NOT ADDING UP
THE FADING PROMISE OF EUROPE’S DUBLIN SYSTEM

EU ASYLUM: TOWARDS 2020 PROJECT

By Susan Fratzke
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March 2015
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The research project aims to contribute to development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) consistent with the European Union’s interests, values, and obligations, through research on challenges and options on asylum to inform the development of evidence-based policies and laws. The project will involve broad consultations with Member States, EU institutions, civil society, international organisations, and academics, to draw on their expertise and seek to work towards consensus on the many key questions around responses to asylum on which perspectives differ.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** .......................................................... 1

**I. INTRODUCTION** ............................................................. 2

**II. BACK TO THE BASICS: DUBLIN’S FOUNDING PRINCIPLES** ...... 4  
*The necessity of the Dublin system* .................................................. 6

**III. NOT MEASURING UP: EVALUATING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE DUBLIN SYSTEM** .......................................................... 7  
A. *An uneven burden* ................................................................. 8  
B. *Actual transfer rates are low* ................................................... 11  
C. *Member States often exchange similar numbers of requests* .......... 13  
D. *Secondary movement and ‘asylum shopping’ remain issues* ........... 13  
E. *Costs* ..................................................................................... 15

**IV. DUBLIN’S UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: ACCESS TO PROTECTION AND OTHER IMPACTS** ............................................ 16  
A. *Disruption of family unity and risks to vulnerable individuals* ........ 17  
B. *Delayed access to asylum procedures* ........................................ 18  
C. *Detention* .............................................................................. 19  
D. *Access to protection after transfer* ............................................ 19  
E. *Other risks* ............................................................................ 20

**V. WHERE TO FROM HERE?** .................................................... 20  
A. *Evaluating the promise of Dublin III* ........................................ 20  
B. *A rocky road ahead* ............................................................... 23

**VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS** ............................ 24

**APPENDIX. DUBLIN REQUESTS AND TRANSFERS, 2012** .............. 26

**WORKS CITED** ........................................................................ 28

**ABOUT THE AUTHOR** ................................................................ 32
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Europe’s Dublin system has been the subject of intense political debate since its inception. It has, on the one hand, been lauded as the cornerstone of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), and on the other vilified as a failure of solidarity and burden-sharing among European Union (EU) Member States.1

In truth, the Dublin system was not designed to equalise or share asylum burdens. Rather, its chief purpose is simply to create a mechanism that swiftly assigns responsibility for processing an individual asylum application to a single Member State. By establishing a legal framework for assigning responsibility, the Dublin Regulation (and its predecessor, the Dublin Convention) seeks to ensure quick access to protection for those in need, and to discourage abuses of the asylum system by preventing applicants from ‘shopping’ for the Member State with the most favourable procedures or reception conditions. Dublin—or a mechanism like it—will remain a necessity as long as separate national asylum systems exist within a European area that lacks internal border controls. As implemented, however, the Dublin Regulation is largely failing to achieve its two primary goals.

Low effective transfer rates and a persistently high incidence of secondary movement among asylum seekers (both before and after filing an application) have undermined the efficiency of the Dublin system. In addition, Dublin has been criticised for leading to unnecessary transfers, particularly when cases could be dealt with quickly (as with manifestly unfounded claims) or when Member States exchange similar numbers of cases. Asylum advocates, meanwhile, have raised serious concerns about the delays that Dublin procedures cause in the evaluation of protection claims. Such delays may disrupt family unity and put vulnerable individuals at risk. Applicants may be returned to nations (e.g., Greece) whose struggling asylum systems lack the capacity to process their claims or provide them with adequate reception conditions.

The criticism most often levelled at the Dublin Regulation is that it has prompted a transfer of asylum-processing responsibilities from Europe’s north to its southern borders—a charge that is not borne out by the evidence.

The 2013 recast of the Dublin Regulation seeks to address some of these concerns by clarifying how Dublin assigns responsibility for asylum claims, by tightening deadlines and by creating an ‘early warning and preparedness mechanism’ to support Member States whose asylum systems are under strain. Most significantly, the recast Dublin (known

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as Dublin III) recognises the responsibility of the transferring Member State to ensure that applicants’ rights are respected at destination—reasoning used by courts to halt transfers to Greece.

The practical effects of the amended regulation remain to be seen (and will likely depend in part on the interpretation of European courts); what is obvious, meanwhile, is that critical gaps in the system remain unfilled. Crucially, the regulation does not recognise or address the main factor underlying the Dublin system’s problems: despite the harmonisation efforts of the CEAS, essential differences remain in the asylum procedures, reception conditions, and integration capacity of EU Member States. Such differences invalidate Dublin’s core assumption that asylum applicants will receive equal consideration and treatment wherever they submit their claims. Addressing this key issue, however, may lie beyond the scope of the Dublin Regulation as it now stands.

There is growing agreement among Member States and advocates alike that the Dublin system is in need of adjustment to reflect the divergent realities of Member States’ asylum systems (although opinions differ on the extent of the adjustment required). The European Commission’s scheduled ‘fitness check’ of the Dublin recast in 2016 presents a unique opportunity to consider future adjustments to the responsibility distribution mechanism. In particular, the following two topics are ripe for review:

- **Priorities for further information gathering.** There is a dearth of high-quality data on the implementation of many aspects of the Dublin system; exploring these under-researched areas should be a priority. Better information is needed on the following items in particular: the duration of Dublin procedures, causes of delays, barriers to completing transfers, the costs of Dublin mechanisms at the national level, and the impact of Dublin transfers on successful applicants’ integration prospects.

- **Avenues for further policy development.** Small-scale measures to improve communication and collaboration among Member States’ asylum authorities on individual cases might streamline decision-making and transfer procedures. Also, it may be worth revisiting previous proposals for mechanisms to reduce unnecessary transfers by fast-tracking certain cases or ‘cancelling out’ transfers between Member States exchanging similar numbers of transfer requests.

Finally, the scale of current pressures on asylum systems in Europe suggests another possibility: there may be room to move beyond limited policy adjustments and consider deeper changes to how the CEAS assigns responsibility for cases. Possibilities include capacity-sharing arrangements such as joint processing or mutual recognition of asylum decisions. Measures like these would not only negate the need for the Dublin system, but could also contribute to reducing irregular movement within the European Union by accommodating asylum seekers’ preferences, a major driver of onward migration. In the coming years the Commission and Member States will need to seriously consider whether it is best to continue investing in the Dublin system as it stands or to explore more comprehensive changes.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The crises repeatedly plaguing individual asylum systems across Europe in recent years have refocused public attention on the need for a truly common asylum system, in law and practice, within the European Union (EU). This is not a new objective. Building a functioning Common European Asylum System (CEAS) has been a stated goal of successive Council of the European Union presidencies since the Council’s 1999 Tampere conclusions. The various directives and regulations on asylum procedures, qualification standards, and reception conditions adopted by the EU Council and European Parliament since 1999—and their subsequent revisions—have sought to move the European Union and its Member States closer to achieving this goal. But as some Member States face increased asylum pressures, a consensus has begun to build among asylum advocates, some national governments, and EU officials alike that key parts of the CEAS, and their implementation in practice, require extensive rethinking.
At the heart of the debate over the CEAS are the 2003 Dublin Regulation (Dublin II, which took the place of the Dublin Convention of the 1990s) and its 2013 recast (Dublin III). (See Box 1.) This regulation determines which Member State is responsible for examining an asylum claim lodged within the European Union. It has on one side been unequivocally affirmed as a ‘cornerstone’ of the CEAS by many of the top asylum-receiving Member States, and on the other borne intense criticism from asylum advocates and Europe’s border states.

Box 1. Evolution of the Dublin system

The Member States of the then-European Community first negotiated the Dublin Convention in 1990 in conjunction with the agreement of the Schengen Convention removing internal borders for most states within the European Community (known as the Schengen zone). The Dublin Convention was initially signed by Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Austria and Sweden joined in 1997, and Finland joined in 1998.

The Dublin Regulation (known as Dublin II) replaced the Dublin Convention in 2003. Dublin II essentially maintained but clarified the criteria for determining responsibility under the Dublin Convention, and brought the Dublin system fully under EU governance procedures, which had evolved since the signing of the original Convention. Dublin II was accompanied by the EURODAC Regulation, which established a database for recording fingerprint data of asylum applicants to aid implementation of the Dublin system. All EU Member States except Denmark acceded to Dublin II; Denmark, which is not bound to EU asylum rules, joined the same year via a bilateral agreement. Non-EU Schengen zone members also participated in Dublin II: Norway and Iceland joined in 2006 and Switzerland and Luxembourg in 2008 (although Norway and Iceland had prior agreements under the Dublin Convention).

In 2013, the European Council and Parliament agreed upon a revision of the Dublin Regulation (known as Dublin III) that sought to address some criticisms of the 2003 legislation. In particular, Dublin III further clarified the hierarchy of criteria determining Member State responsibility and established a mechanism to warn of potential problems with Member States’ asylum systems. Dublin III came into effect in January 2014.

While some Member States believe Dublin is essential to the effective operation of their asylum systems, others feel it unfairly burdens them with additional responsibilities that jeopardise their ability to provide protection. Asylum advocates have continually expressed concerns that Dublin interferes with asylum seekers’ ability to quickly access protection, and may expose them to additional, unnecessary risks by returning them to Member States that lack the capacity to effectively process their applications or by separating them from family members. Meanwhile, several of the Member States that consistently receive the most asylum applications—and whose systems have effectively processed them—have pointed to Dublin as an important mechanism for ensuring other governments are fulfilling their responsibilities under the CEAS.

While Dublin fills a crucial gap in the CEAS—by providing a mechanism to determine responsibility for asylum claims—the system as it currently functions is failing to achieve its twin goals of streamlining asylum procedures and providing swift access to protection.

In recent years, various stakeholders, including the European Commission and advocacy groups, have conducted extensive evaluations of Dublin II’s impact and functioning, and made numerous recommendations on how to mitigate some of its less desirable consequences. This report draws on the existing literature and on interviews with select 3

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Member State officials to present a critical assessment of the Dublin system. The report finds that while Dublin fills a crucial gap in the CEAS—by providing a mechanism to determine responsibility for asylum claims—the system as it currently functions is failing to achieve its twin goals of streamlining asylum procedures and providing swift access to protection. A mechanism such as Dublin will be necessary as long as separate national asylum systems exist in a European area without internal border controls. But adjustments are needed—within the framework of the current legislation—to enable the system to live up to its potential.

