Understanding Transnational Dynamics in European Immigrant Integration Policy

By Paul Clewett

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

While the treatment of immigrant integration diverges significantly across the European Union (EU), Member States increasingly share an acceptance that the expected outcomes have thus far failed to materialise. A fresh approach to integration across the European Union is urgently needed, especially in the current climate, where social cohesion and economic resilience are being widely tested.

Measuring integration outcomes in destination countries and isolating those policy factors responsible is a difficult task. Integration outcomes are not uniform across national groups, nor are they the product of singular policy interventions. Rather, they are the result of a complex, three-way process between the migrant, origin country, and country of destination. Where some policy areas are conventionally seen as the prerogative of the destination country—the promotion of naturalisation, for instance—there is a growing recognition that multiple policies and factors across boundaries must be taken into account to explain the migrant’s progress.

More attention is thus now being paid to the transnational picture: the role that countries of origin can play in the integration process. Migrant-sending countries both affect and are affected by integration at destination. Better integration outcomes can elevate emigrants to a position in the host society from which they can support development at origin. Countries of origin can play a part in this process by actively engaging their nationals abroad and devoting resources to interventions among emigrants in destination communities.

Yet the promotion of country-of-origin strategies alone is insufficient to assure successful integration of their nationals at destination. In cases where destination-country conditions are unfavourable for successful integration, so too appear the outcomes of origin-country integration initiatives. The active participation of origin countries—even where interventions are well-funded and well-placed—is no panacea. Engineering favourable conditions at destination in tandem with complementary origin-country policies should therefore remain a priority for the European Union and its Member States.

I. INTRODUCTION

Immigrant integration policy exists to bring the participation of immigrants in the host society on a par with that of the native population. The approaches employed by EU Member States towards this aim have been numerous and diverse but have tended, to varying degrees, to have fallen short in delivering on expectations. The nature of expectations themselves also differ remarkably between Member States, with achievement in the classroom and the workplace, and exposure to or assimilation with wider society given different weight at different points in time. Despite the lack of consensus on what ‘successful’ integration constitutes, it is widely accepted that progress in the area benefits both host society and migrant.

While much of the focus is on how integration policies and programmes can benefit migrants and the society in which they live, the benefits that well-integrated emigrants can bring to their hometowns and countries of origin are less well explored. Countries of origin have increasingly come to recognise how the emigrant population can be leveraged to support national objectives, and that ‘successful’ migrants can make more significant contributions. Policies and programmes that are aimed at harnessing the benefits of migration therefore increasingly pay attention to integration issues. Yet despite the potential convergence of certain areas of interest between origin and destination governments and migrants themselves, progress is stymied by a lack of understanding of how factors at both ends of the migration trajectory interact to produce integration outcomes.

This policy brief examines how countries of origin might help or hinder integration across nine dimensions: labour market outcomes, education, political participation, civic participation, social interactions, access to naturalisation, language, religion, and residential integration. It draws on a number of corridor reports produced for INTERACT, a research programme consortium tasked with investigating the extent to which integration can be conceived of as a three-way process. While the willingness of origin countries to support integration promises to inject new life into a policy area that often comes across as tired, it must be recognised that they cannot compensate for bad integration conditions at destination. The active participation of origin countries—even where interventions are well-funded and well-placed—is no panacea. Engineering favourable conditions at destination in tandem with complementary origin-country policies should therefore remain a priority for the European Union and its Member States.
destination-country factors on integration outcomes. The third section presents the extent to which a range of origin-country initiatives complement destination-country policy or otherwise, and the fourth concludes with possible policy directions for the European Union and Member States.

II. MEASURING INTEGRATION: THE CASE FOR A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

It is widely acknowledged that immigrant integration is difficult to measure. The central challenge is that the dimensions of integration are interdependent. For example, gains in education outcomes often lead to increased participation in the labour market, which may in turn improve residential integration, civic participation, and social interaction, as the migrant gains access to social and financial capital through employment. Progress in the labour market enables migrants to invest in other areas of their lives, such as their children’s education, thus working towards the long-term integration of individuals, families, and groups. In this scenario, success in one dimension of integration reinforces progress in other areas.

