Breakfast Briefing
June 23, 2005

Introduction

On Thursday June 23rd the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) hosted the release of One Face at the Border: Behind the Slogan, by MPI Policy Analyst Deborah Meyers.  The report is the first comprehensive analysis of the Department of Homeland Security’s September 2003 initiative to integrate legacy INS, Customs, and Agriculture inspectors within the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and to institute a unified inspection process. 

This report is the second in MPI’s series assessing selected border control measures implemented after September 11th.  The first, Real Challenges for Virtual Borders, by Rey Koslowski, was released on June 9th and the third, Secure Borders, Open Doors: Visas Procedures in the Post-September 11 Era, by Stephen Yale-Loehr, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, and Betsy Cooper, will be released later this summer. 

The event was moderated by MPI’s President, Demetrios G. Papademetriou.  Following the presentation of key findings and recommendations by report author Deborah Meyers, commentary was provided by: Anne M. Khademian,Associate Professor at the Center for Public Administration and Policy, School for Public and International Affairs, Virginia Tech University; and C. Stewart Verdery, a principal at Mehlman, Vogel, Castagnetti, Inc., and former Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning at the Border and Transportation Security Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security.

Presentation

Meyers’ findings are based on over eighty interviews she conducted during field visits to three border communities with air, land, and sea ports-of-entry (San Diego/Tijuana, Detroit/Windsor, and Miami) during the twelve to fifteen months after the announcement of One Face at the Border (OFAB). The information from the interviews was supplemented by information from CBP and publicly available sources.   

With One Face at the Border, CBP created a unified primary inspection and single chain of command at ports-of-entry, integrated legacy passenger analysis units, expanded antiterrorism training, and developed new uniforms.  More than 18,000 existing inspectors from the INS, Customs, and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) were converted into the newly created CBP officer position, and over 2,000 new CBP officers have since been hired. The Border Patrol, which is part of CBP but operates between ports-of-entry, was not included in the initiative. CBP agricultural inspectors were created as a specialized position; they do not staff primary inspection lanes.

CBP asserted that the ability to use employees interchangeably for all three functions would allow it to process travelers more rapidly and conveniently while simultaneously identifying and addressing potential risks. Both Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson and CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner argued that America’s borders would be safer and more secure than when the border responsibilities were fragmented.

Meyers recognized numerous positive outcomes resulting from the consolidation, including: a single point of contact for outsiders; a uniform set of policies on issues ranging from the use of force and personal searches to the kenneling of canines; a reduction in duplicative efforts; and the ability to allocate resources more effectively. Increased congressional appropriations have allowed for the hiring of additional staff, while the ability to use former customs inspectors for primary passenger processing has alleviated long-standing immigration staffing shortages.  Moreover, the infusion of resources into CBP has allowed for the procurement of additional security-oriented technology. CBP also has created a single overtime and premium pay system, undertaken professionalism training for its employees, and has clearly defined its primary mission as preventing the entry of terrorists and terrorist weapons.

However, Meyers found that there have been some negative impacts as well. First, there is a lack of immigration expertise in CBP, both at headquarters and in the field. This seems to result from: a failure to use the expertise of legacy agency employees; the loss of specialized knowledge; and a failure to develop new specialized expertise.  For instance, CBP’s immigration policy office lacks a permanent director, most field offices are headed by former customs employees, many immigration experts ended up in other DHS agencies, and the new integrated training is developing generalists who are “jacks of all trades, and masters of none,” according to multiple respondents.

Second, she highlighted inconsistency and unpredictability in policies, application, and adjudications at the border. Examples ranged from inspectors admitting travelers under the wrong categories for the wrong time period to periodic traffic flushing at land borders.  Meyers argued that such inconsistencies pose challenges to US security, the integrity of the immigration system, and individual travelers who bear the consequences. 