The report begins by examining the key criticisms of Dublin II, with special attention to those that address the efficient operation of the European asylum system and the ability of applicants to quickly access asylum procedures and protection. The report then evaluates the potential of the recently adopted recast of the Regulation (Dublin III), and concludes by recommending several topics for consideration during the European Commission’s scheduled 2016 review of the Dublin system.

II. BACK TO THE BASICS: DUBLIN’S FOUNDING PRINCIPLES

While the at-times perverse consequences of the Dublin system have been described as a failure of ‘responsibility sharing’ among EU Member States, the Dublin II Regulation and the preceding Dublin Convention were not originally designed as a mechanism to share responsibility. Adopted in 2003 as the first element of the new Common European Asylum System, Dublin II aimed simply to establish a mechanism swiftly to determine the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application based on agreed-upon criteria—and to ensure that all asylum claims receive a substantive examination.

The principles underpinning today’s system originated in the 1990 Dublin Convention, adopted shortly after the implementation of the border-free Schengen zone within what was then the European Community. It soon became clear to Member States that removing Europe’s internal borders had created a need for greater harmonisation in other policy areas, including asylum. In facilitating internal mobility, Schengen made it possible for asylum seekers to move across EU borders, and thus introduced grounds for Member States to dispute responsibility for examining asylum claims. The Dublin Convention was therefore designed to forestall the anticipated twin phenomenon of ‘asylum shopping’ (i.e., asylum seekers choosing to submit applications to those Member States perceived as most likely to accept them or to offer the most generous reception benefits) and ‘asylum seekers in orbit’ (when no Member State accepts responsibility for an application, delaying access to protection).

The Dublin II Regulation and the preceding Dublin Convention were not originally designed as a mechanism to share responsibility.

The two main purposes of the Dublin system, as affirmed in its 2013 recast (Dublin III), are therefore (1) to ensure quick access to protection for those in need, and (2) to improve the efficiency of asylum procedures and reduce costs to Member States by deterring asylum seekers from submitting multiple applications. To achieve this, the Regulation sets out a hierarchy of criteria to allocate responsibility for a claim, of particular use when an applicant may have transited through more than one Member State (see Box 2).

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5 Here and throughout, the Dublin II Regulation refers to Council of the European Union, ‘Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003’. Dublin III is used to reference European Union, ‘Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013’. This report draws on research and analysis of the 2003 Dublin II and EURODAC regulations, which applied to asylum claims and requests to assume responsibility submitted before 1 January 2014. Dublin II’s implementation has been the subject of the most relevant and comprehensive analysis to date. Where applicable, the report also refers to the recast Dublin III Regulation, adopted in June 2013, which applies to asylum claims and requests for take back or take charge submitted after 1 January 2014.

Box 2. The Dublin hierarchy of criteria

The Dublin Regulation stipulates that the criteria for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application are to be applied in the following order:

**Family unity.** The first three criteria for determining responsibility (Articles 8 through 11 in Dublin III; Articles 6 through 8 in Dublin II) prioritise family unity and the welfare of unaccompanied minors. Asylum seekers who have family members with recognised refugee status or who are in the process of applying for asylum will have their claims determined in the state where their nuclear family members are located. Where an unaccompanied minor has family present in another Member State, that Member State will be responsible for examining his or her claim (but only when in the best interests of the minor).

**Legal residence or visas.** In cases where no family is present, asylum seekers with a valid (or recently expired) residence document or visa will have their claims assessed by the Member State that issued the documentation (Articles 12 and 14 in Dublin III; Article 9 in Dublin II).

**Illegal entry.** If none of the above criteria applies, applicants without residence documents or family present who have illegally transited through another Member State when entering the territory of the European Union are the responsibility of the first Member State in which they arrived (Article 13 in Dublin III; Article 10 in Dublin II).

**Place of application.** Finally, where none of the above criteria applies, responsibility lies with the first Member State in which the applicant filed a claim of asylum (Article 13 in Dublin II).


Both Dublin II and Dublin III are clear that family unity should take precedence over criteria involving documentation or entry, which fall near the bottom of the list. In practice, however, asylum authorities do not always apply the hierarchy of criteria as intended. In fact the criteria involving documentation or point of entry are most often used—and are often at the centre of the debates surrounding Dublin procedures.

Both Dublin II and its recast allow Member States to choose to examine an application for which they would not normally be responsible (through the ‘discretionary clause’, Article 17[1] of Dublin III). Member States can also request another state to take charge of an application for humanitarian reasons, such as serious health concerns or family unity (where an extended family member is present in the hosting or requested state, Article 17[2] of Dublin III).8

Several mechanisms have been instituted to assist Member States in implementing the Dublin system. The EURODAC Regulation, adopted alongside the Dublin II Regulation in 2003, created a centralised system and database for taking and storing the fingerprints of asylum applicants and individuals apprehended while crossing the external borders of the European Union. Through the EURODAC central unit, authorities are able to check whether the fingerprints of an asylum seeker have been recorded in the database, potentially indicating that she or he has already applied for asylum elsewhere or transited through another Member State upon entering the European Union (suggesting that responsibility for examining the application lies elsewhere). Recently, asylum authorities have also had access to information on the visa applications of asylum seekers, as provided to Schengen states by the new Visa Information System (VIS),9 in the final stages of implementation.

The European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which became operational in 2011, also provides technical assistance to Member States, although its responsibilities are not limited to implementation of the Dublin Regulation.10 EASO supplies information, training, and emergency assistance to Member States to support the effective operation of their asylum systems in line with international standards and EU law.

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7 See analysis of Eurostat data in Section III of this report.
8 The predecessor to Article 17[1] was Article 3[2] of the 2003 Regulation, which was also known as the ‘sovereignty clause’. Article 17[2] of the 2013 Regulation replaced Article 15 of the 2003 Regulation, which was referred to as the ‘humanitarian clause’.
9 The Visa Information System (VIS) was established in 2008 by ‘Regulation No. 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 Concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the Exchange of Data between Member States on Short-Stay Visas’. The VIS records biometric data on applicants for visas to participating Member States, in addition to data on the types of visas issued and their dates of validity. VIS fingerprint data are available to asylum officials for the purposes of determining the appropriate application of Dublin’s ‘hierarchy of criteria.’ The full text of Regulation 767/2008 is available here: European Commission, ‘Regulation (EC) No. 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 Concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas (VIS Regulation)’, OJ L 218 13 August 2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32008R0767.
The necessity of the Dublin system

While Dublin II has been the target of heavy criticism for the additional burden it places on some Member States and the barriers to protection it may create, there can be no doubt that it fills a crucial gap by creating an orderly legal framework for determining states’ responsibilities for assessing asylum claims. A 2007 evaluation by the European Commission found that the Dublin system was essentially fulfilling its goals, as it provided ‘a workable system for determining responsibility for the examination of asylum applications’ that had broad support from Member States. Some Member State officials are quick to point out that Dublin is far better than the alternative: ad hoc negotiations between Member States to determine responsibility for protection applications (as done throughout most of the 1990s, before the Dublin Convention came into effect in 1997).

It is worth noting that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) welcomed the adoption of the original Dublin Convention as a tool that would enable states to provide protection more effectively by reducing abuse of the asylum system—widely perceived to be a problem at the time—and preventing lengthy disputes over responsibility for asylum claims.

The system has clearly proven to be an effective mechanism for Member States to communicate about responsibility for asylum claims.

The system has clearly proven to be an effective mechanism for Member States to communicate about responsibility for asylum claims—a key goal of the original Convention. And data on requests for another Member State to assume responsibility for an applicant indicate its frequent use. Between 2008 and 2013 EU Member States exchanged more than 300,000 requests to take back or take charge of asylum applications. By way of comparison, Member States reported more than 1.7 million asylum applications during the same period. This suggests that around 17 per cent of asylum applications filed in the European Union in 2008-13 resulted in a request that another Member State take back or take charge of the application.

The EUROPADAC Regulation has been one of the most successful elements of the Dublin system, and may in fact be key to the system’s functioning. The overwhelming majority of take-back and take-charge requests submitted in recent years have been based on EUROPADAC hits. In 2013, for example, almost 65 per cent of total outgoing requests were based on EUROPADAC data.


12 Interview with official in the Immigration Department, Danish Ministry of Justice, 16 June 2014; interview with official in the Department of Asylum, Rescue, and Return, Directorate General for Immigration, Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, 27 June 2014.


14 Dublin II request and transfer data are available for most Member States beginning in 2009.


17 This includes applications filed in both EU and non-EU Dublin states.

18 Without a EURODAC hit (see definition in footnote below), some Member States report difficulty reaching agreement with other Member States on which party is responsible for claims. Interview with official in the Immigration Department, Danish Ministry of Justice, 16 June 2014.

19 A ‘hit’ occurs in the EURODAC database when fingerprint data submitted after an asylum application has been filed (or after an individual has been apprehended for illegal residence or entry) match data already in the EURODAC system. A hit indicates that an individual has already filed an asylum application or illegally entered the territory of the European Union. Hits may be either foreign or domestic: foreign hits occur against data previously registered by another Member State, while domestic hits occur against data filed by the same Member State. For further information, see European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA), Annual report on the 2013 activities of the Central Unit of Eurodac pursuant to Article 24(1) of Regulation (EC) No. 2725/2000 (Brussels: European Commission, 2013), www.europa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/eulisa_report_eurodac_en.pdf.

20 The significant share of requests that use EURODAC hits as evidence has led many asylum advocates to voice concern. Some recent evaluations criticise Member States for relying too heavily on EURODAC hits to determine responsibility for examining applications, potentially overlooking evidence that may point to the relevance of other, higher-ranked criteria (such as family unity, see Table 1). See the 2013 report of the Dublin Transnational Project, which synthesises national nongovernmental organisation (NGO) reports from 11 Member States: Dublin Transnational Project, Dublin II Regulation: Lives on hold (Brussels: European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2013), www.dublin-project.eu/dublin/content/download/6193/75371/version/6/file/Dublin+FINAL+REPORT.pdf.
Box 3. Dublin terminology defined

**Take charge.** When asylum authorities determine that another Member State is responsible for an asylum application based on the Dublin hierarchy of criteria, the first Member State may request the second Member State to ‘take charge’ of the application. A request to take charge must be submitted within three months of receiving an application for asylum (or two months from a EURODAC hit); the receiving Member State then has two months to accept or reject the request. If the request is accepted, the transfer of the applicant must be completed within six months, or up to 18 months if authorities believe the applicant has absconded.

