside the policies, however, there was an absence of mainstreaming in discourses, in a period when Britain was increasingly seen (in a term coined by Bikhu Parekh) as a ‘community of communities’.

However, in the 2000s, integration as a concept began to reappear on the policy agenda, often alongside the related concept of community cohesion. These policy agendas did not typically focus on migrants or even ethnic minorities in general, but instead on British-born Muslim communities, who have received a disproportionate amount of attention in the public and political discourse since September 11, 2001. This shift marked the emergence of mainstreaming in discourses, as funding for projects and activities targeting specific ethnic groups was increasingly frowned upon, and the emphasis of policies moved to bringing communities together.

Despite a commitment to antidiscrimination, particular migrant and minority groups continue to face persistent disadvantages in society.

It is interesting to note that this concept of mainstreaming cannot be strictly applied or is not applicable in all areas of the United Kingdom. For example, Glasgow has adopted specific measures to make sure migrants (for instance, students) come to Glasgow and stay there. This approach to mainstreaming states that targeted measures are needed to attract migrants. The Bridges Programme and ATLAS (Action for Training and Learning for Asylum Seekers) Scotland are examples of initiatives that do this. Bridges is a specialist agency that helps refugees, asylum seekers, third-country nationals, and anyone living in Glasgow who speaks English as a second language, gain meaningful work experience within their field of expertise. The programme also provides a range of employability and empowerment support to help people get their life back on track.

Despite a commitment to antidiscrimination, particular migrant and minority groups continue to face persistent disadvantages in society, including many that are apparent in the experiences of youth. Additionally, different ethnic groups experience strikingly divergent integration trajectories, with British Indians, for example, outperforming white British people in several socioeconomic outcomes, while other groups fall further behind. For instance, less than 10 per cent of Gypsy and Traveller pupils attain good educational results at age 16, compared with an average of more than 60 per cent in the whole population. As another example, black Caribbean pupils are three times more likely to be persistently excluded from school than the school population as a whole; and the unemployment rate among black young people is twice that of white young people, although their post-16 educational participation rate is much higher.

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There is also evidence of a ‘Muslim penalty’ in the labour market, with Muslims—especially Muslim women—experiencing greater rates of economic inactivity and unemployment, and lower wages.  

### C. Integration since 2010

Migrant integration has had an anomalous place in the United Kingdom’s governmental structures, falling between more than one government department. Responsibility for migration in general lies within the Home Office, the government ministry charged with internal security, policing, and community safety. Its areas of responsibilities include border control, immigration, naturalisation, customs, and visa checks; integration has had a marginal place in its work with almost no budget attached. It is the Home Office that led most of the work on migrant integration in the 1990s and 2000s, but in general, the focus has been on those involved in the immigration system, particularly refugees (excluding projects funded by the European Integration Fund through the UK Border Agency). Indeed, the only formal integration strategy that exists in the United Kingdom is for newly arrived refugees. The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), meanwhile, is in charge of community cohesion, and since 2010 has been given primary responsibility for integration.

The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government elected in May 2010 took some time to clarify its policy statements in the area of integration. Within immigration issues, the government’s main focus was on numbers, with the introduction of a cap on labour migrants. In terms of integration, early speeches emphasised concern with de facto segregation, the importance of compelling migrants to share core British values, the need for migrants to earn citizenship, and, in a key prime ministerial speech in Munich in February 2011, the insistence that ‘state multiculturalism’ has failed. Subsequent statements set out some key ideas on integration: that it is a natural process occurring in communities over long periods of time, at a local level, in real neighbourhoods, and through social bonds that develop in spaces of interaction. Prime Minister David Cameron has also spoken of migrants who are unwilling to integrate and refuse to learn English, continuing the theme of integration as a concept of duty developed by the previous government.

In February 2012, the Department for Communities and Local Government published a long-awaited statement of integration policy called Creating the Conditions for Integration. Although the Department provided no clear definition of integration, it did identify a series of key principles that people in their communities should be encouraged to:

- have shared aspirations, values and experiences;
- have a strong sense of mutual commitments and obligations, promoting personal and social responsibility;
- take part in local and national life and decisionmaking;
- fulfil their potential to get on in life; and
- challenge extremism and hate crime.

The role of government in achieving this was clearly limited, as the DCLG did not articulate a particular strategy or identify significant funding. Rather, government money would be steered into support for activities to demonstrate ways to promote community integration. These projects are in partnership with businesses, voluntary organisations, and communities; and they form the workstream of the DCLG, which is badged as ‘Bringing people together in strong, united communities’.

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13 For a full list of projects funded since 2007, see UK Border Agency, ‘Integrating other migrants from outside Europe’, accessed 10 April 2014, [www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/aboutus/workingwithus/workingwithasylum/integrating_other_migrants/](http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/aboutus/workingwithus/workingwithasylum/integrating_other_migrants/). Projects have typically been led by Further Education colleges, local authorities or third sector organisations, and usually provide direct integration support (like enhancing language with citizenship courses or mentoring) for third-country nationals or to specific groups of migrants identified as having a particular need (for example, women or Ghurkha families).
17 Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘Policy: Bringing people together in strong, united communities’, updated 1 July
The **Creating the Conditions** document and related policy statements make it clear that this workstream complements the government’s higher-priority social mobility strategy, called **Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers**, published in April 2011 and led by the Deputy Prime Minister rather than any particular government department. Overall, social mobility, rather than integration or antidiscrimination, is seen as the solution to the persistent disadvantages faced by some groups and communities. Rather than being a specific policy area, social mobility has become a common thread across the policies of the coalition government (including integration), and thus provides a strong framework for both vertical and horizontal coordination across different parts of government. Interestingly, the social mobility agenda, like the social inclusion agenda promoted by the previous government, is completely separate from the immigration debate, and thus a good example of mainstreaming because it concerns whole populations rather than specific segments.

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**Rather than being a specific policy area, social mobility has become a common thread across the policies of the coalition government.**

### D. Local and regional level integration policy

The British system of governance is characterised by institutional pluralism and several tiers of government, each with considerable freedom. The strength of localism and great diversity of local approaches to policy questions matches a strong place-based framing of social policy in the United Kingdom, with social problems often strongly associated with particular localities or types of localities and new policies typically piloted in local, sublocal or regional target areas.

Even in the period in which Britain most closely embraced multiculturalism, multicultural practices were locally based, implemented through institutions like municipal councils, youth clubs, and schools. This is characteristic of the multtiered form of governance that has developed in the United Kingdom, with a number of areas of service provision devolved to the local authority or, in more limited cases, to the region. This has given local authorities considerable scope to design and set the goals for integration policy, and local approaches vary considerably despite the fact that this policy area has unfolded through centrally developed guidance in the context of a national public debate.

Local authorities are funded in part through a revenue grant from central government and in part through local levies and charges, the most substantial of which is the council tax. The 2010 coalition government has frozen the council tax and enacted an annual reduction in central government grants, leading to a year-on-year reduction in local authority expenditures, with integration often considered a peripheral activity of local authorities and therefore particularly subject to the pressures of fiscal austerity. To give an indication of the scale of local authority budgets, for Glasgow, a city slightly smaller than Rotterdam with 600,000 residents, the 2013-14 budget was approximately 2.1 billion pounds (approximately 2.5 billion euros), of which approximately 1.2 billion comes from a central government grant and 250 million from local taxation. The London Borough of Hackney—an inner city local authority with a population of 247,200 that is considered deprived across multiple indicators—illustrates its 2013-14 budget graphically in Figure 1.

The relative freedom of action on the local level has meant that different local authorities have been innovative in different policy areas. Cooperation mechanisms and platforms for sharing knowledge, practice, and information—for instance through the umbrella organisation Local Government Association—have helped support local authorities.