Meyers also focused on the disconnect between the field and headquarters (input from the field is limited), the decline in proactive outreach efforts with community-based stakeholders (including the elimination of long-standing liaison meetings), and the atmosphere of fear and uncertainty among agency employees (resulting from new CBP standards of conduct, the DHS-wide requirement that employees sign secrecy pledges, and the impending changes in the DHS human resources system).

She further noted that there have been no internal evaluations of OFAB, and that its security-related benefits are unclear. Meyers emphasized the importance of disaggregating valid management-related reasons for integration from security ones. Further, she suggested that there has been a tendency to oversell the potential benefits of the program and create unrealistic expectations about its capabilities that set the program up for failure and lead to missed opportunities for program improvements and partnerships with stakeholders.  Meyers also pointed out that some factors beyond CBP’s control play a role in limiting success, including outdated physical infrastructure at crossing points and inadequate security-related information for inspectors.

In conclusion, Meyers found that One Face at the Border has been a constructive first step toward creating a single, unified, efficient, and professional inspection agency, but that CBP must address the challenges identified to ensure they do not undermine border security or CBP’s ability to perform its mission.  She made a number of recommendations that fell into four categories: 1) Retaining and Developing Specialization and Expertise, 2) Building a New Institutional Culture, 3) Increasing Public Outreach, and 4) Addressing Systemic Obstacles.

Panelist Comments

Anne M. Khademian commented that the report was well done and used her presentation to connect the observations and recommendations to studies of organizations. She began by highlighting some of the traits common to successful organizations. Organizations with a clear sense of mission, that know what they are doing and why, tend to develop a professional identity, foster an institutional culture that reinforces the mission, have a sense of what performance looks like, and can self-evaluate. They also develop a “distinctive competence” and can allow discretion in the field because the clarity of the mission ensures the consistency of outcomes.

However the development of such an institutional culture at CBP is still in its incipient stages. While the counter-terrorism aspect of CBP’s mission should be recognized, it is important to realize that the agency has other missions as well, which sometimes compete with this primary focus.  The tension in CBP’s dual mission of preventing terrorist entry and facilitating legitimate traffic is reflected in the continued pre-9/11 practice of “traffic flushing,” whereby groups of motorists are simply allowed to enter without formally submitting to inspection to reduce backups at land ports-of-entry. Khademian wondered whether it is even possible to gauge the success of CBP’s counterterrorism mission.

She also pointed out that the loss of migration expertise had adversely affected CBP’s effectiveness in enforcing immigration law and suggested that the dominance of a “customs culture” was responsible for the diminution.  She posited that an open and broad political dialogue was necessary to determine how the legacy missions should be incorporated in the counterterrorist focus, particularly given DHS’s move to a pay for performance system, and to what extent such incorporation was both possible and desirable.

Khademian emphasized also emphasized the need for agency transparency and for information sharing internally, with other agencies, and with the public. She stated that the capacity to learn depends on the agency’s ability to share information and understand and use the information that is shared. However, many obstacles highlighted in the report undermine CBP’s capability in this regard, such as fear and uncertainty, the loss of immigration expertise, the dominance of the customs culture, and the prevalence of secrecy within DHS. She placed responsibility on the leadership for setting the right tone and argued for cooperation and institutional learning.

C. Stewart Verdery, Jr. hailed the report as an important first analysis of OFAB and even certain aspects of the CBP transformation more generally. Verdery first considered the question of metrics for evaluating the efficacy of CBP’s counterterrorist mission and secondly, addressed CBP’s lack of consultation with stakeholder groups. 

Verdery pointed out that it is impossible to measure many DHS policy successes because the deterrent effect – the number of events that have not occurred as the intentional result of policy – cannot be measured.. It also is the case when, as noted in the report, there have been a multitude of policy changes and there are multiple factors beyond CBP’s control, such as infrastructure and intelligence, it is difficult to evaluate the performance of any particular organization.  Furthermore, as CBP was being organized, the contemporaneous establishment of the superstructure of the Department of Homeland Security made consistency and evaluation considerably more difficult.