**Take back.** One Member State may request another to ‘take back’ an asylum seeker when the applicant is found to have a protection claim under review in that Member State. Take-back requests may also be filed for applicants who have filed and withdrawn a claim or have already had an asylum application rejected in another Member State. A request to take back must be filed within three months of when a protection application was submitted or when authorities became aware that another Member State may be responsible (or within two months of a EURODAC hit), and the receiving Member State must reply within one month. Member States have six months to complete the transfer, or up to 18 months if the applicant absconds.

Take-charge procedures apply to applicants who have submitted their claim in only one Member State. By contrast, take-back requests are initiated in cases where applicants have submitted claims in more than one Member State.


Dublin’s supporters also point, somewhat controversially, to the Regulation’s role as an incentive for all Member States to ensure the effective operation of their asylum systems. The argument is that without a mechanism to ensure the participation of all Member States in the CEAS, those without fully developed procedures would ‘free ride’ on the efforts of other Member States to provide protection, violating the ‘principle of responsibility’ upon which the CEAS is built. Proponents of this view argue that the Dublin Regulation simply provides a legal framework for Member States to uphold their existing responsibilities.

Arguments on the other side, meanwhile, have put Dublin’s implementation at the centre of controversy for years. The rest of this report examines the concerns of critics, especially those related to Dublin’s impacts on (1) the efficiency of the European asylum system and (2) asylum seekers’ access to protection.

### III. NOT MEASURING UP: EVALUATING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE DUBLIN SYSTEM

Dublin, including its 2013 recast, faces two key criticisms. First, it pushes responsibility for examining claims to Europe’s external borders—and to states that may be ill-equipped to handle this additional burden. Second, it causes delays that put the individuals and families subject to its provisions at risk for hardship and even rights violations. Dublin has also come under scrutiny for its costs and low effective transfer rates; meanwhile, the incidence of secondary movement remains high. Although Dublin II was established with the primary goal of increasing the efficiency of the European asylum system, some reports have suggested that in certain cases Dublin transfers may add unnecessary hurdles to the asylum process. These challenges have been recognised by the Commission; improving the efficiency of the Dublin system was an explicit goal of the recast process.

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21 Interview with official in the Immigration Department, Danish Ministry of Justice, 16 June 2014.
23 See the 2010 declaration of the French and German delegations to the European Asylum Conference: Council of the European Union, ‘Joint French-German Contribution’.
A. An uneven burden

Dublin has been most widely criticised for the additional burden it is seen to place on those Member States most likely to receive Dublin transfers. A common perception is that the Dublin Regulation results in a substantial transfer of responsibility from northern Member States to the borders of the European Union.\(^{26}\) An initial look at data on Dublin II requests seems to confirm this: in 2012, more than 40 per cent of take-charge and take-back requests were submitted by just two Member States, Germany and Switzerland,\(^{27}\) and in 2013 Germany alone accounted for 43 per cent of requests.\(^ {28}\) Together, Italy and Poland received approximately 40 per cent of requests in both 2012 and 2013 (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TOTAL OUTGOING REQUESTS</th>
<th>SHARE OF TOTAL BASED ON EURODAC (%)</th>
<th>TOTAL TAKE BACK</th>
<th>TAKE CHARGE OF WHICH</th>
<th>FAMILY REASONS (ART. 6-8, 14)</th>
<th>DOCUMENTATION/ENTRY (ART. 9-12)</th>
<th>HUMANITARIAN (ART. 15)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>32,796</td>
<td>67.4</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>2,664</td>
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<td>SWEDEN</td>
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<td>53.5</td>
<td>5,350</td>
<td>4,812</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4,737</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
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<td>5,928</td>
<td>3,751</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3,656</td>
<td>53</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
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<td>41.4</td>
<td>5,038</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>5,104</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>4,344</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL (ALL DUBLIN STATES)</td>
<td>76,358</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>59,079</td>
<td>17,279</td>
<td>1,402</td>
<td>15,608</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Because of discrepancies in how participating states report outgoing and incoming requests, the numbers here are based on outgoing Dublin request data only. The following countries had not yet reported outgoing request numbers for 2013: the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. Croatia joined the European Union in July 2013 and is therefore excluded. Totals here include non-EU Dublin states: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.


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27 See Appendix Table A-1. It is important to note that data on Dublin requests and transfers are not exact. There are substantial differences between incoming and outgoing requests and transfers reported to Eurostat by participating states, and these self-reported data diverge to a large extent from that recorded by EURODAC.
28 The number of requests submitted by Germany in 2013 almost tripled over 2012 (see Tables 1 and A-1), likely due—at least in part—to the substantial increase in asylum applications seen by Germany over the same period. By comparison, in 2010 and 2011 Germany submitted approximately 9,500 requests. See Eurostat, ‘Outgoing “Dublin” Requests’.
Table 2. Outgoing requests to take charge or take back, top five receiving states, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TOTAL REQUESTS</th>
<th>SHARE OF TOTAL BASED ON EURODAC (%)</th>
<th>TOTAL TAKE BACK</th>
<th>TAKE CHARGE</th>
<th>OF WHICH</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>FAMILY</td>
<td>DOCUMENTATION/</td>
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<td>REASONS</td>
<td>ENTRY</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ART. 6-8, 14)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>76,358</td>
<td>59,079</td>
<td>17,279</td>
<td>1,402</td>
<td>15,608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ITALY 18,827 64.7 10,678 8,149 71 8,070 8

POLAND 15,549 56.3 14,953 596 48 543 5

HUNGARY 7,219 79.2 6,821 398 46 350 2

BELGIUM 4,282 63.9 4,040 242 66 167 9

FRANCE 3,722 37.8 2,241 1,481 37 1,436 8

Notes: Because of discrepancies in how participating states report outgoing and incoming requests, the numbers here are based on outgoing Dublin request data only. The following countries had not yet reported outgoing request numbers for 2013: the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. Croatia joined the European Union in July 2013 and is therefore excluded. Totals include non-EU Dublin states: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.


A look at the number of transfers that are actually carried out, however, tells a different story. Dublin does not appear to result in a large-scale shift of asylum seekers to Europe’s external borders. Italy and Poland have always been among the major receiving states. Most of the major Dublin sending states, meanwhile, are substantial transfer destinations themselves. (Germany has consistently been among the top five receiving states since 2009. Austria and Sweden have been among the top ten destinations, each receiving between 500 and 900 transfers annually since 2009. Norway received between 400 and 700 transfers per year in the same period.) This suggests more of a circulation of requests among the largest asylum destinations than a push to the borders.

Dublin does not appear to result in a large-scale shift of asylum seekers to Europe’s external borders.

In fact, application of the Regulation may in some cases make the distribution of asylum seekers among Member States more equal. Two of the countries sending the most Dublin transfers (Germany and Sweden) have also been among the European Union’s top five destinations for asylum applicants since at least 2008—an argument often cited by these states in support of Dublin. Germany alone received close to 130,000 asylum applications in 2013, almost twice as many as the other four top Dublin receiving states combined (Italy, Poland, Belgium, and Spain).

30 Previous research indicates that even when relative burdens are considered (e.g., asylum claims per capita), few of the states that bear a disproportionate share of responsibility are at Europe’s borders. It is important to note, however, that

29 Greece was also a substantial destination until most Member States halted transfers to the country in early 2011.
30 Eurostat, “Outgoing ‘Dublin’ Requests”.
31 Ibid.
34 An assessment by Eiko Thielemann based on 1994-2002 data found that Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium are among the Dublin signatories with the highest protection responsibilities per capita; see Thielemann, ‘Towards a Common European Asylum System’. A more recent analysis found that between 2008 and 2012, Sweden, Belgium, Greece, and Austria had all received substantially more asylum applications than would be expected if applications were distributed according to gross domestic product (GDP), population, land area, and unemployment rates. See Steffen Angenendt, Marcus Engler, and Jan Schneider, ‘European Refugee Policy: Pathways to Fairer Burden-Sharing’ (SWP Comments, German Institute
many applicants for asylum in Germany and Sweden did in fact arrive via border states such as Italy and Greece. If transfer or fingerprinting mechanisms were implemented with greater effectiveness, the shift of responsibility to border states would likely be more substantial.

Numbers of applications do not, meanwhile, take into account the capacity of Member States to process and accommodate additional asylum seekers. Asylum systems that lack proper reception facilities or adequately trained staff may find it difficult to accommodate additional applicants for international protection. Bulgaria, for example, received approximately 7,000 new asylum applications in 2013—less than one-tenth the number received by Germany, but enough to put substantial pressure on an already weak asylum system. In response, UNHCR called for a temporary suspension of Dublin transfers to Bulgaria in early 2014 (conditions have since improved sufficiently for transfers to resume in cases where asylum seekers are not found to be especially vulnerable, e.g. unaccompanied children or cases with special needs).

Transfers to Italy have also come under heavy scrutiny in recent years, although the additional burden placed on Italy by Dublin is inarguable—and much more substantial than that placed on Bulgaria. In 2013 Italy received nearly one-quarter of all take-charge and take-back requests and nearly 30 per cent of total transfers—more than half of which came from Switzerland. Under Dublin II, transfers to Italy represented 17 per cent of asylum applications in Italy in 2013 (by comparison, in Germany transfers were just over 1 per cent of applicants).

Accommodating Dublin transferees in addition to rising numbers of new arrivals has clearly been a struggle for the Italian asylum system. A 2011 joint report by Swiss and Norwegian nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) evaluating the state of Italy’s asylum procedures and reception conditions, raised serious doubts as to whether Italy was fulfilling its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and EU law. A 2013 update to the report found continued deficiencies in the system. More recently, UNHCR highlighted ongoing processing delays and inadequate accommodation for applicants in Italy. Dublin transfers to Italy have been challenged in courts in Austria, Switzerland, and the Netherlands due to poor reception conditions (with limited success outside cases of particularly vulnerable individuals). In November 2014 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that gaps and shortcomings in the Italian reception system meant that Switzerland should have requested specific assurances of accommodation and appropriate treatment before returning a family with children to Italy (Tarakhel v. Switzerland, hereafter Tarakhel). The case reaffirmed the reasoning behind the Court’s 2011 decision in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (hereafter M.S.S.), finding that compliance with human rights cannot be presumed as a basis for Dublin transfers. Even where conditions are better than in Greece, sending states may need to request assurances of adequate treatment in individual cases from receiving states.

