Migration Policy Institute
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HOT SPOTS
By Erin Patrick

In this new column, MPI Associate Policy Analyst Erin Patrick examines international crises and humanitarian efforts to assist and protect refugees and internally displaced people. Politically and socially complex, these situations require immediate attention, and usually, action, but they often present political and geographical obstacles that can hamper the effectiveness of aid efforts. This monthly series of articles is designed to stimulate discussion on still-unfolding situations and raise important policy questions for the international community.
SOURCE: UNHCR/V
Internally displaced woman from Chechnya, in Troitskaya settlement, Sunzha District, Ingushetia, Jan. 2000. Source: UNHCR/V.

Please click to enlarge map.
Source: UNHCR

Background

The tiny republic of Chechnya proclaimed its independence from Russia in late 1991, a declaration that went unrecognized by Russia and the international community in general. Since then, Chechen civilians have lived through two major waves of conflict. The first began in 1994 as Russian troops arrived to crush what was seen as a burgeoning and violent separatist movement as well as general criminality and insecurity. In just under two years of heavy fighting, an estimated 50,000 people were killed and anywhere from 400-600,000 civilians fled to neighboring provinces. The capital city of Grozny was largely destroyed.

A tenuous ceasefire was signed in 1996, but insecurity remained constant. The war was re-ignited in 1999 when Russian troops reentered Chechnya following the seizure of several villages in neighboring Dagestan by armed Islamic guerrilla groups, and a series of bombings in Moscow and Dagestan that were blamed on these so-called “Wahhabi guerrillas.” More than 600,000 people were displaced between 1999-2000, many for the second time (having fled during the first wave of conflict in 1994 and returned). Significant numbers of the displaced found temporary – and often precarious – shelter in the neighboring province of Ingushetia.

By mid-2000, the large-scale fighting had ebbed and the conflict in Chechnya began to take on many of the hallmarks of a “dirty war.” Both the Russian army and Chechen rebels have been accused of human rights violations, and targeted attacks on humanitarian workers have greatly limited the ability of such organizations to provide aid to the desperate civilians that remain in the embattled republic. Elections were held in 2003, but large-scale voting irregularities and lack of monitoring caused many human rights groups (and Chechens themselves) to dismiss the results. In a relatively new trend, Chechens have also begun seeking asylum in large numbers. The most recent setback to peace and stability in the republic was the assassination of Chechen President Akmad Kadyrov in April 2004.

Click for Larger Chechnya Map






 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



Forced Return to Chechnya

June 1, 2004

In 2003, the world's largest source country of asylum seekers was a European democracy, an ally of the United States, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council: the Russian Federation. The total number of asylum seekers worldwide from the Russian Federation shot up 68 percent in 2003 to 33,364 people. At the same time, 210,000 Chechens – more than 20 percent of the population of Chechnya – remain displaced within the Russian Federation in 2004.

According to UNHCR, most of these more than 33,000 asylum seekers from the Russian Federation came from the war-ravaged territory of Chechnya. Nearly 100,000 Chechens sought protection through asylum worldwide between 2000-03.

“But hasn’t Chechnya calmed down?”

Many people were familiar with the situation in Chechnya in the 1990s: the near-complete destruction of the capital Grozny, kidnappings of civilians and humanitarian workers by rebel factions, forced disappearances, “mop-up” operations by the Russian military, terrorist bombings in Moscow and overall instability.

The total number of asylum seekers worldwide from the Russian Federation shot up 68 percent in 2003 to 33,364 people. At the same time, 210,000 Chechens – more than 20 percent of the population of Chechnya – remain displaced within the Russian Federation in 2004.
But with the so-called “normalization” of the conflict in Chechnya – the Russian government’s attempt to limit and downplay the scope of the problem – the rogue territory has fallen from international headlines. Even the recent assassination of the pro-Russian Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov barely mustered more than a day of front-page coverage in non-Russian newspapers; and few media even cover the increasingly frequent and brutal activities of the paramilitary organization run by Kadyrov’s son. Arbitrary detentions, extra-judicial killings, disappearances, mop-up operations, torture, kidnappings and pervasive insecurity and fear remain commonplace even into 2004.