In addition to being multiterried, governance in the United Kingdom emphasises partnerships, often involving the voluntary sector as well as cross-sectoral coordination between state agencies. Regional Strategic Migration Partnerships (RSMPs) are an example of partnerships at the highest subnational level. These were set up in the early 2000s as Strategic Partnerships for Asylum and Refugee Support, but their remits widened in 2007 to encompass all migrants rather than just refugees. RSMPs include representatives of the various tiers of local government and other statutory agencies (such as police, health services, and education providers) in the region, usually some representation from migrant and refugee community organisations, and regional representatives of key central government bodies, particularly the Border Agency. Different agencies host these partnerships in different regions; for instance, in London the mayor’s
office coordinates it, but most partnerships sit within regional umbrella organisations of municipalities. These are mainly examples of intersectoral, horizontal mainstreaming, but they also have a vertical dimension: they coordinate local work across regions, calibrating it with national priorities and agencies. However, the coalition government is trimming the regional tier of government, and some of the RSMPs are winding up.

Also at the local level, the migrant-related strategies of some local authorities are strong examples of horizontal mainstreaming. At this level, Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) coordinate the work of different service providers in different sectors. Typically chaired by mayors or council leaders, LSPs include formal representation from other statutory bodies (such as police, health service, and education providers) as well as formal representation from the private sector (often through a local chamber of commerce or similar body). Voluntary and community-sector organisations also participate, usually through local umbrella organisations such as Councils for Voluntary Service.

LSPs do not have their own budgets (beyond small operation budgets provided by the local authority) but rather are designed to pool and bend discretionary budgets of all key agencies locally towards shared targets. These are embodied in a range of performance indicators that are agreed with the national government. From 2004, Local Area Agreements (LAAs) between the central government and each LSP set out the priorities for each locality.

The central government published a National Indicator Set in October 2007, with a series of thematic planks intended to guide the work of LSPs. One such plank is called Safer and Stronger Communities. Each LSP was required to select 35 priority indicators (in addition to statutory education indicators); these are subject to improvement targets, and are systematically monitored. The central government awards Performance Reward Grants to local authorities for achieving their targets, or reduces budgets in response to failure.\(^\text{22}\) The LAA system represents a balance between vertical

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mainstreaming and local target setting, with central government using fiscal carrots and sticks to achieve centrally defined ends, and localities identifying their own priorities from among the suite of centrally provided options. Overall, this system works well with the place-based philosophy of social policy in the United Kingdom, which reached a high point in the 2000s.

However, the coalition government announced in October 2010 that it would end this ‘bureaucratic and complex framework’, including rewards grants and National Indictors and Local Area Agreements, reducing the amount of monitoring and negotiation involved in setting local authority expenditures and targets. This is part of the coalition government’s philosophy of devolving powers from central to local government. At the same time, austerity has meant that funding has been withdrawn from many of the platforms for sharing knowledge and good practices across localities, and local authorities have had to deprioritise this exchange at a time of rationed resources, despite the possibility of long-term savings from improving practice.

Another related tenet of the coalition’s philosophy is the Big Society: the reduction of the state’s role and empowerment of civil society to deliver services. Although the Big Society is not clearly defined and is not embodied in legislation, it is a philosophy that guides several policy areas. As most of these policy areas are devolved to the regional tier in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, it primarily formally applies to England. Its key principle is that the state, and especially the national state, is not always the best agent of change, and that its role should be to empower citizens to enact change rather than changing things for them. Although civil society has played a major role in service delivery for some time, the explicit shift to a Big Society model might provide the scope for local government and local civil society to take a more proactive position on migrant integration and develop more local strategies. As government departments shift further towards commissioning and contracting models of delivery, including for some of the integration programmes being developed by DCLG, there are opportunities for funding for civil society, and a particular emphasis on partnerships between large-scale voluntary sector agencies, the private sector and smaller organisations closer to the grassroots.

However, there is no government funding or support for this approach, and little clarity on implementation. The lack of policy levers for the Big Society vision means that the government cannot use it to tackle the major socioeconomic barriers to migrant integration. And as fiscal austerity means that advocacy organisations have fewer resources for capacity building, advising, and language services, migrant communities may not be able to fully participate in the Big Society. Migrant-focused community organisations among others have criticised the Big Society approach for these shortfalls.23

II. MAINSTREAMING INTEGRATION POLICY: TO WHAT EXTENT AND HOW DELIBERATE?

Migrant integration is a not a clearly defined policy area in the United Kingdom compared to some other European states, as issues of migration, ethnicity, and diversity are framed differently in the country. However, Britain does have well-developed policy instruments in closely related areas—such as citizenship, antidiscrimination, and employment support—that are often part of the integration agenda in other European Union countries.

Where policy is historically well developed (as in antidiscrimination and ethnic minority business and employment support), work has typically been completely mainstreamed. In areas where policy development is less established (such as refugee integration, combating hate crime, and thwarting violent extremism), there has been a significant recent shift towards intersectoral mainstreaming in both rhetoric and policy at a national level. The current coalition government has pushed this agenda further still, issuing a 2012 strategy on integration that rejects targeted integration activities and embraces locally tailored whole-community solutions.

The United Kingdom has a very complex multitiered system of governance, with significant powers devolved to its constituent nations and several competences devolved to local and regional levels. Subnational levels of government are responsible for many areas under the broad integration rubric, and so the United Kingdom provides an interesting case study of local and region-level mainstreaming.

Mainstreaming integration has been most effectively developed in Britain in three key areas:

- race relations and equality initiatives for combating discrimination;
- policies for social inclusion and social mobility; and
- policies for promoting cohesion.

The following subsections describe the policy landscape in each of these areas. Mainstreaming integration also takes different forms. Mainstreaming in discourses (such as narratives that stress the diversity of the whole population) can be seen in the shift to a community cohesion approach, replacing a multicultural celebration of different identities with an emphasis on shared values and coming together. Mainstreaming in policies (the traditional distinction between targeted and generic policies) can be seen in the antidiscrimination framework developed in the United Kingdom, especially since the 1990s, which forces public authorities to ‘equality proof’ generic services. And mainstreaming in governance structures (steering from the centre versus diffuse network governance or collaboration/coordination between horizontal and vertical government structures) is evident in the approach of the last government toward social inclusion, as well as the current government’s approach to social mobility, whereby mechanisms vertically and horizontally coordinate work across different levels and sectors of government.

A. Race relations and equality

The 1997-2010 Labour government, building on lawmaking under Labour governments of the 1960s and 1970s, introduced a series of key pieces of legislation that strengthened the United Kingdom’s already-robust race relations and equality/antidiscrimination laws. Among the landmarks was the judicial inquiry into the failed investigation of the 1993 murder of Stephen Lawrence, a black teenager. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, held under the chair of Sir William Macpherson of Cluny, and its report, known as the Macpherson Report, was published in 1999. The report identified institutional racism in certain British public institutions, including the police. Authorities were required to proactively monitor likely disproportionate impacts of any policy or law on the various groups in society seen as facing discrimination.

The Race Relations Amendment Act 2000 was significant in this regard. For the first time, equalities legislation moved beyond a principle of strong post hoc regulation and individual redress to one of a statutory duty among public services to tackle systemic inequalities. Specific duties for most public bodies included workforce ethnic monitoring and equality impact assessments for policies and services.

A second, related key principle was that of a public duty (imposed on public authorities in 2000) to actively promote good relations between groups. These principles, and the body of law relating to them, mean that public authorities, including at the subnational level, are required to consider equalities and cohesion issues in all areas of their work, rather than seeing these as separate policy areas. This duty was less well taken up by public authorities than the nondiscrimination duty, and there is little evidence of its impact, with some exceptions at the local level, especially in areas that were seeking to manage civil conflict between ethnic groups.

For the first time, equalities legislation moved beyond a principle of strong post hoc regulation and individual redress to one of a statutory duty.

The Equality Act 2006 mandated a new body, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, to monitor seven major ‘strands’ of discrimination and inequality (including race and religion, but also disability, gender, and so on) and to promote good relations between and within different groups in society. The Equality Act 2010 further consolidated and deepened this shift, replacing all previous legislation and aligning United Kingdom law with European Union’s Equal Treatment Directives.