The legal challenges to Dublin transfers to Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, and elsewhere—as well as the serious concerns expressed by UNHCR and others regarding conditions for asylum seekers in these countries—put in question the added burden that Dublin places on Member States. This burden is felt particularly by those systems already struggling to process and accommodate applicants for international protection, or lacking the capacity to quickly scale up their operations to meet new demand. While the additional responsibilities placed on such states may not be large in terms of absolute numbers, transfers can severely tax already overburdened systems and have significant negative consequences for the asylum seekers concerned.

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37 The impact of the Arab Spring and the corresponding resumption of boat arrivals from Libya is clearly evident: Dublin requests to Italy have increased substantially since 2011 (from 9,370 in 2010 to 18,827 in 2013); Eurostat, ‘Outgoing Transfers by Receiving Country and Type of “Dublin” Request [migr_dubto]’, updated 22 September 2014.
38 See Table 4.
41 Dublin Transnational Project, Dublin II Legislation: Lives on hold.
B. Actual transfer rates are low

While Member States exchange a substantial number of requests to take charge or take back asylum applications under the Dublin Regulation each year, the actual number of transfers effected remains quite low. Of the 76,358 outgoing requests to take back or take charge sent in 2013, 56,466 (almost three-quarters) were reported to have been accepted by the receiving Member State. Of those accepted, only 15,938 (just 28 per cent) resulted in actual transfers (see Table 3). 43

43 The case of Germany provides a further example. Despite an increase of more than 20,000 in requests sent by Germany between 2012 and 2013, only 1,000 more transfers were conducted in 2013 than in 2012. (It should be noted, however, that transfers may occur in the calendar year after a request’s submission, with some effect on actual transfer rates.) Eurostat, ‘Outgoing Transfers’; Eurostat, ‘Decisions on Outgoing “Dublin” Requests by Receiving Country and Type of Request [migr_dubto]’, updated 22 November 2014, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_dubto&lang=en.
### Table 3. Transfers, top five sending states, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TOTAL OUTGOING REQUESTS ACCEPTED</th>
<th>TOTAL OUTGOING TRANSFERS</th>
<th>SHARE OF ACCEPTANCES TRANSFERRED (%)</th>
<th>OF WHICH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TAKE BACK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TAKE CHARGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>24,847</td>
<td>4,316</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>4,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
<td>7,592</td>
<td>4,165</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>2,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>7,899</td>
<td>2,869</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>1,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>4,659</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORWAY</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,466</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,938</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,411</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(ALL DUBLIN STATES)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3,327</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Because of discrepancies in how participating states report outgoing and incoming requests, the numbers here are based on outgoing Dublin request data only. The following countries had not yet reported outgoing request numbers for 2013: the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. Croatia joined the European Union in July 2013 and is therefore excluded. Transfer rates are calculated here on an annual basis, though it should be noted that transfers may occur in the calendar year after a request’s submission. Totals include non-EU Dublin states: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.


### Table 4. Transfers, top five receiving states, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TOTAL TRANSFERS</th>
<th>OF WHICH</th>
<th>AS A SHARE OF TOTAL ASYLUM APPLICANTS (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TAKE BACK</td>
<td>TAKE CHARGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>4,516</td>
<td>2,768</td>
<td>1,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>2,876</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,938</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,411</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,527</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(ALL DUBLIN STATES)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Because of discrepancies in how participating states report outgoing and incoming requests, the numbers here are based on outgoing Dublin request data only. The following countries had not yet reported outgoing request numbers for 2013: the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. Croatia joined the European Union in July 2013 and is therefore excluded. Totals include non-EU Dublin states: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.


Member States most often cite absconding asylum seekers as the main factor behind this persistently low transfer rate. But the evaluations of advocacy groups suggest that absconding may not be as frequent as reported and that some Member States tend to interpret the term relatively broadly. Other reasons for the low rate of effective transfers may include applicants’ illness, trauma, or voluntary return to the country of origin; and difficulties coordinating transfer logistics. Appeals by applicants may also suspend the implementation of transfer decisions (in most cases under Dublin II, however, transfers were not automatically suspended by the initiation of an appeal; suspension required a court injunction).  

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44 Interview with officials in the Swedish Migration Board and the Swedish Ministry of Justice, 5 June 2014; and interview with official in the Immigration Department, Danish Ministry of Justice, 16 June 2014. See also European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document’.

45 France, Austria, and Germany have been cited in particular: Dublin Transnational Project, Dublin II Regulation: Lives on hold; Amaral, Protection Interrupted.

46 One Greek official indicated that in some cases airlines may prevent transferees from traveling or may restrict the number of transferees on a particular flight, resulting in delays. Interview with UNHCR Liaison Office, Greek Asylum Service, 19 June 2014. See also European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document’. 

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12 Migration Policy Institute Europe
Member States have also reported that, in some cases, a lack of formal evidence (such as a EURODAC hit) may prevent the acceptance of a take-back or take-charge request by the receiving Member State. Although both Dublin II and III Implementing Regulations include a list of approved circumstantial evidence for accepting a claim (such as statements by the applicant), many Member States do not accept requests without supporting evidence from EURODAC or, in the case of requests for family reasons, a DNA test.47

The evaluations of advocacy groups suggest that absconding may not be as frequent as reported and that some Member States tend to interpret the term relatively broadly.

Finally, a lack of coordination between the transferring and receiving Member State may hamper effective transfer rates. In cases where a Member State has implicitly accepted to take back or take charge of an applicant (i.e., the time limit on responding to the request has expired), the receiving Member State may not be prepared to follow up with the transferring Member State regarding arrangements for implementing the transfer.48 This may be especially problematic when vulnerable individuals or unaccompanied minors are to be transferred. Several Member States have reported difficulties communicating with Italy in particular on implementing transfers.49

C. Member States often exchange similar numbers of requests

Evaluations of the system by asylum advocates, and the Commission itself, have noted that some Dublin transfers may be redundant or unnecessary. For example, several Member States frequently exchange similar numbers of asylum seekers.50

A brief look at recent data on Dublin II requests confirms this. In 2012 three of the top five sending Member States (Germany, Sweden, and Belgium) were also among the top five Member States receiving the most Dublin II requests (see tables A-1 and A-2). A number of these requests involved exchanges with each other. Similarly in 2013 Germany sent 1,380 requests to Sweden and received 947 requests from Sweden; France received 355 requests from Belgium and sent 562 requests to Belgium; and Sweden sent 627 requests to Norway while at the same time receiving 403 requests from Norway.51

Exchanges like these have led the Commission, and asylum advocates, to ask whether there is a more efficient way to handle these sorts of transfers. In its evaluation of Dublin II, the Commission raised the possibility that Member States could cooperate to ‘annul’ redundant transfers, potentially saving transfer costs, expediting asylum procedures for the individuals concerned, and reducing secondary movement.52 However, a mechanism of this kind to limit transfers was rejected in the initial drafting of Dublin II and was not included in the 2013 recast. Other suggestions to avoid unnecessary transfers include adjusting procedures to encourage greater use of Dublin III’s ‘discretionary clause’ (known as the ‘sovereignty clause’ and ‘humanitarian clause’ in Dublin II) for claims that are manifestly unfounded and are returnable. This would free up additional capacity for claims that are well founded.53

D. Secondary movement and ‘asylum shopping’ remain issues

Reducing the need for multiple Member States to examine an asylum application was an explicit goal of both the original Dublin Convention and both Dublin Regulations. However, secondary movement by asylum seekers within the Schengen zone remains common.

47 Interview with official, Immigration Department, Danish Ministry of Justice, 16 June 2014. See also European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document’.
49 Interview with official in the Immigration Department, Danish Ministry of Justice, 16 June 2014. See also Dublin Transnational Project, Dublin II Regulation: Lives on hold.
50 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document’.
52 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document’.
53 Interview with Danish official, Immigration Department, Ministry of Justice, Denmark, 16 June 2014.
In 2013 more than one-third of asylum applicants registered with EURODAC (i.e., Category 1 transactions) had already submitted an asylum claim in another Member State (classified as foreign Category 1 to 1 hits). The largest share of these came from previous applications in Italy—more than 11 per cent of applicants with previous claims had first applied there. Significant shares had also submitted prior claims in Poland and Sweden (both close to 9 per cent). Of those who first applied for protection in Italy, most submitted their second applications in Germany (32 per cent), Sweden (19 per cent), or Switzerland (18 per cent). Asylum seekers whose first claim was in Poland most often later applied for asylum in Germany (64 per cent) or France (14 per cent), while those with initial claims in Sweden tended to also submit applications in Germany (41 per cent) or Denmark (12 per cent).

Table 5. Total EURODAC hits by category, 2009-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL TRANSACTIONS</th>
<th>SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION (CATEGORY 1 TO 1, FOREIGN)</th>
<th>IRREGULAR ENTRY (CATEGORY 1 TO 2, FOREIGN)</th>
<th>ILLEGAL RESIDENCE (CATEGORY 3 TO 1, FOREIGN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL SHARE OF TOTAL TRANSACTIONS (%)</td>
<td>TOTAL SHARE OF TOTAL TRANSACTIONS (%)</td>
<td>TOTAL SHARE OF TOTAL TRANSACTIONS (%)</td>
<td>TOTAL SHARE OF TOTAL TRANSACTIONS (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>353,561</td>
<td>53,620</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>20,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>299,459</td>
<td>57,575</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>11,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>412,303</td>
<td>63,527</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>7,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>411,236</td>
<td>86,471</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>17,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>508,565</td>
<td>124,943</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>26,145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data for 2013 include Croatia, which became an EU Member State and party to EURODAC in July 2013.

In fact, Germany was the most popular destination for asylum applications among people who had already filed claims in other Member States; asylum seekers in Germany generated 33 per cent of Category 1 to 1 hits in 2013. Sweden also received a large share of asylum applications from claimants who had requested asylum elsewhere in 2013.

54 Fingerprint data stored in the EURODAC Central Unit are categorised as ‘Category 1’ (data associated with applications for asylum of individuals over the age of 14); ‘Category 2’ (data on individuals apprehended illegally crossing an EU external border); or ‘Category 3’ (data on individuals present illegally in the territory of a Member State).
55 Foreign Category 1 to 1 hits. See Table 5.
58 Of the asylum applications registered by Germany in EURODAC the same year, 50 per cent (41,617) had already submitted an application in another Member State. European Commission, Annual Report on EURODAC in 2012.
per cent). Given the substantial share of second applications directed at these two states, it is clear why some Member States perceive Dublin to be essential to their protection systems.