Verdery agreed that the lack of immigration expertise has weakened the ability of not only CBP, but also several other DHS agencies; he felt this was a result of the dismantlement of the INS.  He did note that a comprehensive immigration policy office was likely to be established and that this step should remedy the current lack of expertise.  Verdery also stated that while the lack of expertise had been a hindrance, he felt that CBP should not be expected to be a service agency the way the INS was, when in fact, it is an enforcement agency.

This confusion concerning the role of the agency and the lack of a consultative process in establishing policies and practices have contributed to the understandable frustration of both stakeholders and Congress.  Verdery refuted the notion that this was a conscious or callous decision by the DHS, saying simply that given the mandate of the agency to implement anti-terrorist measures within a constrained timeframe, there was not time for a more deliberative process.  Indeed, even he often had little input, with orders coming from the White House to implement certain programs or efforts immediately. The limited consultation created some problems, but he expected that in the future outreach efforts would be made, building on efforts made by the US-VISIT program.

While several of the panelists lamented the loss of discretion in the field, Verdery cited the centralization as desirable for achieving and maintaining consistency in entry policy at all ports-of-entry.  He emphasized the central role of the National Targeting Center (NTC) as a means of supporting inspectors and in enhancing security through the collection and dissemination of information. He also envisaged the employment of private sector expertise to help design and manage more effective data sharing tools to aid the agencies.  He concluded by adding that the report offered valuable insight into many of the challenges faced by CBP and that he expected that officials would study such issues and attempt to resolve them as expeditiously as possible. 

Questions

Papademetriou began by asking Verdery how the enforcement mission of CBP might lessen and change to facilitation of travel and commerce as public concerns about terrorism recede over time. While Verdery conceded that this was possible, he thought that CBP would maintain focus on its enforcement mission, and reiterated that stakeholders who continue to view the agency as a service provider and law enforcement agency in the model of the INS need to reform their perception and engage in reasonable and constructive dialogue that recognizes the primacy of enforcement. 

An audience member then asked Meyers to elaborate on the lack of immigration expertise within the agency and how that might affect the response to asylum seekers at ports-of-entry.  She responded that the basic integrated training provided to CBP officers does cover the basics of immigration and customs law, but both bodies of laws are complex. The retirement of immigration specialists from the former INS compounds the problem. Though Meyers did not hear any direct evidence of adverse impacts on asylum seekers, both the US Commission on International Religious Freedom and the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center recently have released reports on this very topic, and she heard a great deal regarding inconsistencies at inspections more generally.  A follow-up question asked if the division of specialties was desirable or necessary for the agency.  Meyers replied that she thought that the primary inspections could be conducted by cross-trained officers but that it was also important to develop specialized expertise and have that knowledge available, particularly in secondary inspection areas. 

A labor union representative praised the report for putting a human face on the inspectors and asked Verdery about the lack of consultation with the inspectors’ unions and the lack of union representation for new CBP officers.  Verdery responded that it was not deliberate and that the Executive Branch had simply rushed to implement the necessary measures and that he hoped the issue of representation would be resolved quickly.  Meyers added that many stakeholders felt excluded from the reorganization process, not simply unions. It may have been benign neglect, due to the multitude of other high priorities and narrow inward focus, but some respondents felt it was deliberate.

Papademetriou asked Khademian about the domination of a “customs culture” at CBP, as well as the possibilities for returning discretion to the field while ensuring consistent outcomes. Khademian described the challenge of a confluence of competing cultures, particularly compounded by a new mission. Khademian thought that CBP’s clarity of mission was vital to its ability to ensure consistency.  However because of that clarity, over time some degree of discretion could be returned to the field, with a likelihood of achieving consistent outcomes with appropriate training and guidelines. She also noted the natural tendency of an agency to centralize decision-making power and authority when faced with contradictory pressures and the lack of a broad public consensus.   In response to a question about how such an organization can learn, she responded that it was difficult for any organization under such intense political pressure and scrutiny to learn and improve.