In other cases, successful integration along one dimension is associated with poor integration outcomes on another. The ‘failure’ to integrate in residential terms—through tenure (e.g. home ownership or long-term rental) or housing quality, or as a result of segregation—may prove beneficial, as migrants upon arrival in a community benefit from access to niche labour market opportunities and the informal support networks that often grow among migrant communities. Similarly, higher levels of education may be accompanied by unemployment or underemployment in the destination labour market due to poor skills matching. For example, despite lower educational qualifications, Turkish migrants in Germany are more likely to find employment than Russians who are relatively better educated.³

Just as integration dimensions cannot be considered in isolation, integration-related policies at destination and origin are often interlinked, which can make disentangling cause and effect difficult. For example, citizenship acquisition in the destination country (a critical component of political integration) can have repercussions on migrants’ status in the origin country, and even amount to a loss of economic, social, and political rights. Turks in Germany, for instance, cited the loss of property rights at home as a fundamental reason for not naturalising,² thus excluding them from the full enjoyment of political rights reserved for German citizens and associated benefits related to civic participation and labour market integration.³ Unilateral moves by one country to encourage or discourage naturalisation that do not take into account the transnational perspective of the migration may therefore force migrants to make a ‘least worst’ choice as to which option will diminish their rights the least.⁶

In contrast, where countries have come to bilateral arrangements to allow migrants to maintain many of those rights, the benefits can accrue to immigrants, countries of origin, and countries of destination alike. Examples include mutual recognition of dual citizenship and new quasi-citizenship categories such as the Turkish ‘Blue Card’ or Person of Indian Origin (PIO) and Overseas Citizen of Indian (OCI) cards.⁷ Destination countries can also provide categories of belonging that confer rights where citizenship is lacking. Through the ‘Polish Card,’ Poland extends economic and social rights to would-be migrants who can prove a Polish connection. Without taking the added step of becoming citizens, Polish Card holders can integrate more effectively in the labour market and enjoy the additional benefits this brings to other dimensions of integration. Given the significant numbers of transient migrants who may struggle to demonstrate the residence, economic, and language requirements for citizenship, this may offer an alternative boost to integration.⁸

Finally, the openness of sending countries to return migration may affect integration outcomes. Positive indicators of labour market integration in destination countries may reflect origin policies that make it easier for unsuccessful migrants to return. In the same vein, where migrants see unemployment at destination as more favourable than return or onward migration—for instance because prospects for employment or social security elsewhere are slim—unemployment rates are likely to be higher. Ecuador’s robust structures for return and the country’s strong economic growth may explain the relatively low rates of long-term unemployed Ecuadorians in Spain. It may also explain why, following the economic crash, the numbers of Ecuadorians in Spain steadily decreased, while the Moroccan population has continued to increase.⁹

III. WHY DO CERTAIN EMIGRANTS SUCCEED?

Migrant groups of the same nationality often display divergent outcomes in different destination countries, as do different national groups within the same destination country. Given that integration outcomes are often a mix of sending- and receiving-country factors, to what extent
can differences in integration outcomes be attributed to specific policies at origin or destination?

A. Policy context

Any attempt to compare integration outcomes on the level of national emigrant groups must take into account the diversity of experiences between them. Divergences occur in three ways in particular.

1. Emigration policy and diaspora engagement

Diaspora policies vary widely by country, and sometimes by emigrant and national group. The Chinese government, in trying to build a ‘pro-Beijing’ diaspora, targets certain emigrant groups based on age, educational status, and even ethnicity, favouring the majority Han Chinese.\(^\text{10}\) Student organisations, which represent some of the most highly skilled Chinese studying for a postgraduate qualification internationally, often enjoy close relationships with the Chinese government. Policies are liberal towards this group and, although return is encouraged, emigrants are free to support the national development effort from afar. The Chinese government’s attitude to emigrant groups diverges based on a range of factors. Among them: the manner of exit, the class of migrant, and whether citizenship is retained or not.\(^\text{11}\)

2. Political leadership

The philosophy of leadership in the country of origin vis-à-vis the emigrant population is subject to change rapidly. A leadership shift in Morocco in 1999 signalled an about-turn from suspicion of the diaspora to embrace, paving the way for closer relationships with subsequent emigrants and, consequently, a more active and direct role in supporting integration at destination. More subtle changes in leadership happen on a continuous basis and can quickly render analyses of integration policy trends out of date.