Reports by advocacy groups suggest that asylum seekers who make applications in another Member State often do so because to poor reception conditions in the country where they submitted their first application.59 This is evident in Italy: even after receiving refugee status, applicants may choose to file an additional claim in another Member State in response to inadequate facilities or poor integration prospects in Italy.60 Applicants who receive subsidiary protection (or another national form of protection) in one Member State—or who are not granted the full entitlements of such protection—may also choose to resubmit their claim in another Member State in hopes of receiving full refugee status61 (or at least the entitlements attached to subsidiary protection).

Perhaps more troubling are reports of migrants seeking to avoid being fingerprinted or filing claims in certain Member States, particularly those on the European Union’s border. EURODAC data clearly indicate that a substantial number of asylum applicants who illegally entered EU territory later file a claim in a Member State other than the one in which they were first apprehended (see Table 5). Anecdotal evidence from Italy suggests that many others may refuse to have their fingerprints taken or to submit asylum applications in Italy in hopes of circumventing the Dublin Regulation and getting their claim evaluated elsewhere.62 There have been reports of a similar phenomenon in Greece, particularly among arrivals from Syria.63 And some individuals with well-founded claims for protection (e.g., Syrians, among others) may choose to forgo filing an asylum application altogether.64

Reports such as these have raised questions about the effectiveness of the Dublin regime as a whole, in the face of what is perceived as systemic abuse. Allegations have even been made that asylum officials in some Member States are actively helping applicants circumvent Dublin procedures.65 Regardless of the accuracy of these claims, they are fuelling an ongoing political debate. As a result, continued and widespread secondary movement across the European Union has the potential to undermine trust in the Dublin system, and put its continued utility into question.

E. Costs

Another frequent criticism of the Dublin system is that it adds additional costs to the operation of asylum procedures. Meanwhile, the actual costs of operating Dublin at the Member State level are exceedingly difficult to determine, despite numerous inquiries and investigations both by external NGO evaluators and the Commission itself. In most cases, Member States have been unable to report detailed costs due to the challenge of disaggregating Dublin expenditures from the rest of their asylum systems. Estimates may also be difficult where certain functions of the Dublin or state asylum procedures are devolved (as in Germany and France).66

Surveys of asylum authorities in Member States have shed some light on the costs of the Dublin system:67

- **Transfers are the most expensive aspect of the system.** Member States report that travel costs associated with implementing transfers are the most costly element of the Dublin system. Costs vary by destination and the means of transport used; supervised or escorted transfers are the most expensive.

59 Amaral, Protection Interrupted.
60 Swiss Refugee Council, Asylum Procedure and Reception Conditions.
61 Amaral, Protection Interrupted.
62 Maria de Donato, Asylum Information Database, National Country Report: Italy (Brussels: European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2014), www.refworld.org/docid/5406c8ab4.html; Also see UNHCR, UNHCR Recommendations; Parvaz, ‘Italy’s Disappearing Migrants’.
63 Interview with UNHCR Liaison Office, Greek Asylum Service, 19 June 2014.
67 Unless otherwise specified, information cited below is drawn from European Commission, Ad-Hoc Query; European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document’.
The use of detention increases costs. Member States that regularly detain asylum seekers report spending more per application than those that do not, and detention costs make up a significant portion of total expenditure. For example, in a 2010 European Parliament evaluation, the United Kingdom (which systematically detains asylum seekers) reported costs per applicant that were two-thirds higher than those reported by Sweden; one-quarter of this was spent on detention.

Expenditures depend on the size of the Dublin Unit. As might be expected, Member States with dedicated units for processing Dublin inquiries had higher expenses than those who handled Dublin procedures through their primary asylum system. However, those operating specialised Dublin Units were also responsible for more Dublin inquiries and transfers than those that did not.

Operation of EURODAC is not a major cost. Of the Member States that reported costs for operating the EURODAC system, the expense of taking and storing fingerprints was not found to be a significant portion of overall expenditures. But for some countries, prohibitive equipment costs can interfere with the efficient operating of the system.68

It is worth noting that asylum authorities in some Member States consider transferring asylum seekers using Dublin procedures to be less expensive than processing the applications themselves, as the duration of the process may be shorter.69 Several Member States have also made it clear that Dublin’s political goals are worth fulfilling regardless of the financial costs.70

On the European level, the primary costs borne by the Commission are for the operation of the EURODAC central unit and EASO. In 2013 the total cost of operating the EURODAC central unit was 340,669.53 euros, or 0.83 euros per transaction.71

IV. DUBLIN’S UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: ACCESS TO PROTECTION AND OTHER IMPACTS

Since its inception, operation of the Dublin system has been based on the assumption that protection conditions are equal and sufficient in all Member States. In practice, this means that asylum seekers should receive access to determination procedures and reception facilities that meet the requirements of EU and international law, regardless of where they submit their application for protection. But recent legal challenges and assessments by UNHCR and asylum advocates clearly demonstrate that protection conditions vary considerably among Member States, and in some cases are not up to international standards. Greece is the most well-known and comprehensively documented example (see Box 4), but doubts have been raised recently over the capacity of Bulgaria, Italy, and Hungary to receive asylum applicants. In most cases, concerns centre on asylum authorities’ ability to accurately and effectively process applications in a timely manner.

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68 Greece, for example, only recently acquired electronic fingerprinting machines; Dublin Transnational Project-AltIMA, Dublin II Regulation: National Report–Greece (Brussels: European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2010), www.dublin-project.eu/dublin/content/download/6228/75799/version/1/file/Rapport_Greece_WEB.pdf.
69 Interview with official in the Immigration Department, Danish Ministry of Justice, 16 June 2014.
70 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document’.
The Dublin procedure itself may also expose asylum seekers to the risk of rights violations and other hardships by prolonging application times or separating family members. Numerous appeals have been brought before national courts regarding the separation of spouses from each other or of parents from minor children. In other cases, Dublin procedures have been found to place individuals with serious health concerns at particular risk, as Member States do not always communicate health-care needs during transfers.73

A. Disruption of family unity and risks to vulnerable individuals

The risks that Dublin transfers can pose to family unity are apparent in Member States’ application of the hierarchy of criteria. Although the ‘family criteria’ are clearly at the top of the Dublin hierarchy (Articles 8-11 in Dublin III), numerous assessments of Member States’ Dublin procedures have found that these articles are not applied consistently, or in all relevant cases.74 In Germany, for example, one report found evidence that asylum case officers (who often perform interviews and collect Dublin data) were not fully aware of the Dublin hierarchy of criteria or the significance of family connections. Additionally, the transmission of evidence from interviews to the Dublin processing unit may be delayed, and transfer decisions may be made before all relevant information is received, resulting in a misapplication of the hierarchy of criteria.75

The risks that Dublin transfers can pose to family unity are apparent in Member States’ application of the hierarchy of criteria.

Data on the types of requests sent by Member States also indicate that family criteria are not always applied where appropriate (see Table 1). In 2013 Member States submitted just 1,402 take-charge requests for family reasons—or 1.8 per cent of total requests.76 By contrast, more than 20 per cent of the total were take-charge requests because of documentation or irregular entry reasons (Articles 9-12), and over 75 per cent were take-back requests.77 Actual transfers for family reasons were even fewer than requests; in 2013 only 584 applicants (less than 4 per cent of total transfers) were transferred based on family criteria.78

Dublin transfers may also pose particular risks for individuals in need of special medical care. In some cases, asylum authorities have failed to notify the receiving Member State of applicants’ illnesses or special needs, or to confirm that adequate health-care facilities would be available after the applicant had been transferred.79 Article 31 of the recast Dublin III requires Member States to communicate all necessary information regarding transferees’ health care or other needs (the effectiveness of this provision in practice remains to be seen).

The Dublin Regulation does, however, contain provisions that aim to ensure that Member States preserve family unity or protect especially vulnerable individuals as needed. One option is for a Member State to examine the claim itself (known as the ‘sovereignty clause’ in Article 3[2] of the 2003 Dublin Regulation, now part of the ‘discretionary clause’ in Article 17[1] of the 2013 Regulation). Another option is to request a Member State containing members...


73 Dublin Transnational Project, Dublin II Regulation: Lives on hold.

74 Ibid.


76 The share of take-charge requests that are based on Articles 6-8 or 14 has increased substantially since 2009 (when it stood at 2.9 per cent). Much of this increase is due to greater use of the family criteria by Greece. In 2012 Greece submitted well over half of Article 6-8/14 requests (625), the majority of which were directed to Germany.

77 Eurostat, ‘Outgoing “Dublin” Requests’.

78 The majority of family transfers were completed by Greece. In 2013, 491 transfers for family reasons were from Greece (84 per cent). According to Greek officials, this increase in the use of family criteria is in part due to the halt of transfers from other Member States. Applicants in Greece are therefore more likely to have family members in other Member States who have been granted protected status. Interview with UNHCR Liaison Office, Greek Asylum Service, 19 June 2014. Eurostat, ‘Outgoing Transfers’.

79 Dublin Transnational Project, Dublin II Regulation: Lives on hold.
of an applicant’s extended family to take responsibility for the claim on humanitarian grounds (Article 17[2] of Dublin III, corresponding to the ‘humanitarian clause’, former Article 15). However, Eurostat data suggest that these discretionary provisions are applied by Member States even less frequently than the family criteria—although reports suggest use of the ‘sovereignty clause’ has increased since most Member States halted transfers to Greece. In 2013 the humanitarian clause was applied in just 269 cases, and 204 transfers for humanitarian reasons were actually carried out, mostly by Greece.

One reason for the infrequent use of both discretionary provisions may be a lack of administrative or legal guidance on how the clauses should be applied. The judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and ECtHR in N.S. v. the United Kingdom and M.E. v. Ireland (hereafter N.S./M.E.) and M.S.S. clearly placed a new obligation on Member States to refrain from transferring cases when ‘systemic deficiencies’ are evident in the responsible state’s asylum procedures (see Box 4). But interpretations of what qualifies as a systemic deficiency have varied substantially among Member States. Despite increasing evidence of failings in Italy’s asylum procedures, for example, most asylum authorities have been hesitant to use the logic of the CJEU’s decision in N.S./M.E. to refrain from transferring claims to Italy. In Austria asylum authorities have declined to do so on the grounds that, since the Commission has not instituted infringement procedures, Italy is still fulfilling its obligations under EU law. The ECtHR also found, in 2013, that returns to Italy were permissible in specific cases. However, the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber ruled in late 2014 that Member States must obtain specific assurances prior to the transfer of a family with children, including appropriate reception conditions and the ability to remain together.

