Breakfast Briefing
August 18, 2005

On August 18, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) hosted the release of the third and final report in its project Assessing Selected Border Control Measures After September 11.  The event was taped by C-SPAN2 and televised later in the day.

Secure Borders, Open Doors: Visa Procedures in the Post-September 11 Era, co-authored by Stephen Yale-Loehr, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, and Betsy Cooper, details and analyzes the many reforms to the system through which foreigners travel to and seek entry into the United States.

The first report in this series, Real Challenges for Virtual Borders: The Implementation of US-VISIT by Rey Koslowski, was released on June 9, and the second, One Face at the Border: Behind the Slogan by Deborah Meyers was released on June 23. 

The event was chaired by MPI’s Senior Fellow Doris Meissner.  Authors Papademetriou and Cooper presented the executive summary and other key findings of the study.   Margaret Stock, Associate Professor of Law at the US Military Academy, and Debra Stewart, President of the Council of Graduate Schools, served as commentators. 

Presentation

Betsy Cooper opened the presentation by discussing the relationship between the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Prior to 2002, the Department of State was in charge of visa policy.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security and gave it certain functions (including the authority to issue regulations, enforce, and administer law related to the functions of visas).  The language of the act was internally inconsistent and operationally confusing, which necessitated a memorandum of understanding to clarify the functions of each department.  As Cooper explained, “the final memorandum of understanding gave responsibility for ‘visa policy’ to the Secretary of Homeland Security, while leaving the Secretary of State to manage the visa process.”   While the Department of Homeland Security has established the Visa Security Officer program to supervise the issuance of visas, otherwise little has changed.  Initially there was a more security-conscious approach, but a sense of proportionality and flexibility has gradually been reintroduced.

Cooper highlighted three main points.  First, while the incongruity of the DHS/DOS relationship was understandable immediately after 9/11, it is now time to clarify the functions of each.  Second, some overlap between the two agencies exists to the point of being costly rather than strategically redundant.  Finally, the two departments do not have a clearly defined visa policy. Cooper also noted that based on their research, the Department of State for all intents and purposes has continued to operate the visa process, and DHS has more or less taken a back seat in its oversight role.

Demetrios Papademetriou described visas and the visa process as the first line of defense to prevent undesirable people from entering the country.  He presented national security as a series of concentric circles through which a visitor must pass, and visas are the outermost circle.  Security, under this scheme, is about strengthening these circles in an intelligent way and is based on:

• Quality and timeliness of the intelligence;
• Diligence of information sharing between agencies;
• Interoperability of the data;
• Compatibility of the underlying data systems;
• Security of our electronic communications systems;
• Training of those who make decisions on visas and entries, through training and cross-training;
• Better staffed and resourced first-line agencies; and,
• Agencies which are on the same page in terms of priorities and procedures.

These eight elements of greater security reinforce each other and make it possible to achieve an outcome where the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

He then elaborated on the three points at which it is possible to intercept possible terrorists and other threats to security:  prior to the issuance of the visa, prior to boarding an airplane or ship abroad, and upon arriving at a port of entry.  In other words, the visa process provides the first in a series of meaningful transactions in which there is face-to-face contact between a US official (or someone whose behavior is closely regulated by a US agency) and the intending visitor.  Papademetriou described this process of multiple points of contact as strategically redundant.  However, he also noted that the current security measures have created delays that have hurt other long term economic, political, and foreign policy interests. 

Papademetriou concluded that the overall picture for the visa process is encouraging.  He cautioned against overconfidence, however, given that the success of visa screening relies upon intelligence and there is no way to evaluate how good that intelligence is.  Intelligent management models are the appropriate policy tool for reopening the border for purposes such as international business.  These models must be dynamic so as to respond to changing security threats while keeping the border open to those who do not pose a threat.  The failure to find an appropriate model to achieve these goals is a threat to the security, economic, and cultural interests of this country, and it is time to begin to reevaluate.

He concluded his remarks by outlining some of the report’s final recommendations. These included the need for:

• Openness in the visa process (visitors need to have predictable outcomes);
• Training and cross-training;
• Greater interagency cooperation mechanisms;
• Articulation of a vision for US visa policy (this vision has been reduced to “keeping the bad out” since 9/11);
• Simplification of the visa application process and perhaps allowing applicants to self-classify;
• Reconsideration of whether all applicants require in-person interviews;
• Creation of “Master Visa Officers” (an elite corps at key embassies who would serve as a knowledge base and as master trainers for other officers); and
• Reform of the dual intent provision given the lack of its security value (currently there is too much emphasis placed on a consular officer determining whether or not a visitor intends to stay in the US as the key factor in determining visa eligibility).

In short, it is time to begin making sure that systems solutions are compatible with social and political ones.

Panelist Commentary

Debra Stewart focused her remarks on visas and international graduate students, pointing out the decline in both international student applications and enrollment.  She argued that the US’s intellectual leadership is dependent upon its ability to recruit students, which affects not only academia but the business community as well.  Competition for talent is global and is growing, as other countries are capitalizing on the US’s current weaknesses.  For instance, the European Union is currently engaged in the Bologna Process to harmonize its higher education programs in order to hold onto its own students as well as attract ones from other regions.  India and China also have committed to “growing their own” scholars through improvement of its own institutions. The proximate cause is a shift in the US’s visa process as well as perceptions of reduced openness, though she acknowledged recent changes by the State Department have improved the process.