3. Mode of entry and exit

Emigration policy can shape the relationship between the country of origin and certain emigrant groups for prolonged periods. Those who flee persecution in their origin countries—for example Iranians who left the country while emigration was ‘illegal’, asylum seekers from Russia and Turkey, or oppressed minority populations from anywhere—are likely to prove bigger challenges for relationship building than counterparts who emigrated in a regular fashion and not under pressure.

Immigration policy also characterises integration challenges. Immigrants who enter having been preselected for jobs are much more likely to succeed in the labour market.\(^\text{12}\) Other selective immigration policies also play a part in shaping integration challenges. The large numbers of students migrating from China to the United Kingdom (from 2010-12 around three-quarters of residence permits issued to the Chinese were for education\(^\text{13}\)) explains why the Chinese emigrant population appears better integrated into the UK education system than the Indian population—and even the native-born population\(^\text{14}\)—by virtue of the fact that they entered on visas specifically to study.

B. Host countries as determining actors

Given these nuances, it is possible to explore the relative role of origin- and destination-country factors on integration outcomes. Although choices made in the country of origin are important, it is evident that destination-country factors often prevail as the deciding element in integration outcomes.

The destination country sets the agenda. The turn away from a multicultural approach to integration in many EU Member States to one based on civic integration and identity-based politics contrasts directly with the aim of the origin country to maintain strong ties and boost integration outcomes at destination. Italy’s Piano per la integrazione (‘Integration Plan’) is a case in point of the prioritisation of civic integration. This has paved the way for a greater share (of a diminished pool of) resources to be spent on making sure economically inactive women are exposed to Italian culture, which is a low priority for the Moroccan government, for example. The prioritisation of the cultural over the economic at destination may explain in part why Moroccan government efforts to boost the economic participation of its emigrants have yielded such poor results.\(^\text{15}\)

Discrimination at destination can negate origin-country efforts. With the exception of lower rates of unemployment, Turkish migrants are generally worse off than their Russian counterparts in Germany despite the Turkish government’s comparatively well-developed diaspora policies and the Russian government’s relative apathy.\(^\text{16}\) Factors
often cited as explanations for the poor outcomes of Turkish groups—such as specific religious and cultural differences, or the high proportion of asylum seekers—have also been present in the Russian population. A more likely explanation is that host-country factors were responsible: many Russians were allowed entry as ‘ethnic Germans’, which granted them access to extensive integration support. Turks, meanwhile, were offered limited support by a handful of nongovernmental organisations and have often been depicted as ‘outsiders’.

Migrants appear more likely to acquire citizenship where laws at destination are favourable. Turkish naturalisations in Belgium and Sweden are notably high, whilst Turkish naturalisation rates in Germany are very low. Each of these migration corridors was catalysed by similar bilateral agreements in the 1950s and ‘60s, and each followed similar trends of family reunification and asylum-seeking once labour recruitment was stopped in the 1970s, yet integration outcomes are polarised. The pattern is repeated with Moroccan migrants in Belgium, whose rates of naturalisation are only marginally lower than that of the Turks, yet sharply in contrast with poor rates of naturalisation in Spain, which takes a tougher stance on dual citizenship. The high Moroccan-Belgian rates are particularly interesting in this regard given the decades spent by the Moroccan government specifically discouraging naturalisation. Russians demonstrate the inverse, commonly holding dual citizenship in spite of the negative stance of their origin government toward the practice.

In some cases, origin factors may appear stronger than they are in determining integration outcomes. Here, a ‘chicken or egg’ situation can emerge, where apparent advantages to integration are reinforced by the institutionalisation of those advantages in law. Perceptions of immigrants matter: in Spain, Latin Americans are seen as culturally closer than Arabs. When this perceived closeness is translated into law, its effects are institutionally reinforced. Given that naturalisation is associated with significantly improved economic, social, and political integration, then the ease with which Ecuadoreans naturalise relative to other migrants (Ecuadorians must be resident in Spain for two years before being eligible; Moroccans ten) may lead to better integration outcomes for Ecuadorians not as the result of cultural closeness itself, but due to a favourable legislative climate at destination. Like the extensive frameworks for the integration of aussiedler Russians (‘ethnic Germans’) in Germany, the destination country plays a pivotal role in making sure that these cultural similarities matter more in some cases than others.