B. Delayed access to asylum procedures

Application of the Dublin procedures will, unavoidably, delay the review of an asylum applicant’s claim. Even in successful cases, delaying access to protection has a cost for receiving communities, including delayed integration and lost human capital. The longer it takes to determine an application’s status, the more time passes before those who are eventually recognised can access language courses or other integration support, or fully enter the labour force, raising the potential for long-term dependency and marginalisation. Delays can also make the assessment of claims more difficult; gathering evidence by which to evaluate applications can be more challenging for authorities when there is a large gap between when a claim is filed and when it is assessed. In addition, returns after rejection become more complicated the longer an applicant is in the country of asylum.

Very little information is available, however, on the usual duration of Dublin procedures in Member States or the length of the delays that applicants experience. External evaluations have found that Member States generally respected the deadlines set out in the Dublin II Regulation. But even when Member States fully comply with these time limits, applicants who are subject to transfers under take-charge procedures (under both the 2003 and 2013 Regulations) may still wait up to a year before their asylum claims are considered. Applicants subject to take-back procedures under the old system may have waited even longer, as Dublin II did not specify a time limit for

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80 Eurostat, ‘Outgoing “Dublin” Requests’. Data on use of the ‘sovereignty clause’ are not available through Eurostat, but recent reports by advocacy groups suggest that it is applied more frequently than the humanitarian clause and has been used most often to halt transfers to Greece. Amanal, Protection Interrupted; Dublin Transnational Project, Transnational Advisory and Assistance Network for Asylum Seekers under a Dublin Process: Final Report (Villeurbanne Cedex, France: Dublin Transnational Project, 2011). www.asyl-in-net.org/uploads/rapportfinal-gb_%28%29.pdf.
81 In 2013, 60 per cent of Article 15 requests and two-thirds of transfers were conducted by Greece. Eurostat, ‘Outgoing “Dublin” Requests’; Eurostat, ‘Outgoing Transfers’.
82 Ibid.
83 ECtHR, Daytbegova v. Austria, Application no. 6198/12, judgment of 4 June 2013 (ECtHR, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.asp?i=001-122459; ECtHR, Abubeker v Austria and Italy, Application no. 72874/11, judgment of 18 June 2013 (ECtHR, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.asp?i=001-122459; on selected national case law, see also Dublin Transnational Project, Dublin II Regulation: Lives on hold.
84 ECtHR, Tarakhel v. Switzerland.
85 Changes in the recast Reception Conditions Directive seek to mitigate some of these negative effects by lowering the maximum wait time for access to the labour market to nine months for asylum applicants. Germany has gone even further by allowing labour market access just three months after an application is filed.
86 Interview with official in the Immigration Department, Danish Ministry of Justice, 16 June 2014.
87 Available evidence suggests that the duration of procedures varies substantially by country. A 2013 UNHCR review of procedures in Italy, for example, suggested it can take up to 24 months to process applicants under Dublin procedures. See UNHCR, UNHCR Recommendations. In Sweden Dublin cases took an average of 69 days in 2013. Interview with officials in the Swedish Migration Board and the Swedish Ministry of Justice, 5 June 2014.
88 Under both Dublin II and III, the time limit for submitting a request to take charge is three months. The receiving Member State then has two months to issue a response. If the request is accepted (explicitly or by default), the sending Member State has six months to complete the transfer. See Council of the European Union, ‘Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003’ and European Union, ‘Regulation (EU) No 604/2013’:
submitting a take-back request.\textsuperscript{89} Reports suggest that delays may be particularly long in Germany, where take-back requests are considered low priority.\textsuperscript{90} In Sweden, Denmark, and Greece, officials have reported that communications between Member States on responsibility for an application can account for a substantial share of the processing time.\textsuperscript{91}

\textbf{Very little information is available on the usual duration of Dublin procedures in Member States or the length of the delays that applicants experience.}

The Regulation allows Member States to extend the deadline for completing a transfer by up to 18 months in cases when an applicant is found to have absconded. Some Member States have tended to interpret absconding relatively loosely and extended deadlines for transfers somewhat automatically. Authorities in France, for example, may consider an applicant to have absconded after he or she has missed just one appointment at the asylum office. And in Austria applicants who are homeless are generally registered as having absconded, according to reports.\textsuperscript{92}

\subsection*{C. Detention}

Applicants who are placed in detention have been found to be less well informed about Dublin procedures or their rights to appeal. Detention can be particularly hard on vulnerable individuals (such as unaccompanied minors, those with particular health needs, or victims of trauma). But as with other aspects of the Dublin system, data on the frequency or duration of detention during Dublin procedures are not readily available. What little information there is suggests that detention practices vary widely across Member States.

Responses to surveys of individuals subject to Dublin procedures in several Member States indicate that the share of Dublin applicants who are detained may be around 40 per cent.\textsuperscript{93} In France detention tends to be used systematically, while authorities in Spain do not use detention at all.\textsuperscript{94} Another study found that in Germany approximately half of applicants have been subject to detention.\textsuperscript{95}

According to surveys, the average duration of detention for Dublin applicants is almost two months, but this varies significantly by Member State, primarily based on how widely detention is used and at what point in the process it is applied. Applicants who were apprehended for illegal residence may be detained for the entire procedure in some Member States, while in others they may be detained for a few days directly prior to a transfer.\textsuperscript{96}

\subsection*{D. Access to protection after transfer}

Asylum advocacy groups have also raised concerns about the ability of Dublin transferees to access asylum procedures after a transfer has been completed. In the case of Greece in particular, reports indicate that some transferees may have been returned to Turkey before their applications were fully evaluated, which could have amounted to refoulement.\textsuperscript{97} In Bulgaria if an asylum seeker who previously submitted a claim is absent for three months or more, the application process is discontinued and the applicant returned to his or her country of origin without the opportunity to submit a subsequent application.\textsuperscript{98} Asylum seekers whose applications are rejected while they are out of the

\textsuperscript{89} The Dublin III regulation has since introduced a two-month time limit for submitting take back requests.
\textsuperscript{90} Dublin Transnational Project, \textit{Dublin II Regulation: Lives on hold}.
\textsuperscript{91} Interviews with officials in the Swedish Migration Board and the Swedish Ministry of Justice, 2 June 2014; UNHCR Liaison Office in the Greek Asylum Service, 19 June 2014; and official in the Immigration Department, Danish Ministry of Justice, 16 June 2014.
\textsuperscript{92} Dublin Transnational Project, \textit{Dublin II Regulation: Lives on hold}.
\textsuperscript{93} Amaral, \textit{Protection Interrupted}.
\textsuperscript{94} Dublin Transnational Project, \textit{Transnational Advisory and Assistance Network}.
\textsuperscript{95} Hess-sächser Flüchtlingsrat and Pro Asyl, \textit{Dublin II Regulation: National Report Germany}.
\textsuperscript{96} Amaral, \textit{Protection Interrupted}.
\textsuperscript{98} UNHCR, \textit{UNHCR Observations}; Dublin Transnational Project, \textit{Dublin II Regulation: Lives on hold}.
country may find it difficult to submit an appeal after being transferred and may be at higher risk for deportation and refoulement.\textsuperscript{99}

Most transferees do not appear to receive adequate information about asylum procedures in the country to which they are being transferred.\textsuperscript{100} This can create particular difficulties in cases where there are strict deadlines for submitting a subsequent application or an appeal after an asylum seeker is transferred.

\subsection*{E. Other risks}

Finally, some reports by asylum advocates have noted that the application of the Dublin criteria removes the element of individual agency from asylum seekers’ decision on where to file an application for protection.\textsuperscript{101} While this may serve to decrease ‘pull factors’ for some states and reduce the burden on states perceived to have more generous asylum systems, it can also have implications for asylum seekers’ integration or reception. Applicants choose destinations for a variety of reasons. While some individuals may in fact choose their destinations according to the availability of benefits or more generous asylum criteria—a common concern of Member State governments\textsuperscript{102}—others may prefer Member States where they have family, friends, or networks of co-nationals who could ease their transition. Others may choose to apply in Member States where they know the language or perceive economic conditions to be friendly to their labour market prospects. While these are not reasons for seeking protection, they are significant factors in determining an applicant’s integration prospects in the destination country after protection is granted.

\section*{V. WHERE TO FROM HERE?}

It is clear that the demands currently placed on the CEAS by the ongoing crises in Syria, Iraq, and Central and East Africa, among others, are unlikely to diminish in the immediate future. In the face of these pressures, debates among Member States on the appropriate sharing of responsibilities—and specifically the Dublin Regulation—will almost certainly continue.

In June 2013 the European Union completed a five-year effort to reform the Dublin system to address some of the concerns described in this report. While the recast Dublin III includes significant improvements in certain areas, problems remain. The recently implemented VIS and new legal challenges to Dublin in both the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union promise to further alter the context in which Dublin operates.

\subsection*{A. Evaluating the promise of Dublin III}

\subsubsection*{1. Raising the bar: Improved access to protection}

Much of the Dublin Regulation’s recast involves clarifying portions of the original legislation that were interpreted and applied differently among Member States. In particular, the 2013 Regulation seeks to clarify the application of Dublin’s hierarchy of criteria for assigning responsibility for claims, to tighten deadlines for Dublin procedures, and to improve asylum applicants’ access to information about the Dublin Regulation.

Although the criteria for determining responsibility have not changed in essence (or the order in which they are to be implemented), the recast Regulation has expanded and significantly clarified how the criteria are to be applied. For example, it contains an exhaustive list of the members of an unaccompanied minor asylum seeker’s family whose presence in another Member State may render that Member State responsible for the claim (when in the minor’s best

\textsuperscript{99} Hessischer Flüchtlingsrat and Pro Asyl, *Dublin II Regulation: National Report Germany.*

\textsuperscript{100} Amaral, *Protection Interrupted;* Hessischer Flüchtlingsrat and Pro Asyl, *Dublin II Regulation: National Report Germany.*

\textsuperscript{101} Amaral, *Protection Interrupted.*

\textsuperscript{102} Council of the European Union, ‘Joint French-German Contribution.’
interest)—something that was not adequately clarified in the 2003 Regulation. The recast also extends the family criteria to family members who are beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. Previously, the right to be reunited with family who already had international protection within the European Union extended only to recognised refugees or those in asylum procedures.

Dublin III slightly shortens the deadlines for completing certain parts of Dublin procedures. Most important, the recast sets a deadline for submitting a take-back request, filling a major gap in Dublin II. However, normal transfer procedures may still last a year or longer, and Member States can still extend transfer deadlines up to 18 months if an applicant is found to have absconded.