Stewart lauded the report for providing a primer on visa changes and suggesting that visa policy deals with more than just bureaucratic issues: it is, in fact, the face of American diplomacy and affects the way that students and other foreigners view the country.  Visa policy reform must balance security with other values and policy goals.  Furthermore, she asserted that improved staffing at the consulates is crucial, not only in terms of the hiring of more officers, but also to find those with technical knowledge of current scientific research and understanding of the US education system to be able to identify high risk applicants. 

From the universities’ point of view, visa policy should be a partnership between those seeking to attract qualified foreigners and government agencies.  Stewart cited efforts by the universities to facilitate the application process for students as proof of their commitment to the issue.  Dual intent has proven especially difficult to deal with for universities, since many want to employ the most talented of students after they graduate, including the foreign-born.  Stewart concurred with Papademetriou’s support for strategic thinking and a comprehensive overhaul of the current policy (rather than merely tinkering with today’s system).

Margaret Stock followed Stewart’s comments by addressing immigration as an integral, yet absent, component of national security.  She explained that immigration is not mentioned at all in the overall vision of national security, which she views as a missed opportunity. 

Stock stated that the debate after 9/11 has missed the target by focusing on the idea that the security aspect of visa policy is based solely on keeping people out.  Stock asserted that we should instead focus on alternative steps to correctly let the right people in so they may be an asset to the country and US security.  Some current security measures are effective, but those who have briefly overstayed their visas or have insufficient income to meet current requirements are not security risks.  She stated that the assumption that the visa process contributes to security by keeping people out is misguided, counterproductive, and harmful.  Rather, separated families, lost opportunities for business people, and the inability to attract global talent undercut out security.   

She concurred with the report’s argument that visa policy should be viewed through a “Secure Border, Open Doors” perspective.  Rather than focusing on keeping people out, security and visa policy requires a cost benefit analysis.  Current policy considers too narrow a definition of security and is not considering the costs that a loss of immigrant vitality creates (for example, the loss of science students who are investigating technologies that could be used by terrorists).  The definition should include protection of vital economic and political interests, not just physical protection.

Stock then addressed the balancing act for visa policy and procedures by the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security by comparing it to changes within the Department of Defense.  With so many agencies involved, formal legislation may be necessary to ensure that change is successful, much as the Goldwater-Nichols Act was necessary to restructure the Department of Defense.

Question and Answer Session

A journalist asked how specific nations who previously were afforded special treatment were affected by the changes in visa policy, especially Saudi Arabia.  Papademetriou cited the drop in applications as evidence of changes resulting from new government initiatives, especially the 100% interview requirement.  The “don’t bother to apply” attitude of current policies may have discouraged many potential applicants.  While the US previously enjoyed first choice status as a destination for foreign students, the country is no longer alone in this regard and must be flexible to adjust to dynamic conditions. 

An audience member inquired as to how changes to particular visa types have hindered mobility.  Papademetriou stated that the report did not cover specific effects, but that the complexity of the category system itself has frustrated its efficiency.  For example, when visa privileges are extended to a specific group, should a new category be added every time? After all, the visa categories already have reached V.  He cited the creation of the E3 visa for Australians, even though it does not really fit under the E treaty trader category and is more akin to a combination of a Trade NAFTA visa or H1-B high-tech visa (preexisting categories).  Stock added that the US immigration system is far too complicated, especially when compared with that of other nations. 

A different audience member asked, how given the current political climate, the 100% interview policy could be changed.  Furthermore, he inquired about the impact of this environment on Consular Affairs.  Cooper specified that the report recommended that only those low-risk applicants who have been approved for a visa within the previous two years and have already submitted biometric identifiers receive interview waivers.  She then stated that the costs of the 100% interview policy may be greater than its benefits.  As to the environment within Consular Affairs, officers fear bearing responsibility for letting in someone who poses a security threat, and this continues to influence their actions.

The panel was then asked to describe Visa Security Officers.  Cooper referred the audience to page 51 of the report.  Essentially, VSOs review all applications in their post, prescreen applicants prior to the interview process, and look for troublesome trends.  Visa Security Officers are currently located only in two posts in Saudi Arabia, although there are plans to extend the program to other countries. 

An attendee asked if the report addressed new criteria that officers might use to evaluate visa applicants.  Papademetriou responded that the criteria used by consular officers should be contextual.  Thus, a self-adjusting algorithm system that utilizes set criteria to screen for passengers who are potential security risks should be implemented.  Further, Papademetriou pointed out that by reducing the number of interviews, officers would have more time to interview other applicants about whom less information is known or who may pose potential risks. The visa application stage is the appropriate one for this type of review given the time pressures and volume faced at both at airport and at land border sites.

Finally, MPI was asked to consider drafting model legislation for Congress given the agreement by the panel that reform on visa policy was needed.  Meissner responded that such legislation would be a possible next step, either by MPI or others, but stated that she was not willing to commit to that on behalf of MPI at this point.