The results are limited in scope, but they demonstrate the difficulty in attributing integration outcomes directly to state interventions. It is evident that policy must take into account the nuances of emigration circumstance and sociopolitical context. It must also acknowledge the continued importance of the destination country in crafting conditions in which the increasing enthusiasm with which many origin countries are embracing integration can flourish. In this context, a more in-depth exploration of the relationship between the country of origin and integration can help to illuminate those areas where cooperation may be most fruitful.

IV. THE ORIGIN COUNTRY AS INTEGRATION ACTOR

As an under-researched actor in the field of integration, the activities of the country of origin deserve more space in the policy debate. However, the confusion between integration outcomes and the array of influencing factors can cloud debate. To make things simpler, origin governments’ engagement with the integration of migrants can be placed on a spectrum consisting of four key markers ranging from ‘active discordance’ to ‘active concordance’.

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A. Active discordance

This refers to policies that are deliberately obstructive of integration aims. Examples are far less numerous than other categories, reflecting a general (but fairly recent) shift away from negative representations of emigration and emigrants. Examples include:

- **Negative conceptualisation of emigrants.** India, as one among a number of countries, has undergone a spectacular transformation, from the casting of emigrants as ‘traitors’ to national development, and the low status of the Non-Resident (dismissively referred to by some as Non-Required) Indian, to the celebration of the extended diaspora as an integral part of the country’s present and future.

- **Active discouragement of integration-related activity at destination.** Morocco’s strong focus on loyalty up until the 1990s led to the government openly discouraging integration, especially political and civic integration.
B. Passive discordance

Passive discordance refers to existing situations that were not created to obstruct integration, but do so because of reluctance to give integration sufficiently high priority, or to bring state practices into line with an otherwise constructive rhetoric. It represents the area where the most progress can be made, as a legal framework is often already established.

- The legal-institutional gap. Ukraine’s 1996 Constitution affirmed the social and political rights of nationals residing abroad, and a range of political declarations have been made and legislative proposals passed reaffirming these rights. So far, however, funds have not been budgeted. A similar ‘legal-institutional’ gap exists in Russia, where despite a legal promise to support human rights and labour market integration for its emigrants at destination, as well as engagement in culture, language, and education, practical policy outcomes have not been forthcoming. Iran is one step further behind, having made symbolic gestures but failing so far to build a comprehensive diaspora engagement strategy, instead continuing to emphasise return.

- Persisting misguided interventions. Sometimes policies are intended to support integration aims, but a lack of harmonisation results in counterproductive outcomes. The conservative imams trained by Morocco and Turkey and sent to emigrant towns in Europe often cause friction with local, more liberal Muslim migrant groups. In addition, the enthusiasm with which Turkey has embraced diaspora engagement through the funding of myriad cultural, religious, educational, and informational centres has led to the view that it is ‘actively shaping migrant neighbourhoods’, prompting suspicion in some quarters from resident Turkish migrants and, one might predict, German natives too.

- Lack of remedy for conflicting laws. Standing origin-country citizenship laws that inadvertently apply a penalty to those who naturalise, i.e. through a concomitant loss of citizenship or rights at home, can prove a strong disincentive to integration. This can be mitigated by permitting dual citizenship where possible, or the creation of alternatives to citizenship, such as the Turkish Blue Card, which emulate many of its rights and privileges.

C. Passive concordance

Passive concordance applies to cases where, in attempting to fulfil a policy objective unrelated to integration, the origin country inadvertently supports integration outcomes.

- State-funded institutions acting beyond their official remit. Financial support for the Russian Orthodox Church abroad is in place to extend the state’s ideological reach among emigrants. Individual churches, however, at times interpret their roles more expansively, becoming an important community hub and centre for support. Funds directed towards the Church therefore have the potential to fulfil a range of objectives unforeseen by the origin government.