The public-sector duty to ensure equality was widely taken up. The Commission for Racial Equality and then the Equality and Human Rights Commission developed detailed guidance for local authorities covering consulting on and assessing impact of new policies, training staff, procurement, and how to monitor service use. Although there is little comprehensive analysis or evidence of its effect—and some evidence that local authorities have responded to it in a...
tokenistic ‘tick box’ fashion—there are a number of examples of major recalibrations of service delivery at different geographical scales. For example, health authorities have developed robust systems for monitoring health inequalities and disproportionalities in service take-up, requiring major overhauls of both information systems and frontline practice. In criminal justice, reviews of police ‘stop and search’ practices revealed major disproportionalities in some areas, which were addressed through systematic reviews of practice. The new monitoring also revolutionised how police forces record and address racist incidents. In schools, improved pupil outcomes for minorities are a result of equality policies and action plans.

At a local level, however, the culture of working practice formed after several decades of race relations and antidiscrimination legislation has remained robust.

The coalition government made an early statement of what they described as a ‘new approach’ to equality, which could be interpreted as a stronger commitment to a mainstreaming model. The government published The Equality Strategy: Building a Fairer Britain in December 2010. Led by then Minister for Women and Equalities Theresa May, but with a remit significantly including all government departments, the strategy defined equality in terms of equal treatment and equal opportunity (rather than equal outcomes), stressed reward for ambition and hard work, recommended a retreat from a legislative or regulatory approach, and a commitment to seeing people as individuals and not as representative of particular groups. In her statement introducing the strategy, the Minister emphasized this shift away from target groups:

‘Too often the word “equality” has been misused and misunderstood because it has come to mean political correctness, social engineering, form filling, and box ticking…. The gradual evolution of equality law led to a “strand-based” approach to equality with different laws to protect different groups. Putting people into different categories simply because they ticked a box on a form ignores their needs as an individual. At the same time, some people have been made to feel as if equality is not for them’.

She also emphasised a retreat from a government-led approach to a decentralised, localist, hands-off approach, stressing the role of employers, civil society, and communities:

‘We will continue to make targeted interventions where there is clear evidence that legislation is needed. But while legislation has made a difference in the past, it is not a panacea for the continuing gaps in equality that we face… Government will work with employers, employees, and wider society as an advocate for change, instead of dictating what the right approach should be through rules and regulations’.

Hence the strategy did outline some targeted interventions (such as different practices on retaining the DNA of those arrested, to address the striking disproportionalities in black youth among those arrested but not charged, or funding for educational participation for disadvantaged 16- to 19-year-olds) but mainly outlined actions that aim to empower communities rather than the state (for example, a National Citizen Service programme for young people, or involvement of young people in sport).

At a local level, however, the culture of working practice formed after several decades of race relations and anti-discrimination legislation has remained robust. All local authorities, and especially those in areas with a significant minority population, monitor the take-up of services by different ethnic groups, ensure that new policies and practices conform to the legislation, routinely analyse the equality impact of new policies and practices, have strong and binding guidance on equal opportunities in terms of their own employment practices, and regularly train staff on diversity and antidiscrimination issues. When a local authority sets its annual budget, it ought to reflect an effort to pay ‘due regard’ to the need to eliminate discrimination and promote equality. These requirements apply across the ‘protected characteristics’ of race, religion, etc., and the authority must demonstrate that this due regard has occurred in decision-making. Thus, for instance, when agreeing to budget cuts in light of decreased funding, council officers present elected members with an Equality Impact Assessment, which systematically records likely impacts on the population groups defined by the multiple protected characteristics.


B. Social inclusion and social mobility

A related agenda has unfolded around social inclusion since 1997. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair and former Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown prioritised the elimination of poverty, especially child poverty. Accordingly, policy rhetoric focused on particular on areas of concentrated deprivation. This policy agenda neither implicitly nor explicitly addressed migrants, but did recognise persistent forms of exclusion experienced by ethnic minorities; however, the primary policy focus was on residents of social housing in relatively homogeneous white British-dominated outer city areas as well as more diverse inner-city areas, marking a shift from inner city-focused approaches to poverty in the 1970s to 1990s. In other words, specific places, rather than specific ethnic groups, were targeted by these policies—constituting a form of mainstreaming in policy.

The Blair government created a Social Exclusion Unit reporting directly to the Prime Minister, and developed a number of policy instruments. These included the creation of nationwide antipoverty programmes led by a range of government departments, as well as major programmes of ring-fenced discretionary funding targeted at geographical areas with evidence of particular need. Examples include Health Action Zones, Education Action Zones, Sure Start programmes focused on child poverty, and the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal, an area-based approach to renewal of infrastructure, services, and empowerment of local residents.

Many of these policies focused on the 10 or 20 per cent of the United Kingdom’s most deprived wards (the smallest scale of administration); although not all of these areas have significant numbers of minority residents, two-thirds of Britain’s minority ethnic population do live in the most deprived 10 per cent. Hence minority ethnic residents were the de facto focus of much social exclusion policy, and many of the elements of the agenda required local authorities to monitor outcomes by ethnicity and appropriately target services where there was evidence of need. There were also a small number of targeted programmes and initiatives nationally: for example, an Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant for schools with large populations of minority (and later, migrant) children, and an Ethnic Minority Employment Taskforce.

Target setting was a key policy instrument within this social inclusion agenda, including targets to raise overall outcomes, targets to reduce the number of individuals suffering from deprivation, and targets intended to narrow the gap between outcomes for the most deprived and the national average. These targets were written into a series of contractual relations, known as Public Service Agreements, between different levels of government, with lower levels given discretion as to how to achieve them, but fiscal penalties for missing them. This created an audit regime that highlighted the persistent disadvantages facing particular groups. This target culture helped advance the underlying policy goals: they encouraged concrete, measurable steps towards narrowing gaps and ensured that resources were channelled through an evidence-based process towards meeting real needs. Intersectoral cooperation at a local level was driven by the fiscal penalties and rewards associated with these targets. However, many local authorities experienced this target focus as an example of heavy-handed, top-down policymaking.

Under the current coalition government, many of the policy instruments and funding sources developed under the rubric of social inclusion have been terminated, along with many of the sources of evidence through which progress has been monitored. The coalition government continues a commitment to ‘localism’, allowing local authorities discretion in achieving better outcomes; it highlights social mobility as key to combating exclusion and recognises persistent barriers to social mobility among particular groups (including white British working class people, as well as particular minority ethnic communities) as a priority. The government’s social mobility strategy sets out some key actions and principles for addressing these issues, but (in the spirit of localism) with minimal direction to local authorities about their own work.

Social mobility is a key tenet of the coalition government’s philosophy. The key principle is that a society’s fairness should be judged by success and advancement rewarding hard work, skills, and talents. A social mobility strategy in this sense means removing the obstacles that prevent citizens, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds, from achieving their potential. A suite of actions aimed at early years, school age children, young people, and the labour market are associated with the strategy, delivered by a wide range of government departments and nongovernmental partners, with a large role for private-sector players as well.

As already noted, the Deputy Prime Minister’s office leads the social mobility strategy rather than any specific government department. This demonstrates a clear commitment to horizontal mainstreaming, with senior level interdepartmental meetings held regularly to coordinate work across the civil service. The assignment with the Deputy Prime Minister rather than the Cabinet Office (which works at senior level to coordinate interdepartmental strategies) is significant. On one hand, it signals a strong commitment by association with the second most senior politician in the
government. On the other hand, the Deputy Prime Minister’s office is, in some senses, also marginal to the mainstream work of the Cabinet and the major government departments. From this viewpoint, the strategy can be seen as form of both horizontal and vertical mainstreaming – but an anomalous example and it is too early to assess its effectiveness.

C. Cohesion

A third relevant policy agenda is that of cohesion, developed since 2001. This policy agenda was provoked by a series of civil disturbances in areas with high proportions of minority ethnic groups (specifically Muslim British Asians). The policy agenda focused not on migrants as such but rather on minority ethnic communities, including the second and third generations. And, not least because the disturbances occurred in the weeks immediately before 9/11, the cohesion agenda as a whole has often been associated with Muslim communities.