Forced Return

One of the most troubling elements of Russian and Ingushetian government policies has been the forced return of the displaced to Chechnya. Beginning in 2001 and continuing into 2004, newly displaced Chechens have been refused forced migrant status by Russian authorities and camps for displaced Chechens in neighboring Ingushetia have been systematically closed in contravention of international standards. There are reports of threats and intimidation on the part of Russian and Ingush officials to force people from the camps, including cutting off gas and electricity, or removing families from humanitarian aid distribution lists. On the other side of the border, promises made by Russian officials to resume aid to suffering Chechens, of reimbursements for destroyed houses, or other incentives have yet to materialize, in many cases causing returnees to flee once again to Ingushetia.

Seeking Protection Elsewhere

The conflict in Chechnya has been going on, in ebbs and flows, for a decade now. Why is it only in 2004 that Chechens began to seek international protection in such large numbers that it has become the world’s largest nationality of origin?

There are several factors that have come into play, including:

· Deplorable conditions in Ingushetia including scarce aid, a profound lack of adequate housing, constant pressure from authorities to leave, and increased tensions with the local population (who also suffer from extreme poverty);
· An inability or unwillingness to return to Chechnya due to ongoing security concerns;
· A lack of residency permits and/or forced migrant status elsewhere in the Russian Federation, therefore preventing access to state benefits or even, in many situations, legal housing;
· Increasing anti-Chechen public sentiment throughout Russia, stirred by Chechen rebel attacks and hostage taking in Moscow, and not discouraged by government policies.

Of these factors, however, perhaps none is more significant to the increase in the number of Chechen asylum seekers than the issue of forced return from Ingushetia to Chechnya. In a survey conducted by Médecins Sans Frontières in April 2003, 98 percent of those interviewed said they did not want to go back to Chechnya. Of those, 93 percent cited ongoing security concerns as the main reason keeping them from returning, despite the dire circumstances in Ingushetia. A further 74 percent also cited lack of housing available in Chechnya – and this was despite the fact that the majority of those surveyed were found to be living in cellars, overcrowded abandoned buildings, leaky tents or worse. Only 2 percent said the aid they received in Ingushetia was the primary reason for their unwillingness to return to Chechnya – a response that is perhaps not surprising considering the precarious state of humanitarian assistance in either territory. Life in Ingushetia becomes more difficult for Chechens by the day.

Given a choice, then, between being forced back to a place so many continue to fear, staying hidden and without support in an increasingly unfriendly place, or seeking protection and a better life in another country, tens of thousands of Chechens have chosen to seek asylum.

International Implications

As with most “internal” conflicts, the consequences of the war in Chechnya have spilled across borders and have strong implications for the refugee protection and human rights regimes and international politics in general. Clearly, 30-40,000 Chechens cannot keep arriving at Europe’s doorstep every year without causing a policy reaction.

The eventual impact of the increased number of asylum seekers is likely be most significant for the newest EU member states, as these nations with more fragile and less experienced asylum systems are receiving nearly as many Chechens as more traditional asylum countries such as Germany and Austria. Further, it is the accession states that now make up the “frontiers” of the EU to which the Dublin II framework suggests overland asylum seekers should be returned. Chechens may prove to be the first major test of both the new states’ asylum systems and the willingness of the EU-15 to commit to any of the burden-sharing proposals now under consideration with the new accession countries.

Beyond strictly European borders, the profound lack of willingness of many in the international community to criticize the forced return policies of the Russian government also continues to be of major concern. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly labeled the Chechen rebels as Islamic terrorists and linked the conflict in Chechnya to the broader post-9/11 “war on terror.” Many in the international community have questioned the validity of such claims, which remain notoriously difficult to asses as few, if any, international observers or human rights monitors are allowed into Chechnya.

Might a continued influx of civilians fleeing the Russian Federation cause the international community to reconsider their hands-off approach to Russia’s Chechnya policy? Or, on the other hand, has the policy succeeded in labeling all Chechens as terrorists, thereby causing even more fear and xenophobia on the part of receiving countries? If this were the case, Chechens who fled first to Ingushetia and again to seek asylum to avoid forced return could instead end up being sent back to Chechnya by the country to which they applied for asylum.

Blind fear should not be used as an excuse for systematically denying protection to those in need. With this in mind, the international community must be careful to avoid setting a precedent in which a mere reference to “terrorism” can hold the Refugee Convention hostage for entire groups of civilians. Clearly the Russian people have experienced truly horrifying incidents in recent years, and all appropriate steps should be taken to combat such egregious acts of violence. But hundreds of thousands of Chechen civilians have lived in their own version of hell for a nearly a decade. With no end in sight and little or no protection available nearby, they must be allowed to avail themselves of the international protections guaranteed by the Convention.



Read the first article in the series: Ethnic Cleansing and Forced Displacement in Darfur.