| Peace
in the midst of war? How the
Naivasha Protocols affect Darfur
February 2005
After more than 20 years of nearly continuous civil war
and over two years of peace negotiations, the government
of Sudan and the main rebel group in the south, the Southern
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), signed
final peace protocols in Nairobi, Kenya, on January 9, 2005.
Immediately, the international community, led by the United
Nations, began gearing up for what is likely to be one of
its largest-ever refugee repatriation operations. Over the
coming months and years, more than 500,000 southern Sudanese
refugees currently spread throughout the Horn and East of
Africa – as well as much further afield – will,
with international assistance, voluntarily return to a homeland
many have not seen for decades.
Naivasha in Brief
A mere paragraph cannot do justice to the complexity of the
Naivasha Agreement, but a basic background is important for
understanding Naivasha’s relationship to any potential
accords in Darfur. The Naivasha Agreement is a series of protocols
aimed at solving the multitude of points of contention between
the government and the southern rebels. Some of the key issues
addressed in the agreement1 include the requirement
for the government of Sudan to withdraw 91,000 troops from
the south within two and half years, whereas the SPLM/A is
required to withdraw all of its forces from the north within
eight months. The agreement then details a framework for integrating
the armed forces and for administering areas of central Sudan.
It contains the requirement that Sudan change its constitution
in order to ensure that non-Muslims in Sudan are not subject
to Sharia law. It contains further protocols on both legislative
power sharing – that is, incorporating SPLM/A leaders
in the central government in Khartoum – as well as “natural
resource” sharing, meaning equitable distribution of
the south’s oil revenues. Lastly, the agreement contains
provisions for a large peacekeeping force to be deployed in
the South, as well as an eventual referendum on independence
for the south, not expected until at least 2011.
Darfur continues
Meanwhile, however, a much younger war continues to flare
in southern Sudan’s neighboring region, Darfur. A rebel
group called the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) began an
uprising in Darfur in February 2003, in part due to fears
that the long-neglected region would be further marginalized
by the government-SPLM/A peace talks, which, at the time,
had just started. The original manifestos of the SLA invited
the participation of all aggrieved Darfurians, and claimed
that they aimed to redress the history of neglect and exploitation
of the Darfur region at the hands of the government.
By April 2003, the rebels had captured a major garrison
in northern Darfur and attracted government attention. The
government’s motivations and decisions after this point
are open to speculation. Perhaps the most accepted theory,
however, suggests that the government, having only recently
entered into power-sharing talks with its long-term enemy
and aware of the unrest brewing in many of its other so-called “peripheral” areas,
feared that anything less than a harsh response to the Darfur
rebels would invite similar uprisings in other restive regions.
Following a time-honored tradition, the government called
on the services of an ethnically-based militia, known as
the Janjaweed, to quell the rebellion.
“Quelling the rebellion,” however, quickly became
a full scale, brutal attack by both government and Janjaweed
forces on the mostly sedentary and non-Arabic-speaking farming
tribes of Darfur, identified as “African” as
opposed to the predominately cattle-herding, Arabic-speaking
Janjaweed. Since April of 2003, estimates of anywhere from
70,000-350,000 civilians have been killed, approximately
300,000 have fled to Chad, and between 1.3 and 1.8 million
more are internally displaced within Darfur. Millions are
at risk from disease and starvation. There are also widespread
reports of mass rape and other forms of sexual violence,
destruction of homes, properties and livelihoods.
The response of the international community
The international community has, controversially, worked
to keep the conflicts and peace talks for both Darfur and
southern Sudan entirely separate. Since the very beginning
of the conflict in Darfur, many observers (including UN member
states) have portrayed the situation in Sudan as a type of
zero-sum game: peace would only prevail in the south if Darfur
was, at least temporarily, put to the side.
| The so-called
Naivasha process – named after the lakeside town
in Kenya where the more than two years of negotiations
took place – was beginning to show its first
real signs of progress just as Darfur was descending
further into chaos. |
The so-called Naivasha process – named after the lakeside
town in Kenya where the more than two years of negotiations
took place – was beginning to show its first real signs
of progress just as Darfur was descending further into chaos. After
investing so much time, energy and resources into the Naivasha
talks, the sponsors (including the US, Norway and the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development – IGAD) were concerned that
exerting too much pressure on the Sudanese government about
Darfur at such a crucial point for the south could cause
the fragile southern process to unravel. The Sudanese government,
for its part, understood this fact, and did not hesitate
to use the resulting leverage to increase its attacks on
Darfur, both through aerial bombardment and support of the
Janjaweed militias.
The concerns of the international community about the fragility
of the southern peace process were not unfounded – peace
processes are inherently unstable, particularly after such
a long and bloody war. However, it is also well understood
by all involved that the government of Sudan has, throughout
nearly two decades of continuous conflict, cleverly played
off of the interests of the international community. When
UN and other international attention is directed elsewhere,
the government and its militias have committed grave atrocities
against civilians – in the south, in the Nuba mountains,
in Darfur, and most recently, in the northeast. When international
attention refocuses, however, Khartoum generally changes
its policies or actions just enough as to avoid strong penalties:
it allows limited humanitarian access in order to avert sanctions,
it says some harsh words against terrorist activities on
its territory in order to stave off an arms embargo or worse,
and so on and so on. Then the cycle repeats itself in what
Sudan expert John Prendergast has labeled a policy of both “divide
and conquer” as well as “divide and confuse.”2
Keeping in mind this longstanding pattern of disingenuousness
on the part of the Sudanese government, the sponsors of Naivasha
could not have realistically expected that attempting to
keep the two conflicts separate while only focusing on a
peaceful resolutions for one would result in better policies
for both. Instead, Darfur exploded as Naivasha dragged on.