The promotion of stronger bonds and shared values at the local level...increasingly replaced multiculturalism and equality as the primary focus of local authorities.

In exploring the causes of the disturbances, a number of official and academic reports, as well as the punditry of influential centre-left commentators, identified de facto segregation between communities as the primary factor, with official multiculturalism as part of the problem. Funding targeted at specific groups on the basis of identity was seen as promoting division. For example, local authorities had been seen as allocating resources (such as funding for community centres or projects) to particular ethnic groups, as a form of patronage, which was in turn seen as breeding resentment and ethnically based competition. The imperative to celebrate separate identities (but not the identity of the ethnic majority) was seen as fostering isolated communities and impeding the development of common, shared identities and belonging. Such policies were accused of creating ethnic communities living ‘parallel lives’.

The promotion of stronger bonds and shared values at the local level—termed ‘community cohesion’—increasingly replaced multiculturalism and equality as the primary focus of local authorities. From 2006, after the report of a high-level Commission on Integration and Cohesion, local authorities were required to make a presumption against ‘single group’ funding; the latter was now expected to be the exception, requiring specific evidence-based justification, with funding of projects aimed at whole communities as the rule.

Because of the Muslim focus of the agenda, especially after the 2005 terror bombings carried out by ‘homegrown’ Muslim youth, cohesion has been entangled with policies around homeland security and counter-extremism, and have been criticised by civil society as promoting the ‘securitisation’ of minority-focused policy and the stigmatisation of particular groups. In particular, cohesion policy had an ambivalent relationship with the ‘Prevent’ agenda, which sought to combat violent extremism in Muslim populations, delivered in partnership between law enforcement agencies and local government. However, in practice, many local authorities used the Prevent funding to support community development and civic engagement work with Muslim residents. In 2010, in response to the rise in far-right violence, the Prevent agenda was reconfigured to target right-wing extremism as well as Islamist violence.

Although the current coalition government has tended to use the term ‘cohesion’ less often than the previous government did after 2001 (perhaps seeing it as too strongly associated with the politics of the Labour government), it continues to expound very similar concerns—around de facto segregation, perceived problematic Muslim communities and the apparent backlash politics in white working-class communities—and this is an area of significant continuity between the two administrations.

Cohesion also continues to be a concern for local authorities, who typically define the term according to local concerns and conditions, albeit under the influence of central government guidance and national public debate. For example, the London Borough of Hackney has a detailed policy on cohesion, which it has recently reviewed. The 2009 review document states that:

‘Cohesion is central to the vision that the Council and its partners have for Hackney as a borough. By cohesion we mean the practices and processes of living together; rather than a fixed state of a “cohesive community” which would remain static once achieved. There is also a feeling that what cohesion might mean in practice in Hackney could be quite different to other parts of the country’.
Interestingly, the review is clear that diversity and cohesion in the borough should not be framed solely in terms of ethnicity or migration, but also in terms of class, length of residence and other variables.  

III. YOUTH AS A CENTRAL FOCUS OF INTEGRATION POLICY

Traditionally, youth have not been a central focus of integration or cohesion policy in the United Kingdom. Recurrent moral panics have erupted around specific groups of minority ethnic youth: African-Caribbean ‘muggers’ in the 1970s, inner-city black youth during the period of urban unrest in the 1980s, the ‘Asian gang’ emerging in the 1990s, Asian youth in the mill town riots in Northern England in the early 2000s, Muslim youth during the terrorism scares of the 2000s, and urban youth in general in the 2011 riots. However, these themes have only occasionally been central to public and policy debates around integration, and concern for youth has largely existed in a parallel discursive space to the integration debate.

The divide between the policy areas is reflected institutionally as well at every level of governance. We have already seen that integration policy has moved between different government departments but now sits within the DCLG, while youth policy sits mainly within the Department for Education (although the Department for Work and Pensions is responsible for tackling youth unemployment and the Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills shares responsibility for improving the quality of training).

At the local level too, the two areas tend to be administratively divided and are usually the responsibility of different elected cabinet politicians. For instance, in the London Borough of Waltham Forest, integration falls within Community Safety and Cohesion while youth policy falls within Children and Young People. Youth work has embedded in Britain since the 1970s and has been an area in which the central government has not heavily intervened. Local authority and voluntary-sector agencies tend to share youth work and community development methods, and workers often move between agencies.

A. The Preventing Violent Extremism programme

The one policy area that bridges the ground between youth policy and integration policy is that of radicalisation and extremism among young people, and particularly young people from Muslim communities, most especially in the wake of the 2005 London bombings. This has been an area of broad continuity between the pre- and post-2010 governments. The Labour government developed a Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) programme, with counter-radicalisation among the young as a central goal. ‘Prevent’ was one of the four planks of the ‘Contest’ agenda on terrorism, published in the wake of the 7/7 bombings of 2005 alongside ‘Pursue, Protect and Prepare’. DCLG initially led on Prevent, a programme that distributed a ring-fenced budget allocated to local authorities with significant Muslim populations, with local authorities given considerable discretion on how they spent it.

Critics of the PVE programme argued that it blurred the line between integration or cohesion work and surveillance or security, in a way that stigmatised Muslim communities, and generated an atmosphere of distrust, disengagement, and grievance within them. Conversely, other critics argued that the funding was being ineffectively used by under-prepared local authorities, who often ended up funding groups some considered to be extremist.

Consequently, the strategy was refocused in 2010. The government published a new approach in June 2011, emphasising that legally operating nonviolent forms of extremism can be inspiration for terrorist ideologies, and also that al-Qaeda-type Islamism is the most pressing of a spectrum of threats that also include right-wing extremism. Subsequently, in July 2011, the government presented a new edition of the whole Contest strategy, reflecting these changes. In terms of Prevent, this described a widening of scope, to include nonviolent extremism; and a narrowing of focus, to clearly demarcate counterextremism and integration.

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B. NEETs and social inclusion

In terms of youth policy itself, the Labour government of 1997-2010 invested heavily in programmes aimed at tackling social exclusion among young people, framed as both a moral problem (centring on antisocial behavior) and a socio-economic problem (focused on barriers to employment, education, and training). As in other European countries, the issue of youth unemployment became prominent, with the emergence of the phenomenon of NEETs—young people not in education, employment, or training. By 2011, there were 1.16 million 16- to 24-year-olds in this situation. 29

Several major ring-fenced funding streams were dedicated to youth inclusion, such as the Positive Futures and Positive Activities for Young People programmes, and the Connexions youth employment service. Overall, government funding created a large voluntary-sector infrastructure for youth engagement. Although many of these programmes were targeted at areas of deprivation (including inner-city areas with larger minority ethnic populations), minority ethnic youth were rarely the primary target, and migrant youth still less. In all of these programmes, there was centrally provided support and guidance to support local agencies to design policy, some centrally coordinated evaluation, and a centrally dictated framing of the targets to be achieved. However, in design and in particular in implementation, local authorities had a great degree of discretion.

Since 2010, the coalition government has articulated many of the same policy concerns as the previous government, particularly in the areas of NEETs and social exclusion. The governing coalition has also continued developing youth policy away from central government to local government, thereby increasing the discretion of local authorities in designing and implementing services. The minister responsible for youth provision, Education Minister Michael Gove, has explicitly said that youth policy is not a priority for central government and argued that the previous government was too directive in this area. Meanwhile, fiscal austerity has meant an end to most of the ring-fenced funds and to massive cuts in local authorities’ own budgets for youth work, leading to a very significant reduction in provision for young people, which has meant, paradoxically, that local authorities have not welcomed the devolution of youth policy.