- The unforeseen alignment of origin-country objectives with positive integration outcomes. Cultural institutions of many major sending countries, including in this case EU Member States (e.g. Russian Centers of Science and Culture Abroad, Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Institute, France’s Alliance Française, Germany’s Goethe Institut) promote language learning, which can support migrants in the labour market at destination. Multinational corporations—especially for languages of global economic importance such as Russian, Arabic and (increasingly) Turkish—transnational companies (‘migration businesses’), tourism agencies, and public services all seek origin-country language skills.

D. Active concordance

Active concordance refers to interventions by the country of origin that explicitly aim to promote integration abroad.
The bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and Belgium in 1964 showed an early indication of an understanding that a more holistic approach to integration would aid the economic component of emigration. As part of their employment contracts, Turkish workers secured access to social housing, prayer facilities at destination, financial support for dependent children remaining in Turkey, and even partial reimbursement of travel expenses for wives with young children.

Even Morocco, which signed its own agreement with Belgium soon after in 1964, and has been until recently particularly wary of subversion in its diaspora, had secured guarantees that employers would observe Moroccan national holidays, indicating a willingness to create conditions of cultural understanding.35

International agreements often contain active support for integration. The latest Andrés Bello Convention,36 signed by a range of Latin American countries and Spain in 1995, offers a pioneering framework for integration cooperation. EU mobility partnerships also show this potential, although this has often been overshadowed by a prevailing emphasis on migration management.37

Countries of origin can also support civil society in promising areas. Turkish ‘solidarity networks’ are informal networks formed between migrants and hometowns, and are most visible through their websites. Through their dedicated websites they bring news from the hometown and diaspora under one virtual roof, providing a platform for members to share job offers, business proposals, and development projects: from fundraising campaigns for low-income families to the construction and maintenance of schools and mosques. Nongovernmental, nationally prominent organisations such as the Swedish-Turkish Association offer transnational reach for civil-society networks. Having a transnational presence enables support organisations to understand the challenges of migration and integration and provide support to migrants at each stage of the migration process.38

The key question is whether encouraging countries of origin to expand their activity in the fourth segment—active concordance—would itself bring tangible benefits to integration outcomes. What is clear from the examples is that when countries of origin actively engage in the integration at destination of their emigrants, the impact is only positive when the destination-country factors are in tune with their efforts. The European Union has an important role to play in helping to strike the balance, as will be discussed next.

V. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union plays an important auxiliary role in ensuring that Member States and countries of origin maximise the resources already at their disposal, and continue to engage in meaningful dialogue with each other on the issue of immigrant integration. The EU role can further be expanded upon in four ways: by pursuing synergies between policy areas, developing a systematic awareness of the fallout from structural changes, targeting financial resources at closing the legal-institutional gap, and supporting further research.

First, the European Union can seek synergies between integration and other areas of policy. The relevance of integration to the migration and development agenda raises the possibility of funds for international cooperation and development can increase the reach of those resources earmarked for integration (and vice versa), thereby bringing better value for money in both areas. Other mechanisms developed for various purposes, such as the Eastern Partnership and Globalisation Adjustment Fund, could be harnessed for integration.

The European Union can also use its integration funds strategically to help close the legal-institutional gap in origin countries and, where necessary, destination countries too.

Second, the European Union should be made systematically aware of how other policy outcomes can impact integration and devote resources to monitoring the impact of these changes on integration needs. Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004 required it to tighten what were until then fairly porous borders with the Ukraine, forcing an institutionalisation of an informal, circular flow of workers. The accommodating out-migration from Poland to other EU Member States left certain areas with acute labour market needs and specific demographic challenges.39 Future border alterations, changes to laws around free movement, security measures targeted at certain populations, and macro-economic stability packages might all change the game in terms of integration.

Third, the European Union can also use its integration funds strategically to help close the legal-institutional gap in origin countries and, where necessary, destination...
countries too. This should include funds for the systematic evaluation of new and existing initiatives and a space for dissemination between key origin and destination states to ensure that any increase in origin-country activity is concordant with the policy and conditions at destination.

Countries of origin can have an impact on the integration outcomes of their nationals, but it is pivotal to first build a receptive environment at destination.

Fourth, the European Union can support civil-society organisations that have little prospect of support from their origin governments, as in the case of Iranian migrant groups in Sweden. This can be through financial support or assistance with coordination. As one of many potential avenues for exploration, the European Union’s existing E-Twinning networking programme between schools could be adapted to fit migration corridors and encourage networking between other relevant actors at origin and destination.