Given that scenario, one might have expected that the recent
signing of the Naivasha Agreement would in turn cause the
international community, at long last, to turn its attention
toward Darfur. More than a month beyond the Naivasha signing,
however, there has not been any tangible increase in international
actions in Darfur. Rather, since a peak of international
attention in the summer and early fall of 2004, Darfur has
in large part fallen off of the international radar screen.
Also worrying are “new” arguments being voiced
from several quarters about the fragility of the implementation of
the Naivasha Agreement. There is no question that the agreement
is complicated, and even if all runs smoothly, its full implementation
will take years. However, any suggestion that Naivasha remains
in too fragile a position to exert strong pressure on Khartoum
about Darfur demonstrates not only a lack of understanding
about the motivations of the Sudanese government, but a near
complete disregard for the suffering of millions of civilians
in Darfur. “Patience on Darfur” during the Naivasha
talks must not be allowed to become “patience on Darfur” during
Naivasha’s implementation.
A way forward? The importance of a truly comprehensive
peace agreement
What must happen instead? International involvement in Darfur
could take any of a number of forms, though the actions most
likely to make a real difference are the same actions most
likely to cause a negative reaction from Khartoum – sanctions
on Sudan’s leadership, enforcement of a no-fly zone
or, especially, greatly increasing the size and strengthening
the mandate of the African Union force currently monitoring
human rights abuses in the region.
The concerns that sending an increased AU or international
force into Darfur could upend the years of painstaking peace
work in the south are very real. However, implementation
of the Naivasha Agreement has only just begun. And, of course,
ultimate success of the complicated series of protocols is
not guaranteed, particularly with such contentious issues
as power and revenue sharing at stake and the daunting challenges
of implementation that still lay ahead. Given the snail’s
pace at which the talks proceeded, it is beyond callous to
expect Darfurian civilians to continue to watch their families
being torn apart and their livelihoods destroyed, all while
waiting for the international community to eventually (if
ever) turn its attention toward them – first while
Naivasha was being concluded and now as it is implemented.
As noted above, the government of Sudan has already shown
itself willing to use Naivasha as necessary to gain leverage
in Darfur, and there is no reason to think that it would
not continue such a tactic as long as it continues to work.
| Allowing the
crisis in Darfur to continue nearly unabated for the
sake of the southern peace process could prove devastating
for both – and perhaps for Sudan’s eastern
regions as well. |
It is also becoming increasingly difficult to justify inaction
in Darfur as merely a consequence of achieving peace in the
south. Not only does the sheer number of victims in Darfur
defy such logic, but the increasing size and intensity of
the conflict in Darfur (as well as recent, deadly riots in
the east) makes it less and less likely that the Naivasha
Agreement will survive in the long term with a full-scale
war going on in nearly half the country. The principles currently
guiding the SPLA in the south and the founding principles
of the SLA in Darfur are fairly similar. Allowing the crisis
in Darfur to continue nearly unabated for the sake of the
southern peace process could prove devastating for both – and
perhaps for Sudan’s eastern regions as well.
An alternative to this scenario is to include Darfur, as
well as other regions or political parties in dispute with
Khartoum, in all-country peace talks. All-country talks are
the only way to solve what lies at the heart of all of
the various crises in Sudan: the political manifestation
of national identity – that is, who controls what,
gives what to whom and why.
The idea of all-country talks does not mean a vast table with
representatives of dozens of different groups milling around
arguing with each other, but rather the development of a common
framework for all of the various regional talks, allowing for
regional and political particulars as they arise. The current
piecemeal approach – the Naivasha protocols, the government
and Darfur rebels occasionally talking in Abuja and the recent
preliminary agreement following years of talks with the opposition
National Democratic Alliance in Cairo – may produce short
term results but is unlikely to be sustainable in the long term
unless all talks and agreements address the underlying –
and common – causes of Sudan’s various conflicts.
The millions of suffering civilians in Darfur should not be
left to fend for themselves for the sake of an unsustainable
framework.
1) For more information, see IRIN, “Southern
Agreement Raises Hope for Nationwide Peace,” January 10, 2005 or http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v48n02-5OD02.htm for
a summary of the protocols.
2) John Prendergast, speaking at
a briefing entitled “Darfur, Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda: The
Quest for a Comprehensive Peace,” Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, Africa Program, February 7, 2005.
Previous Columns
"Unlike Any Other, It Is A War on
Children": Victims of the Conflict in Northern Uganda
August 17, 2004
The World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis Continues:
Ethnic Cleansing and Forced Displacement in Darfur
July 8, 2004
Forced Return to Chechnya
June 1, 2004
"The
World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis":
Ethnic Cleansing and Forced Displacement in Darfur
May 5, 2004 |