C. Youth social mobility

Youth policy under the current government in England and Wales falls within the remit of the Department of Education; in Scotland and Northern Ireland it is devolved to the regional tier of government. The Department’s core agenda includes schooling, but it also has a major workstream called ‘Children and Young People’ focusing beyond the school. This workstream is in turn broken down mainly in terms of the life cycle, with Young People as one of eight areas of work, along with Early Learning and Child Care, Families, and so on. The work under Young People includes Our Future, a longitudinal study of youth outcomes; activity relating to Qualifications and Learning; the Positive for Youth strategy, which builds partnerships with the private sector to provide activities to improve outcomes for young people; Student Support; Participation; a National Citizen Service (a voluntary eight-week summer programme for all 16- to 17-year-olds to give them the skills to engage in the Big Society); and the promotion of a military ethos.

The legislative framework for much of this activity, especially the Positive for Youth programme, was inherited from the previous government’s Education Act 2006, whose section 507B places a duty on local authorities to secure, as far as is practicable, sufficient services and activities to improve the well-being of young people—and, further, to take into account young people’s views and publicise information about available resources and programming. 30 The Coalition’s guidance on carrying out this duty emphasises the freedom and flexibility to respond to local needs and priorities. The guidance promotes transparency and local accountability. There is, however, no dedicated budget for this from the central government, and (in the context of austerity and cuts) local governments must identify funds from their own, tightly squeezed general budgets for this work, which may not be seen as a highest priority compared to other statutory duties. 31

29 Compared to the rest of the European Union, the United Kingdom has a below average level of adult unemployment but an average level of youth unemployment (UK Commission for Employment and Skills, The Youth Inquiry).


The focus on youth under the Coalition government has largely been within the strategy set by its flagship social mobility strategy, *Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers*, and is delivered through a series of measures falling within that strategy.

- Opening Doors identifies the need for ‘a life cycle approach’, aiming to ‘make life chances more equal at the critical points for social mobility’. The ‘transition years’ at 16+ are identified among these, as the point at which people’s paths diverge sharply. Among the policies set out for this stage are the raising of the education-locale participation age from 16 to 18 (implementing legislation passed in 2008 under the previous government), investment in learning for 16 to 19 year-olds, and an apprenticeship programme of vocational education.

- Youth Contract, a programme announced in November 2011, includes additional support for unemployed 16- to 24-year-olds, subsidies for small businesses taking them on as apprentices, and targeted support for moving NEETs into education, training or employment at ages 16 to 17. The Education Funding Agency (EFA) paid for this targeted support, but the implementation was contracted out to private and voluntary-sector providers.32

- Building Engagement, Building Futures (December 2011) fleshed out a strategy to raise participation during the transition years.

- A review of the Opening Doors strategy published in May 2012 identified indicators for measuring the achievement of its aims; at the transition years stage, these included education attainment at age 19 and participation in education or employment, including participation in higher education. It also gave local authorities a responsibility in identifying those at risk from becoming NEETs at age 16.33

- The raising of the participation age for these programmes, effective Summer 2013, expands the amount of time young people are expected to remain in education or training programmes. Initially, the age will be raised to the end of the academic year in which young people turn 17, and to their 18th birthday from Summer 2015. This adds an additional statutory duty on local authorities to promote effective participation and to identify those young people not participating.34

Guidance on local authority duties in relation to services and activities to improve young people’s well-being makes no reference to minority ethnic youth. This is despite evidence of need among some groups, collected by statutory agencies and disseminated by the Equality and Human Rights Commission.35 Building Engagement makes no reference to minority ethnic youth, despite evidence of lower participation rates for many groups. Guidance on involving young people and children makes no reference to migrant or minority ethnic youth or to any particular issues or barriers they may face in having their voice heard.36

The *Opening Doors* review identifies just one example of progress for minority ethnic young people: 74 paid intern placements lasting eight or nine weeks were offered to young people from black and minority ethnic groups and less well-off backgrounds in 2011. However, the review did also identify a need for the strategy to be sensitive to particular groups facing specific disadvantage, noting that poor white boys, and also young black men and Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, all have worse outcomes than others in society. The Government Equalities Office has been charged with identifying barriers faced by these groups, common themes across them, and strategies for how they could be addressed.

The coalition government has also mainstreamed the only ring-fenced fund aimed at minority ethnic young people. The Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant—which had provided additional support to schools with higher numbers of minority ethnic pupils and those whose home language was not English—was mainstreamed into the Direct School Finance, including the Pupil Premium (House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/SIP/67000, 14 August 2013), [www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06700/school-funding-pupil-premium](http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06700/school-funding-pupil-premium).

35 Department for Education, ‘Statutory Guidance for Local Authorities on to Services and Activities to Improve Young People’s Well-being.’
Nevertheless, due to the legacy of the working culture instilled in local government after decades of equality and anti-discrimination legislation, local authorities routinely monitor the use of youth and family services by ethnicity, and minority ethnic youth are typically over-represented in take-up of mainstream services. Individual youth work managers and youth workers tend to be very much aware of issues around discrimination and inclusion. Consequently, although there are almost no examples of systematic evaluation or overarching strategies in this regard, there are a wide range of formal and informal efforts made by local youth services in reaching out to minority youth users, listening to their concerns and tailoring appropriate services to them.

IV. TARGETING WITHIN MAINSTREAMING: YOUTH POLICY AND PROVISIONS FOR YOUTH OF IMMIGRANT ORIGIN

This section offers examples of promising local practices, drawn from Glasgow in Scotland and a number of boroughs in London. In some ways, these case studies are not completely typical of the UK scene. London is the city with the largest concentration of migrants and ethnic minorities, and there is a strong cross-party consensus that is more comfortable with diversity and more positive toward migrants than elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Similarly, Scotland’s population dynamics have meant that, despite lower levels of migration than most of the United Kingdom, there are more positive attitudes towards migrants. Nonetheless, despite widespread hostility to migration in other parts of the United Kingdom, local authorities across the country have taken up positive attitudes to diversity and promoted good relations, and there are examples of promising practices in integration in smaller cities such as Bristol or Peterborough or even from rural areas such as Breckland in the East of England.38

A. Case study: Glasgow

1. Overview of the Scottish context

Although not its capital, Glasgow is Scotland’s largest city, with a population of more than 1 million. It is an industrial city with a strong working class identity. Glasgow’s policy innovations occur within the context of wider policy innovations in a devolved Scotland. Under the terms of devolution, Scotland has responsibility for integration and cohesion, but no power over immigration. While the population of the United Kingdom as a whole continues to grow, Scotland’s population has declined in most of the last four decades. Although Glasgow and some other areas now have a growing population, some Scottish local authorities continue to face acute demographic challenges such as a growing elderly population, a decreasing working-age population and even depopulation—all of which mean that the continued provision of services may become untenable. Consequently, the Scottish government has identified in-migration as a solution to achieving ambitious population targets to address demographic challenges, including an initiative called Fresh Talent to promote in-migration. During 2005-08, under the Fresh Talent framework, the Scottish government negotiated the possibility for graduating students to live and work in Scotland beyond their normal visa period. A striking feature of the Scottish context, in contrast with England, is a broadly pro-migration cross-party consensus.

The Scottish government has worked closely with local government on migration and integration issues. The Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) produced a Migration Policy Toolkit for local authorities, launched in May 2010. They provided intensive support to some local authorities using the toolkit, and used this learning to share lessons more widely. The toolkit suggests policy options for local authorities to attract, retain, and integrate migrants, including work to support both migrants and settled communities. There is a focus on face-to-face communication, for instance the training of local councillors and front-line staff so they have accurate information on migration, its

38 See, for example, the promising practices in Hannah Jones, Country research report — United Kingdom, AMICALL UK Research Report UK (Oxford: COMPAS, January 2012), www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Events/Events 2012/AMICALL UK report Jan 2012_HJ.pdf.
benefits and their own role in promoting these benefits. The toolkit encourages similar work with local people. Since 2010, COSLA has worked with local authorities to use the toolkit to build migration-related policy into local mainstream planning of strategies and services.