VI. CONCLUSION

The evidence analysed shows that countries of origin can have an impact on the integration outcomes of their nationals, but it is pivotal to first build a receptive environment at destination. The way forward must therefore be highly contextualised and with clear priorities spelled out: both in terms of supporting those interventions or policies most conducive to effective integration outcomes and by taking into account the multi-faceted differences between immigrant populations that extend beyond national identities.

Although the weight of assuring integration and putting in place the right policy and programming support continues to fall on destination countries, migrant-sending countries should be engaged as equal partners in the integration process in order to ensure that policy changes in one place do not negatively impact initiatives from another. The European Union can support this process by streaming integration objectives across policy areas, incorporating integration objectives into a range of pre-existing tools, and continuing to create space for dialogue between actors.

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INTERACT: Researching Third-Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-Way Process Involving Immigrants, Countries of Emigration, and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration

Approximately 25 million persons born outside the European Union (third-country nationals) currently live in EU Member States and represent 5 per cent of the total EU population. Integrating these immigrants—enabling their participation in the destination society at the same level as natives—is an active process that involves both the receiving society and immigrants working together to build a cohesive whole.

Policymaking on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: their origin and their destination. While integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries that see expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants interact with their home country.

The INTERACT project looks at how governments and nongovernmental institutions in origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); and legally (to support their rights).

The INTERACT project explores several important questions:

To what extent do the immigrant integration policies of EU Member States and the expatriate-focused policies of governments and nonstate actors in origin countries complement or contradict each other? How do policies in origin and destination countries affect the successful integration of migrants, and what obstacles do they raise?

Researchers in the European Union have produced a considerable body of high-quality information and analysis on the integration of migrants. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done.

INTERACT is cofinanced by the European Union and is implemented by a consortium built by the Center for Ethnic and Migration Studies (CEDEM), UPF, and MPI Europe.

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The INTERACT corridor reports comprise a survey component, which assesses integration across the nine categories listed above, an analysis of emigration and diaspora policy at origin and immigration policy at destination, and an interview component with representatives from migrant organisations at destination who were asked for their perspectives on the impact of origin countries on emigrant groups. For more, see the position papers published as part of the INTERACT project, of which the Migration Policy Institute Europe (MPI Europe) is a member; Migration Policy Centre, ‘Publications’, accessed 27 January 2015, http://interact-project.eu/publications/. The reports focus on several migration corridors: Turkey and Morocco to Belgium, Iran and Turkey to Sweden, Turkey and Russia to Germany, Russia and Ukraine to Poland, Ukraine and Morocco to Italy, and China and India to the United Kingdom. Preliminary findings from Morocco and Ecuador to Spain, and China and Morocco to the Netherlands were also reviewed.


2. Although it must be taken into account that Russian women are more likely to be active in the labour market than Turkish women. See Agnieszka Weinar and Jan Schneider, Corridor Report: Germany (Florence: Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, unpublished INTERACT project research report, 2014).


5. Citizenship is a prerequisite for a number of public service jobs. It has also been demonstrated that, informally, job applications are more likely to succeed when submitted by a citizen. See Tomas Liebig and Friederike von Haaren, ‘Citizenship and Socioeconomic Integration of Immigrants and their Children’, in Naturalisation: A Passport for the Better Integration of Immigrants? (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011), 23-57.

6. This is not to claim that migrants always make a choice based on rational cost-benefit analysis, only that this is often a major part of the decision-making process. For more discussion, see Marteen Peter Vink, Immigrant Integration and Access to Citizenship in the European Union: The Role of Origin Countries, INTERACT Research Report (Florence: Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, 2014), http://interact-project.eu/docs/publications/Research%20Report/INTERACT-RR-2013-05.pdf.

7. The difference between legal statuses can cause some confusion. Prime Minister Narendra Modi shortly after taking office in October 2014 declared that the Person of Indian Origin status (for those who are descended from or married to an Indian but have never held citizenship) would be brought into line with the Overseas Citizen of India status (for former citizens of India) and provide the same set of rights to holders: chiefly a lifetime visa to enter India. The Non-Resident India (NRI) card is taken by Indians abroad on work permits who have not renounced Indian citizenship. For further background, see Ishani Duttagupta, ‘PIO, OCI: Clearing the air on cards’, The Economic Times India Times blog, updated October 6, 2014, http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/globalindian/pio-oci-clearing-the-air-on-cards/.