One of the primary problems observed during the implementation of the Dublin II Regulation was that asylum seekers had inadequate information about Dublin procedures. Surveys of Dublin applicants found that most respondents had very limited knowledge of the Dublin II Regulation itself; most were unaware of the hierarchy of criteria, their options for appeal, or the existence of the sovereignty and humanitarian clauses.103

Applicants who are ill-informed about the relevance of Dublin to their cases are less prepared to provide authorities with pertinent details (e.g., the location of family members). Several investigations have suggested that inadequate information may contribute to secondary movement. Rejected asylum seekers who do not know about their options for appeal may choose to abscond rather than wait to be transferred.104

The recast Dublin Regulation now requires asylum authorities to inform applicants of how responsibility for examining an asylum claim is determined (including the consequences of moving between Member States and the relevance of family members) and options for appealing a transfer decision.105 In addition, the European Commission has created an information leaflet for individuals subject to Dublin Procedures, to ensure that they are provided with important facts in writing, and authorities are now required to perform a personal interview with all applicants before transfer decisions are made.106

2. Early warning and preparedness mechanism

One of the most significant innovations of the Dublin recast is the introduction of an ‘early warning and preparedness mechanism’ in Article 33. The aim of this mechanism is to identify deficiencies in Member States’ asylum systems—and assist policymakers and authorities in these states to develop a plan of action to address them—before they develop into a ‘crisis’.107 The Commission had originally proposed a mechanism that would automatically require Member States to halt Dublin transfers, at least on a temporary basis, to countries where asylum seekers would likely encounter limited access to protection or poor reception conditions. However, strong objections from several Member State governments prohibited the inclusion of such a mechanism.

One of the most significant innovations of the Dublin recast is the introduction of an ‘early warning and preparedness mechanism’.

How the early warning and preparedness mechanism will function in practice remains to be seen. According to a 2013 discussion paper from the Commission, the mechanism will have three primary components:

- An ‘early warning phase’ that includes analysing and monitoring existing data sources for evidence of particular pressures on and deficiencies in Member States’ asylum systems

- A ‘preparedness phase’ that allows the Commission and EASO to work—first informally and, if necessary, formally—with a Member State whose system has been deemed deficient to create a preventative action plan (PAP) to address deficiencies

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103 Amaral, Protection Interrupted.
104 Ibid.
Where needed, a ‘crisis management phase’ during which the Member State in question would be required to submit a crisis management action plan (CRIS-MAP) with input from not only the Commission, but also the Justice and Home Affairs Council.

The Commission has also laid out an initial ‘suitability test’ for triggering the mechanism. This evaluates the relevance of observed deficiencies to the operation of Dublin III, the severity of the problem, the urgency of the risks posed, and the resilience of the asylum system to the pressures it faces.  

It is clear that EASO will play a significant role throughout the implementation of the early warning mechanism. The support office will be responsible for gathering the data and conducting the analysis envisioned in phase one, and may be called upon to provide technical assistance and support to Member States during phases two and three.

By addressing the underlying causes of protection gaps in Member States’ asylum systems, the early warning mechanism represents a necessary and highly valuable step (particularly for the long-term sustainability of the CEAS). But Member States’ reactions to the mechanism have been mixed. Some have highlighted its potentially important role in enabling them to make timely decisions to halt transfers to particular asylum systems (for example, information on Bulgaria provided by EASO and UNHCR encouraged some Member States to quickly adjust their transfer policies to conditions on the ground). However, the exact nature, extent, and timeliness of the practical support that will be available from EASO or other Member States when the mechanism is triggered have not been specified. This raises concerns that the early warning process will simply place an additional reporting burden on already-strained Member States.

Most significantly, the mechanism does not address a key concern of asylum advocates: unless transfers are halted, Dublin transferees may still be at risk while a PAP or CRIS-MAP is being implemented. It is also unclear if the interventions proposed under the early warning mechanism will be sustainable. For example, EASO expressed concerns that Greece may lack the capacity to take over responsibility and operation of its asylum system without ongoing EASO support. Most recently, a December 2014 assessment by UNHCR found that Greek asylum services required continued assistance from UNHCR and the European Union in order to maintain the improvements made since 2011. This could be a risk in other cases where the early warning and preparedness mechanism is applied.

By addressing the underlying causes of protection gaps in Member States’ asylum systems, the early warning mechanism represents a necessary and highly valuable step.

Dublin III does include a separate provision placing a new responsibility on the transferring Member State to ensure that the applicant’s rights and ability to access protection will be respected in the receiving state (Article 3). In doing so, the Regulation incorporates much of the language from CJEU’s 2011 decision in N.S./M.E., but does not provide any further definition of a ‘systemic flaw’ that would require Member States to halt transfers.

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109 Interview with official in the Immigration Department, Danish Ministry of Justice, 16 June 2014.
110 Interview with UNHCR Liaison Office, Greek Asylum Service, 19 June 2014.
111 EASO support in Greece ended in December 2014. While EASO’s interim assessment report in July 2014 indicated significant progress had been made since April 2011, when EASO operations in Greece began, the report also flagged significant remaining gaps. These gaps included a substantial backlog of cases, insufficient accommodations for applicants, a lack of mechanisms for cooperation among agencies, and a lack of capacity to monitor and evaluate reception procedures and services. Officials from the UNHCR Liaison Office in the Greek Asylum Service also raised doubts about the sustainability of the system without external support. Interview with UNHCR Liaison Office, Greek Asylum Service, 19 June 2014. See EASO, Interim Assessment for Greece (Valletta Harbour, Malta: EASO, 2014), http://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/Interim-Assessment-Greece.pdf; and EASO, Annual Report 2011 (Brussels: EASO, 2011), http://easo.europa.eu/docs/home-affairs/pdf/easo_annual_report_final.pdf.
3. The role of the courts in implementation and interpretation

National and European-level courts will likely be called upon to shape the implementation of the recast Dublin Regulation. Since the M.S.S. and N.S./M.E. rulings, both courts have produced several more judgments further refining their analysis of the circumstances under which Member States are obliged to halt Dublin transfers. These include two ECtHR decisions that elaborate on the conditions under which Member States’ asylum authorities can be presumed to know that a Dublin transfer would expose an asylum seeker to ‘inhumane or degrading treatment’ in violation of the ECHR (as in M.S.S.). Both decisions have helped develop a legal rationale that may influence Member State interpretations of Dublin’s new Article 3 provisions for halting transfers.113

Another case heard by CJEU has specifically shaped Member States’ implementation of Dublin III’s requirements for the treatment of applications by minors.114 In its June 2013 decision in M.A. and Others v. Secretary of State of the Home Department, the Court held that where an unaccompanied minor has lodged an application in multiple Member States and has no family within the territory of the European Union, the Member State where the minor is present will be responsible for processing the application.115 The ruling has forced a change of practice in many Member States, where minors without family present were often subject to the same Dublin procedures as adults, and has not been without controversy. Officials in several Member States have expressed concerns that the ruling will place an additional burden on the Dublin system, particularly since procedures for determining age are not harmonised across the CEAS.116

B. A rocky road ahead

As Member States work to adapt to and implement the recast Regulation, several further developments have potential to once again alter how the system operates. The expanding use of the new VIS is one such development. Since it provides a new source of evidence for assigning claims, the system has the potential to change request and transfer patterns. Several Member State officials state that VIS has already enabled them to transfer individuals based on visa patterns. Several Member State officials state that VIS has already enabled them to transfer individuals based on visa reasons that otherwise would not have shown up in EURODAC or been flagged as Dublin cases.117 VIS also makes the identification of family members already residing in EU territory easier, allowing for better application of Dublin’s family criteria. Officials indicate that VIS may help to facilitate returns in cases of unsuccessful applications, since it links nationality and family information to biometric data.118

Conditions in Italy and Greece continue to be the most significant moving pieces of the Dublin puzzle.

113 In both cases the court drew a line between information on asylum deficiencies that is developing and ‘open for the exercise of particular discretion’ and the level of information provided to the Belgian authorities in M.S.S. (which included a direct letter from UNHCR ‘unequivocally’ asking for a halt of Dublin transfers by Belgium). See ECtHR, Case of Sharifi v. Austria, Application no. 60104/08, European Court of Human Rights, 5 December 2013, www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/sites/www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/files/aldfiles/CASE%20OF%20SHARIFI%20v.%20AUSTRIA.pdf; ECtHR, Case of Safaii v. Austria, Application no. 44689/09, European Court of Human Rights, 7 May 2014, www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/sites/www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/files/aldfiles/CASE%20OF%20SAFII%20v.%20AUSTRIA.pdf.

114 As the judgment in this case was handed down within weeks of the adoption of the Dublin III recast, the Council asked the Commission to propose language amending the recast regulation to bring it in line with the Court’s ruling. The Commission did so, and the proposed amendment was under consideration at the time of writing. See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 as regards determining the Member State responsible for examining the application for international protection of unaccompanied minors with no family member, sibling or relative legally present in a Member State’, 26 June 2014, COM(2014) 382 final.


116 As member states, for example, officials cited an increase in take-charge requests to France and Spain based on new VIS data indicating that applicants were issued EU entry visas by these two countries. Interviews with the Swedish Migration Board and the Swedish Ministry of Justice, 5 June 2014; and Dutch Ministry of Justice, 27 June 2014.

117 In Sweden, for example, officials cited an increase in take-charge requests to France and Spain based on new VIS data indicating that applicants were issued EU entry visas by these two countries. Interviews with the Swedish Migration Board and the Swedish Ministry of Justice, 5 June 2014, and official in the Immigration Department, Danish Ministry of Justice, 16 June 2014.
But conditions in Italy and Greece continue to be the most significant moving pieces of the Dublin puzzle. The decision in the Tarakhel case raises further concerns among Member States about the functioning of a Dublin system in which they are required to seek assurances of asylum seekers’ legal rights—even where gaps do not amount to ‘systemic deficiencies’ in a given asylum system. In addition, the end of EASO support operations in Greece, which occurred in December 2014, will likely prompt many Member States to review their policies regarding transfers to the country. Some may choose to resume returns, even as both advocates and Greek officials raise doubts that Greece is ready (amid a substantial backlog of asylum cases). Political debate on the application of the Dublin system in Greece and Italy is almost certain to remain heated.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The pressures placed on the CEAS in recent years by a rising number of refugee arrivals, many driven by the Arab Spring and the Syria crisis, have thrown the deficiencies of the Dublin system into sharp relief. The evidence accumulated in numerous studies and evaluations since 2003 suggests that the Dublin system has not fully achieved its original goals, and has in fact had several unintended and adverse consequences.