2. Glasgow Overview

Glasgow is Scotland’s most demographically diverse city. It has a migration history, with some Jewish and non-Jewish migration from Eastern Europe in the early 20th century. Glasgow has a population of around 600,000 residents. As of 2010, there were an estimated 72,000 to 90,000 people from minority ethnic groups living in the city, equivalent to 12 to 15 per cent of the total population. The largest ethnic minority group is Pakistani (also referred to as the Scots Asian community) at 2.7 per cent of the population, followed by Indian and Chinese.

Since the Census of Population in 2001, Glasgow’s ethnic minority population has changed significantly. Two factors have contributed to this change. First, Glasgow was a dispersal centre under the UK asylum-seeker dispersal scheme (the only one in Scotland), and so has a substantial refugee and asylum-seeking population, from the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. The Council’s contract with the National Asylum Support Service was in its early stages in 2001. Since then, significant numbers of people have been granted refugee status. In 2007, there were 4,230 asylum seekers in Scotland, 92 per cent living in Glasgow (3,905 of these residing in dispersed accommodation in Glasgow). The majority of asylum seekers are from Pakistan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, and Iraq. Until 2007, the majority of asylum seekers were applying along with their families. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift and now approximately 80 per cent of asylum seekers are single people and 20 per cent are within families.

The second change in Glasgow’s ethnic minority population is due to the fact that the city has been an important destination for migrants from the ten new EU Member States. Evidence suggests that the number of migrants from EU accession countries is likely to reach 5,000 to 15,000; and likely to be toward the higher end of this estimate. Examples include the number of registrations of Polish people, which have decreased substantially since a peak in 2007; and the number of registrations of Romanian people, which have increased substantially since 2007, though are still relatively small.39

These changes could be connected to Glasgow’s improved employment position since 1996. There has also been an increase in the number of international students. These factors have changed not only the size of the ethnic minority population in Glasgow, but also its diversity. The city has increased numbers of people coming from European countries, like Poland, generally for economic reasons. They are becoming a community themselves. Glasgow’s new migrants also originate from other European countries. For example, Govanhill in Glasgow has seen an increase in the Roma community.40

Overall, the Glasgow City Council’s approach to migration is similar to that of the Scottish government—encouraging migration as part of an overall economic development strategy. Policy innovation around migrants in Glasgow has included a focus on migrant children and youth but the authors found that the ongoing work in Glasgow around the integration of its minority youth is intertwined closely with services for the mainstream young population. Representatives in local government did not indicate a particular difference in approach in tackling the issues facing young people from minority groups.

The initiatives and programmes for minority youth in Glasgow vary in their scope and objectives. Glasgow City Council used to have more funding for this area, but this has decreased and now the council delegates the work to other organisations. Councillors and community representatives indicated that minority youth were not a special point of focus (as it was felt that this would reinforce the stigma and discrimination), but instead, policies and programmes targeted young people in general.

There was an emphasis on social cohesion and integration to bridge the gap between the settled (including the indigenous people of Glasgow and the Asians and South Asians) and the more recent immigrant communities (in particular, the Roma community in Govanhill, the most multiethnic part of the city). The City Council’s education service has been active in developing comprehensive multimedia curriculum resources for antiracism work in both primary and secondary schools. The AMICALL research project, interviewing local policymakers, heard widespread suggestions

that one of the most important factors in promoting positive attitudes toward migrants had been the presence of migrant children in schools, because it is a way of making migrant families part of local communities.\footnote{Hannah Jones, \textit{Country research report — United Kingdom}, 33.} Intense tutoring in the English language for newly arrived children with the most basic levels of English supported these integration efforts.

3. Promising practice examples in Glasgow

There are several examples of promising practices in Glasgow, especially among organisations that work with migrant and minority youth. Many of these are civil-society organisations based in migrant and minority communities, such as the Minorities Youth Foundation (MYF) or the Youth Community Support Agency (YCSA). Some work across minority communities, as with MYF and YCSA; others work with specific ethnic or faith populations, such as the Roma Youth Project and the Roma East Project. The Active Life Project works with Pakistani youth. Other programmes, such as Glasgow All Nations Sports And Recreation, have broadened from an ethnic minority approach to a whole community approach. Approaches include providing activities, for instance through sport; providing language education and skills training; careers advice and counselling. There are also organisations working specifically on integration: for example, Bridging the Gap attempts to tackle sectarianism, discrimination, and racism in local schools, and also works to help asylum seekers and refugees to settle into local communities. And the Bridges Programmes is a long-running initiative to provide access to employment for migrants, including through close partnerships with employers in across sectors.

Local youth- or adult-oriented neighbourhood anchor organisations provide specific support to migrants or minorities. The Castlemilk Youth Complex is one good example: it is a youth-managed, arts-focused facility, and the majority of its directors are young people living, working, or studying in its locality. The Complex delivers a number of educational and employability projects, developed through a structured programme of ongoing consultation with users. While predominantly an arts-focused organisation, it also runs citizenship and personal development courses. Castlemilk has a number of settled asylum seekers, and the project has worked closely with them.

There are also umbrella organisations that work with minorities both regionally and locally. For instance, the Roma Youth Project and Roma East Project are delivered by the West of Scotland Regional Equality Council (WSREC), a voluntary organisation registered as a charity. WSREC is one of the four Regional Equality Councils in Scotland and its area of operation covers almost half of Scotland with 12 local authorities. The Council of Ethnic Minority Voluntary Sector Organisations (CEMVO Scotland) is another umbrella body for groups that focus on ethnic minorities in Scotland. CEMVO has developed a programme of work encouraging minority ethnic youth into social enterprise by delivering workshops to enhancing their skills. The South East Integration Network is another umbrella body for community organisations that deal with black and minority ethnic groups. This network covers the part of the city (Govanhill) with the largest multiethnic population. And the Glasgow Refugee, Asylum, and Migration Network is an initiative of the University of Glasgow and a partnership with a range of community and public organisations working in the integration field to develop user-led research, knowledge exchange, and a platform for public engagement.

4. Summary

The City of Glasgow is host to the largest population of refugees and asylum seekers under the dispersal policy, and it also has a history of hosting large communities of migrants. Glasgow has a large number of organisations working with migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in a variety of ways. Although immigration is not a devolved matter, it is clear that Scotland provides a distinctive context for migration, refugee, and asylum issues within the United Kingdom. In addition, Scotland’s traditional communities have shown distinctive and creative approaches to the integration and sustaining of new and unstable populations, and to promoting health, prosperity, peace-building, and community sustainability.
B. Case study: London

London is the United Kingdom’s capital city and its most diverse and migrant-rich location. It has a complex governance structure with an elected London Mayor and Assembly with limited administrative power, and a mosaic of local authorities called the London boroughs. The Mayor has a migrant integration strategy, London Enriched. Children and young people have been a priority within that strategy.42

In general, the most deprived and most ethnically diverse London boroughs are located in inner London, and these boroughs have seen major challenges arising from the combination of poverty and demographic change, but have also experienced substantial policy innovation in the field of integration. There are, therefore, promising practice examples from several London boroughs. All of the following boroughs were involved in the summer 2011 youth riots, and have consequently invested considerable energy into investigating the causes of the riots and in ensuring appropriate youth services are retained in the context of fiscal austerity.

1. Hackney: a smart mainstreaming approach to cohesion

The London Borough of Hackney has a large migrant population and still larger minority ethnic population; it describes itself as ‘a truly global borough, home to more than 207,000 people from six continents and a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. More than 100 languages are spoken in the borough’.43 Forty per cent of Hackney residents were born abroad (28 per cent are from other EU countries). Just 36 per cent of the population is white British, with White Other (16 per cent) and black (11 per cent) forming the largest other ethnic groups. Twenty-five per cent of the population speaks a language other than English as their main language. Hackney has long been ‘superdiverse’, in the sense that its minority ethnic population is composed of many different groups rather than particular large groups, which creates challenges for service delivery. Responding to this challenge has been the main driver of the horizontal coordination of different sectors in the borough, in order to balance meeting the needs of the whole community and ensuring that no particular group is left out.