11. Originally, the Chinese government distinguished between citizens overseas and Chinese overseas, the former holding Chinese passports and the latter being defined in ethnic terms. Although diaspora engagement policy in China has expanded to incorporate most groups abroad, important differences still remain. For more information, see Xiang Biao, ‘Emigration from China: A sending country perspective’, International Migration Review 41 no. 3 (2003): 21-48.

Moroccans are found to languish second to last in the economic dimension relative to 17 other immigrant groups in Italy. See Anna di Bartolomeo, Giuseppe Gabrielli, and Salvatore Strozza, *Corridor Report on Italy: The case of Moroccan and Ukrainian immigrants*, INTERACT research report (Florence: Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, 2014 unpublished).

Spain requires the renunciation of citizenship for naturalisation of most immigrants, although enforcement is patchy. The only exceptions to this rule exist in Latin America, where the first bilateral agreement on dual citizenship was signed with Chile in 1958, and the latest with Colombia in 1979. See Francesco Pasetti, *Country Report: Integration Policies in Spain*, INTERACT Research Report (Florence: Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, 2014), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33231/INTERACT-RR-2014%20-%2030.pdf?sequence=1.


Weinar and Schneider, *Corridor Report: Germany*, 32-3.


Pasetti, *Country Report: Integration Policies in Spain*. ‘Non-required Indian’ is a parody of the special ‘Non-resident Indian’ legal status given to those Indians who have moved abroad for a period of six months or more. For a more in-depth discussion of this, see Metka Hertog and Melissa Siegel, ‘Diaspora Engagement in India: from Non-Required Indians to Angels of Development’, in Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).


This is not to say that instruments for engaging the diaspora are nonexistent. They include: the High Council of Iranian Affairs Abroad, the Department of International Affairs and Schools Abroad, the National Elites Foundation, and several working groups within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that are focused on cooperation in arts, science, law, and religion, among others. See Lorenzo Gabrielli and Francesco Pasetti, *Corridor Report on Sweden: The Case of Iranian and Turkish Migrants*, INTERACT research report (Barcelona: GRITIM, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014 unpublished).

Weinar and Schneider, *Corridor Report: Germany*, 41.


Weinar and Schneider, *Corridor Report: Germany*, 41.

Ibid., 27.


The Singapore National Day website states that the day is for Singaporeans only as its rationale is for nationals to ‘reconnect with home’. It nevertheless permits one non-Singaporean per guest, thereby creating space for intercultural dialogue. See Singapore Day FAQs, ‘What Is Singapore Day?’ accessed 8 February 2015, www.singaporeday.sg/faqs.html.

This seems to have been unique to Belgium and likely related to the fierce competition for workers with firms in Germany, Holland, and France which, given Belgium’s small size, forced employers to offer more.


Turkish associations in Sweden reported that they were most appreciated for efforts to match would-be migrants to jobs and supporting them in negotiating legal structures at destination. See Gabrielli and Pasetti, Corridor Report on Sweden.

Lesińska, Immigration of Ukrainians and Russians into Poland.

Gabrielli and Pasetti, Corridor Report on Sweden.

E-Twinning is a platform that facilitates cooperation between schools across a network of 35 European countries. Of the origin countries discussed in this report, only Turkey is included so far. For more information see European Commission, ‘E-Twinning, www.etwinning.net/en/pub/index.htm, accessed 11 February 2015.

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Migration Policy Institute Europe, established in Brussels in 2011, is a nonprofit, independent research institute that aims to provide a better understanding of migration in Europe and thus promote effective policymaking. Building upon the experience and resources of the Migration Policy Institute, which operates internationally, MPI Europe provides authoritative research and practical policy design to governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders who seek more effective management of immigration, immigrant integration, and asylum systems as well as successful outcomes for newcomers, families of immigrant background, and receiving communities throughout Europe. MPI Europe also provides a forum for the exchange of information on migration and immigrant integration practices within the European Union and Europe more generally.