Since its inception in the 1990 Dublin Convention, the aim of the Dublin system has always been to improve the efficiency of Member States’ asylum systems by discouraging multiple applications and preventing disputes over responsibility for examining claims. Yet today, secondary movement remains significant, and Member States continue to disagree over the distribution of responsibility for asylum applications. In addition, Dublin procedures have tended to delay asylum seekers’ access to protection and in some cases exposed them to potential refoulement or insufficient reception conditions (when returned to Member States with systems ill-prepared to cope with more arrivals).

The current Dublin Regulation, as recast in 2013, seeks to address some of these challenges. It requires Member States to provide asylum seekers with better access to information on Dublin procedures, clarifies how responsibility for claims is to be decided (Dublin’s ‘hierarchy of criteria’), sets processing deadlines, and creates a new ‘early warning mechanism’ for detecting problems in Member States’ asylum systems. But it does not touch on the problem at the heart of the Dublin system: the variation in Member States’ capacity for receiving, processing, and integrating asylum applicants. In addition, the Regulation does not take into consideration the reasons why asylum seekers may choose one destination over another (e.g., personal networks, language skills, employment opportunities), reasons that will continue to drive secondary movement.

The new early warning mechanism will provide some needed support to asylum authorities, and the clarifications provided by the 2013 Regulation may streamline some processes. But the recast overlooks the fact that the European Union may have outgrown the Dublin system. Although Dublin was not created as a burden-sharing mechanism, procedures specifically designed to share responsibility or asylum capacity might just be what the CEAS needs to succeed.

Although Dublin was not created as a burden-sharing mechanism, procedures specifically designed to share responsibility or asylum capacity might just be what the CEAS needs to succeed.

As they prepare for a review of the Dublin Regulation, scheduled for 2016, the European Commission and Member States have a unique opportunity to explore the underlying causes of Dublin’s struggles—and viable opportunities for change. The following areas are ripe for review:

- **Implementation of Dublin procedures in practice.** Information on the duration of Dublin procedures, states’ use of detention, and barriers to transfers of applicants is anecdotal or nonexistent. Procedural delays and Dublin’s low effective transfer rate are concerns of Member State governments and asylum advocates alike. Better understanding of where and why delays occur could reveal simple solutions that improve the efficiency of the system as a whole—a desirable outcome for both asylum authorities and applicants.

119 Interview with the UNHCR Liaison Office, Greek Asylum Service, 19 June 2014.
**Dublin’s costs.** Data on the cost of Dublin mechanisms are inherently difficult to gather due to the administrative structure of most Member States’ asylum-processing and Dublin units. But information on the costs of Dublin in practice is crucial to an informed evaluation of the system’s impact. Dublin supporters indicate that transfers are less costly than processing applicants at home, but this claim cannot be backed by data. Understanding the costs of existing and potential policy responses is also critical, especially to generate political will for change where needed.

**Impact of transfers on successful applicants’ integration prospects.** Interviews with asylum seekers suggest they choose their destinations based not only on the likelihood they will receive protection, but also on the odds of economic and social success after arrival. Economic conditions, language skills, and social and family networks also play a role. Further research is needed into what, if any, impact redistributing asylum seekers according to the Dublin criteria may have on integration outcomes.

**Member States’ views on Dublin.** While humanitarian concerns surrounding the application of Dublin procedures are well researched, little information is publicly available on the perceived benefits that lie behind the support of many Member States for the Dublin system. Understanding why many Member States perceive Dublin to be crucial to the operation of their asylum systems is imperative to designing any adjustments to the mechanism.

In addition to thoroughly exploring how the Dublin Regulation is applied, the Commission might consider using its review to evaluate and propose possible avenues for change:

**Improve communication between asylum authorities.** Delays in Dublin procedures and low transfer rates have been attributed, among other reasons, to poor communication and a lack of trust among Member States’ authorities. Expanding cooperation mechanisms such as liaison officers (already used by a few Member States) or introducing procedures for the joint screening of applicants who have been flagged as Dublin cases (e.g., through video conferencing) could speed up processing by ensuring all involved authorities have timely access to the same evidence and information. Communication mechanisms such as these could benefit from EU-level assistance in financing and implementation.

**Explore ways to reduce unnecessary transfers and requests.** Dublin’s low transfer rate has put into question not only the effectiveness of transfer mechanisms, but also the necessity of transfer requests. Furthermore, what little data exist on Dublin’s costs suggest that transfers (when carried out) are among the most expensive aspects of the system. Transfers can also disrupt family unity or place vulnerable individuals at risk, and may be redundant where Member States exchange approximately equal numbers of asylum seekers. In terms of costs and efficiency, it may be worth exploring ways to ‘cancel out’ Dublin transfers, as proposed by the Commission in its 2007 review, or encourage Member States to ‘fast track’ certain cases (e.g., those that are manifestly unfounded) rather than putting them through Dublin procedures.

**Consider arrangements for greater capacity sharing.** While the mechanism to detect systemic problems, introduced by Dublin III, may help fill some gaps in processing capacity, a key question remains: would the goals of the CEAS be better served by a processing mechanism that is truly a joint operation? Any mechanism for capacity sharing must take into account the strain that transfers place on a state’s reception and integration capacity by supporting Member States’ ability to accommodate asylum seekers, not just process applications. Pooling reception facilities across Member States is one possible way to increase the scope for sharing integration and reception capacity.

For more information on MPI’s Transatlantic Council on Migration, visit: www.migrationpolicy.org/transatlantic
## APPENDIX. DUBLIN REQUESTS AND TRANSFERS, 2012

### Table A-1. Outgoing requests to take charge or take back, top five sending states, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TOTAL OUTGOING REQUESTS</th>
<th>SHARE OF TOTAL BASED ON EURODAC (%)</th>
<th>TOTAL TAKE BACK</th>
<th>TAKE CHARGE</th>
<th>OF WHICH</th>
<th>FAMILY REASONS (ART. 6-8, 14)</th>
<th>DOCUMENTATION/ENTRY (ART. 9-12)</th>
<th>HUMANITARIAN (ART. 15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>11,574</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>10,534</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3,564</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
<td>11,029</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>7,355</td>
<td>3,674</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2,358</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
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<td>55.8</td>
<td>5,412</td>
<td>2,393</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2,358</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>5,389</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>4,636</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>651</td>
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<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>4,119</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>2,065</td>
<td>2,054</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2,016</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (ALL DUBLIN STATES)</td>
<td>53,439</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>38,984</td>
<td>12,912</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>11,637</td>
<td>175</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Because of discrepancies in how participating states report outgoing and incoming requests, the numbers here are based on outgoing Dublin request data only. Data from 2012 do not include request numbers from the Netherlands. Totals include non-EU Dublin states: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.


### Table A-2. Outgoing requests to take charge or take back, top five receiving states, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TOTAL REQUESTS</th>
<th>TOTAL TAKE BACK*</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>TAKE CHARGE*</th>
<th>OF WHICH</th>
<th>FAMILY REASONS (ART. 6-8, 14)</th>
<th>DOCUMENTATION/ENTRY (ART. 9-12)</th>
<th>HUMANITARIAN (ART. 15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>15,618</td>
<td>9,666</td>
<td>5,434</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5,363</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>5,533</td>
<td>4,876</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>3,149</td>
<td>2,657</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>3,094</td>
<td>2,152</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>2,836</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (ALL DUBLIN STATES)</td>
<td>53,439</td>
<td>38,984</td>
<td>12,912</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>11,637</td>
<td>175</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Because of discrepancies in how participating states report outgoing and incoming requests, the numbers here are based on outgoing Dublin request data only. Data do not include request numbers from the Netherlands. Denmark does not provide breakdowns of requests by take back versus take charge. Therefore take back and take charge data are presented without requests from Denmark. Totals include non-EU Dublin states: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.

Source: Eurostat, "Outgoing "Dublin" Requests by Receiving Country and Type of Request [migr_dubro]", 22 September 2014.
### Table A-3. Transfers, top five sending states, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TOTAL OUTGOING REQUESTS ACCEPTED</th>
<th>TOTAL OUTGOING TRANSFERS</th>
<th>SHARE OF ACCEPTANCES TRANSFERRED</th>
<th>OF WHICH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TAKE BACK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>9,328</td>
<td>4,637</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>3,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7,916</td>
<td>3,062</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5,477</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>1,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3,084</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2,660</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (ALL DUBLIN STATES)</td>
<td>36,749</td>
<td>14,405</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>11,078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Because of discrepancies in how participating states report outgoing and incoming transfers, the numbers here are based on outgoing Dublin transfer data only. Data do not include request numbers from the Netherlands. Transfer rates are calculated here on an annual basis, though it should be noted that transfers may occur in the calendar year after a request’s submission. Totals include non-EU Dublin states: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.


### Table A-4. Transfers, top five receiving states, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TOTAL TRANSFERS</th>
<th>OF WHICH</th>
<th>AS A SHARE OF TOTAL ASYLUM APPLICANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TAKE BACK</td>
<td>TAKE CHARGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4,894</td>
<td>3,611</td>
<td>1,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (ALL DUBLIN STATES)</td>
<td>14,405</td>
<td>11,078</td>
<td>3,327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Because of discrepancies in how participating states report outgoing and incoming transfers, the numbers here are based on outgoing Dublin transfer data only. Data do not include request numbers from the Netherlands or Denmark. Totals include non-EU Dublin states: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.

**Sources:** Eurostat, 'Outgoing Transfers by Receiving Country and Type of “Dublin” Request [migr_dubto]', updated 22 September 2014; Eurostat, 'Asylum and New Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, Age and Sex Annual Aggregated Data (rounded) [migr_asyappctza]', updated 29 October 2014.
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Susan Fratzke is an Associate Policy Analyst and Program Coordinator with the Migration Policy Institute’s International Program, where she primarily works with the Transatlantic Council on Migration. Her research areas include forced migration and European Union asylum policy, as well as vocational training and labor market integration.

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Migration Policy Institute Europe, established in Brussels in 2011, is a non-profit, independent research institute that aims to provide a better understanding of migration in Europe and thus promote effective policymaking. Building upon the experience and resources of the Migration Policy Institute, which operates internationally, MPI Europe provides authoritative research and practical policy design to governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders who seek more effective management of immigration, immigrant integration, and asylum systems as well as successful outcomes for newcomers, families of immigrant background, and receiving communities throughout Europe. MPI Europe also provides a forum for the exchange of information on migration and immigrant integration practices within the European Union and Europe more generally.

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