Hackney coordinates its work with a range of other stakeholders, who sit together on the borough’s Local Strategic Partnership, Team Hackney. The Hackney Council for Voluntary Service (HCVS) represents the voluntary sector on this body. Hackney’s approach to integration is an evidence-led mainstream approach. Hackney has a strong commitment to valuing diversity. According to Team Hackney’s strategy document,

‘It has been the Mayor of Hackney’s ambition since his election in 2002 “to achieve balanced, sustainable communities and neighbourhoods, which celebrate our diversity and share in London’s growing prosperity and enable a good quality of life for all.” We recognise that ensuring that diversity continues to be a strength in the context of growth is a challenge, but also that the borough’s diversity is one of its greatest strengths’.44

Although ‘integration’ is not an identified policy goal of the local authority, ‘cohesion’ is central to the council’s long-term plan (namely, the Sustainable Community Strategy, published in 2008). The commitment to cohesion means that, as well as valuing diversity, initiatives target whole communities rather than specific groups, while still addressing the persistent disadvantages of specific groups. This approach is described in the report of the AMICALL project:

‘The LA [local authority] corporate policy, and the approach described by all LA representatives interviewed for this research, is that “migrants” are not treated as a distinct group by the LA. This is partly in recognition of the vast diversity within the category of “migrant”. The LA emphasises service provision to meet needs, rather than category of person, and attempts to meet diverse needs within mainstream services, rather than devising discrete services for different groups. Those interviewed for this research stressed that developing mainstream services to cater for everyone was complemented by working to identify minority or specialist needs to be included, such as migrant status... A cross-cutting review of work on cohesion was established in June 2009, which sought to focus the LA on a relevant local definition and approach to cohesion, to gather empirical research about potential

problems, and to develop practical interventions where necessary. This review included migration as one dimension of diversity and cohesion, but did not privilege it above other questions such as economic inequality or discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or religion’.

2. Waltham Forest: involving young people and combating gangs

The Borough of Waltham Forest in East London is also diverse, with just 36 per cent of white British ethnicity, White Other at 14.5 per cent and Pakistani at 10 per cent. Nine per cent of the population are from EU accession states. Twenty-two per cent are Muslim. The significant Muslim population has meant that, in the context of the post-9/11 concerns about terrorism, both cohesion and counter-radicalisation have been major priorities in the community. The council launched its Community Cohesion Task Group in 2003 in response to rising tensions related to British participation in the Iraq War. The local authority’s sense that it did not fully understand the dynamics of its Muslim communities nor did it have their confidence was one of the main drivers of the innovative approaches to the cross-sectoral coordination of policies that the borough has subsequently developed.

The multisector taskforce conducted a survey, Religion and Faith in Focus, which mapped religion, ethnicity, gender, and economic activity in the borough and established a benchmark to guide future development of its work on community cohesion. Tensions deepened in 2006 with high-profile arrests of terror suspects in the borough. The council responded with the One Community strategy to brand the borough as more cohesive and united. The council commissioned the Institute for Community Cohesion to investigate cohesion issues locally, resulting in the 2007 report, Breaking Down the ‘Walls of Silence’, which identified a culture of mistrust between local communities and police and security forces. The report showed that Muslim communities did not feel listened-to, and revealed widespread concerns about youth involvement in gangs and crime. The council launched a series of initiatives in response to this, which were recognised when the borough was awarded Beacon status for ‘Cohesive and resilient communities’ in the Local Innovation Awards Scheme in 2008, 2009, and 2010.

Waltham Forest has a very strong record on involving young people. Among its flagship policies are its Young Advisers programme, with trained consultants who work with the council and its partner services to ensure they are youth-friendly and advise on how to make services better for young people locally. Another is its Gangs Prevention Programme, ‘Enough is Enough’, a council-funded programme which seeks to support young people and their families in making positive choices and moving away from negative lifestyles. Linked to this is a central government funded small grants programme for amounts between 500 pounds and 20,000 pounds for organisations to work in combating gang membership and the factors which cause it. Although these programmes are not targeted at minority youth, they work with the borough’s diverse youth population and many of their aspects can been seen as promising practices in reaching minority youth. Another project, identified by the Open Society Foundations’ At Home in Europe project as an example of good practice is the Youth Independent Advisory Group (YIAG), comprised of young people who provide advice on community safety. Some of these are former young offenders who are trained to deliver conflict management workshops to young people in youth offending teams and pupil referral units. They also provide advice on interventions with gangs and have been involved in training police officers following young people’s experiences of stop and search.

46 Institute of Community Cohesion (iCoCo), Breaking Down the ‘Walls of Silence’: Supporting Community Engagement and Tackling Extremism in the London Borough of Waltham Forest, 8 August 2007, [www.wfcw.org/docs/038.%20Cantle,T.%20et%20al.%20%282007%29%20Breaking%20down%20the%20%27Walls%20of%20silence%27%20Supporting%20community%20cohesion%20in%20Waltham%20Forest.pdf](http://www.wfcw.org/docs/038.%20Cantle,T.%20et%20al.%20%282007%29%20Breaking%20down%20the%20%27Walls%20of%20silence%27%20Supporting%20community%20cohesion%20in%20Waltham%20Forest.pdf).
3. **Lewisham: an intercultural approach to youth inclusion**

The London Borough of Lewisham, in Southeast London, is also ethnically diverse: with a 40 per cent white British population, black Caribbean population of 12 per cent, black African 12 per cent, and White Other 10 per cent. While it is often thought of as a fairly cohesive borough, it has a large number of hate crimes, and was a location of the 2011 youth riots. The area is characterised by fairly high levels of multiple deprivation. As with Hackney, the challenge of super-diversity has been a main driver of the cross-sectoral coordination in Lewisham. Its Sustainable Community Plan puts a large emphasis on reducing inequalities.

Lewisham has also promoted a policy of devolving decision making and outsourcing of services to other providers. Since 2005, Lewisham hosted a case study as part of the Comedia Intercultural City research project, which worked with the borough in involving diverse communities, including young people, in designing inclusive public spaces. Since then, Lewisham has been active in the Council of Europe’s Intercultural Cities network, and taken an explicitly intercultural rather than multicultural branding for its policies, giving it a subtly different perspective on integration and cohesion than other London boroughs. Public statements of commitment to interculturalism reflect this philosophy, as does the tendency to support projects that bring groups together in dialogue rather than celebrating specific cultures. Policies around planning and public space also reflect this approach, and have foregrounded creating spaces for young people and especially ‘safe havens’ in the context of gang activity.

A parallel programme in Lewisham focuses on involving young people in democratic decision making. The Intercultural Cities project describes this effort:

> ‘Many local authorities have adopted the idea of youth parliaments but these can often appear tokenistic. On the other hand the Lewisham Young Mayor seems a much more robust attempt to put real power and responsibility in the hands of young people and treat them seriously. The Young Mayor is elected by direct ballot every year and – along with a cabinet of young advisors – is given a budget (£30,000 per annum) to initiate a programme of work, as well as to scrutinize the work of [the borough mayor] and the Council’.

4. **One Tower Hamlets**

The London Borough of Tower Hamlets is another superdiverse East London borough, a historic migration gateway for the United Kingdom, with a history of Jewish, Irish, Bangladeshi, and other migrants. In the last decade, the actual size of the foreign-origin population has not increased but the number of different groups has, creating new challenges for policymakers used to working with specific ethnic communities. Although less than in the 1990s, there are some community tensions between and within different ethnic and religious groups, and high-profile cases of both Islamist and far-right extremism.

The borough’s Local Strategic Partnership, Tower Hamlets Partnership, has a Community Plan with a number of aims, parallel for example to Hackney’s Sustainable Community Strategy. What makes it distinct, however, is the crosscutting One Tower Hamlets strategy, which encompasses work towards tackling inequality, strengthening cohesion, and building community leadership and personal responsibility. This was developed out of a refreshing of the council’s Community Plan in 2007-08, as well as from the Bridging Communities Project, which used research (and in particular a series of focus groups involving 400 residents) to identify key local barriers to community cohesion. The One Tower Hamlets approach has focused on moving from target-group based to whole-community cohesion work, but also identifying evidence of persistent need and disadvantage faced by particular groups. More recently, it has been working to foreground migrant populations as well as minority ethnic populations in this work. It is a good example of mainstreaming of integration work in the sense that it is led by a very high-level team within the council’s crosscutting Strategy, Policy, and Performance service in the Chief Executive’s Directorate, rather than being placed in a departmental silo.

A key area of mainstreaming work in this borough has been education. The auditing and monitoring processes instituted under the Labour government from the late 1990s led to the identification of significant gaps in outcomes between ethnic groups in the borough. The local authority worked to build a cross-agency and cross-community consensus...
about the need to move away from an earlier culture of low expectations. The local authority then developed an action plan around this and devoted significant resources to schools. High-quality data, including pupil tracking systems, were central to this. The plan’s ingredients were consistent leadership, alliance with local business and local community groups, and intensive work with parents. For example, the council worked with mosques to challenge the culture of taking children out of school for long periods to visit family in sending countries. The strategy has rapidly resulted in a narrowing of the gap but also some of the best education outcomes in London for all children—not just those previously disadvantaged. In the space of eight years, Tower Hamlets more than doubled the proportion of children obtaining five good General Certificates of Secondary Education from 25 per cent to 61 per cent.

5. Southwark: bringing minorities and young people inside the mainstream

The London Borough of Southwark, neighbouring Lewisham in South London, is similarly diverse, with 39 per cent of the population white British and 16 per cent black African. Although the borough is seen as fairly cohesive, there have been issues of youth gang behavior, and the borough has been targeted by the Prevent programme as having risk factors for violent extremism. As with Waltham Forest, these sorts of pressures, along with the super-diversity challenges similar to those in Hackney and Lewisham, have been the main drivers in building cross-sectoral coordination.

The council used its Prevent funding to support community development and cohesion work and bring its heterogeneous Muslim population inside its existing community development infrastructure. It actively sought to avoid a stigmatising target-group approach—that is, the council engaged in mainstreaming in discourse in delivering the Prevent programme. Several of the Prevent initiatives worked with young people, often using urban popular culture as a hook, such as the South City Radio project to hear young Muslim voices. It has also worked to make the police and other mainstream services more engaged with and knowledgeable of the local Muslim communities.

Southwark has developed an extensive programme of training both young people and minority communities in peer research approaches, based on the principle that community members are best placed to understand and represent the needs of diverse populations. This has been used within the Prevent programme to work with Muslim communities, but in other programmes to engage other migrant and non-migrant groups. Like Waltham Forest, Southwark was awarded Beacon status for ‘Cohesive and resilient communities’ in the Local Innovation Awards Scheme for this work.

6. Summary

London local authorities have taken a leadership position in developing innovative work on including and engaging minority young people and in developing mainstreamed integration and cohesion strategies (most impressively in Tower Hamlets and Hackney, which have both developed strong evidence-based whole community approaches). The culture of measurement and monitoring built up during the 1997-2010 period through the social inclusion and equalities agendas provided robust frameworks for evidencing the success of these approaches, most clearly demonstrated, for example, in Tower Hamlets’ educational improvement.

A range of methodologies were used for timely identification of issues and problems and for listening to migrant youth and families. In all cases, young people from minority communities are well represented in the consultative structures of local authorities (most impressively in the case of the Waltham Forest and Lewisham case studies). In all cases, minority communities are well represented or over-represented in local authority staff teams, especially among community development and youth workers. Youth work and community development work methodologies are widely shared across local authority and voluntary providers, including an emphasis on users’ holistic personal development and on giving voice, and participatory techniques such as the use of peer researchers. However, these dimensions of mainstreaming are much less straightforward to systematically evaluate, and the success of such measures has been reported anecdotally rather than evidenced.
V. CONCLUSION

There is considerable evidence for widespread mainstreaming in integration policies and practices in the United Kingdom at the national and local levels, including mainstreaming in discourse, policies, and governance structures. The central government has tended to set the overall agenda on integration—both under the previous government with its emphasis on cohesion and equality and under the current government with its emphasis on localism. However, just as multicultural policies were often initiated at the local level without central-government sanction in an earlier period, local authorities continue to develop their own approaches to integration, both in adapting national agendas to local situations and in designing innovative policy.

On the question of whether mainstreaming integration in the United Kingdom has been deliberate or driven according to needs on the ground, it seems that the push towards mainstreaming has come from four different (and perhaps contradictory) directions.

First, the long-standing civil-society suspicion of framing minorities as migrants and pursuing integration goals has often meant that where there are targeted policies, they have addressed the needs of ethnic minorities rather than migrants, and have been subsumed within a concern for equality and diversity.

More recently, an ideological commitment to localism and the Big Society at the national level, combined with a suspicion of top-down and regulatory antidiscrimination measures, has meant that the current government has relinquished responsibility and leadership in the field of integration and ended almost all central guidance and funding for it. This might create space for the development of innovative local approaches in some areas, but also raises the risk of policy marginalisation.

The United Kingdom’s localist turn and the emphasis on mainstreaming should be welcomed, as the processes of integration occur primarily at the local level.

Third, harsh fiscal austerity measures since 2008 and especially since the 2010 election have forced local authorities to cut integration, inclusion, and community development budgets—which are seen as a luxury compared to more pressing needs and statutory obligations. But austerity has also driven some innovation in meeting integration and cohesion objectives through the mainstream.

Fourth, at a local level, responding to local conditions and building an independent evidence base has led some local authorities toward a ‘smart mainstreaming’ approach, as in the One Tower Hamlets or Team Hackney examples set out above: a whole community focus but with consistent, strategic, and intelligence-led attention to persistent needs or inequalities faced by particular communities. Although this builds on the possibilities opened up by austerity and localism, it is vulnerable to a lack of funding and has only been seen in relatively isolated cases.

These ‘targeting within mainstreaming’ approaches appear to work best when driven by high-level officials within local authorities, and with a crossdepartmental remit; otherwise, traditional patterns of silo working can prevent coordination. Sometimes, however, it seems that individual officials become identified with the work, which is then vulnerable to their departure or restructuring.

Finally, there are other promising practice examples that devolve responsibility to the voluntary sector, social enterprise, and private agencies, which are often more responsive to the needs of minority communities. Since highly motivated individuals often engage in this work, it too is vulnerable to their departure or burnout, or to small reductions in funding.

The United Kingdom’s localist turn and the emphasis on mainstreaming should be welcomed, as the processes of integration occur primarily at the local level and as it is clear that mainstream policies, rather than integration policies as such, are the best levers for integration. However, the main concern with this turn is that, especially in a context of fiscal austerity, a mainstreamed approach might obscure the strong evidence for persistent inequalities, disadvantages, disproportionalities, and specific barriers facing particular groups.
WORKS CITED


ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Sundas Ali completed her doctorate in sociology from Nuffield College at the University of Oxford. Her research interests encompass national identity and belonging, particularly in relation to Muslims in Britain. Her publications include several journal articles and book chapters on minorities, ethnic identity, and public opinion. Dr. Ali has also worked with the team conducting the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Survey and has carried out policy work for the Aga Khan Foundation on minority groups in Britain. She has recently completed a Foresight project on the future of identities in the United Kingdom for the Government Office for Science and is undertaking another Foresight project that looks at the future of cities in relation to belonging, citizenship, and identity. She is also analysing the 2011 Census data on Muslims for the Muslim Council of Britain.

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Migration Policy Institute Europe, established in Brussels in 2011, is a non-profit, independent research institute that aims to provide a better understanding of migration in Europe and thus promote effective policymaking. Building upon the experience and resources of the Migration Policy Institute, which operates internationally, MPI Europe provides authoritative research and practical policy design to governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders who seek more effective management of immigration, immigrant integration, and asylum systems as well as successful outcomes for newcomers, families of immigrant background, and receiving communities throughout Europe. MPI Europe also provides a forum for the exchange of information on migration and immigrant integration practices within the European Union and Europe more generally.