In April 1991, some 450,000 Iraqi Kurds, fleeing their homes after the Gulf War, were denied entry into Turkey. Consequently, the international community established a 'safe haven' in the North of Iraq, an area of de facto Kurdish autonomy, whose defense has been assisted by the enforcement of the Northern No-Fly Zone. As a new war now unfolds in Iraq, the fate of the Kurds and those who have fled to the relative safety of the enclave is unknown. The Turkish government is reported to be ready to enter into Northern Iraq to hold back any refugee flow caused by unfolding events. Joanne van Selm convened this MPI briefing, one of a series on "Migration Policies, Practices, and Processes in the EU" sponsored by the European Commission's Washington DC delegation. Panelists Kemal Kirisçi, Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration at Bogaziçi University in Istanbul, and Pary Karadaghi, Director of Kurdish Human Rights Watch, presented perspectives on Turkish-Kurdish relations in the context of Turkish refugee policy and the humanitarian realities of the war in Iraq.

Kemal Kirisçi addressed the legal aspects of Turkish refugee policy and the role of Turkey's relations with the EU in the context surrounding Turkey's approach to both the refugee issues and the Kurdish question. Turkey, which was one of the drafters of and an early signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention, is one of few countries to maintain the geographical limit on the extension of refugee status to persons fleeing into Turkey from beyond Europe. In the 1990s, Turkey has begun in conjunction with UNHCR to recognize refugees more broadly, and to facilitate integration in Turkey rather than focus on resettlement to third countries. However, in considering the case of North Iraq, it is important to note that the Geneva Convention does not recommend practices for dealing with mass influxes of refugees although the UN Executive Committee does give some grounds on which action can be based.

Current Turkish attitudes towards the Kurdish refugees must be understood in light of two recent mass movements of refugees. In 1988, 55-60,000 Kurdish refugees fled Iraq following the chemical attacks in Halabja and surrounding areas. In 1991, 450,000 Kurds fled after the Gulf War. Between these two events, a number of changes occurred in the ideological construction of Turkish identity and as a consequence, mainstream Turkish thinking on these issues changed as well. For instance, in 1988 Kurds were still referred to as 'mountain Turks' and as 'temporary guests' rather than 'refugees'. By 1991, the word 'Kurd' was no longer taboo, but the Turkish attitude towards the Kurds still remained ambivalent and antagonistic. Ambivalent and without international support, Turkey was overwhelmed by the humanitarian crisis of 1991 and was unable to respond quickly and appropriately. The international media focused on the human side of the story, and its portrayal damaged the official image of Turkey in this respect. Only after the humanitarian crisis became the subject of media attention did the international community take on a bigger role, and was UNSC 688 drafted, establishing a safe haven in Northern Iraq, under protection of the no-fly zone. At this time, the PKK (the Turkish nationalist movement seeking succession for Kurds from Turkey) had started to wage what was for some a liberation war, for the Turkish authorities terrorism towards Turkey. The PKK took advantage of the refugee crisis on the border to step up activity within Turkey. From 1991, there was an increase in violence that continued well into the 1990s. These events are important to understanding the attitudes of the Turkish authorities towards an impending refugee crisis in Iraq.

One important consequence was the way in which Turkey cried wolf. Turkish reactions to the passage of Resolution 688 and Operation Provide Comfort (in1991) make clear that Turkey's mistrust of possible U.S. support for a Kurdish state in Iraq. Because Operation Provide Comfort provoked none of the political repercussions about which Turkey was so concerned, the U.S. and EU are no longer as responsive to Turkish complaints about the current refugee relief proposals. However, Turkey has a deeply embedded mistrust of the United States with the allegation that the U.S, with Barazani and Talibani, hope to construct a Kurdish state in North Iraq with irredentist claims on the Kurdish population in Turkey.

The EU has considerable influence over Turkish refugee policy through the EU accession requirements. The EU has required that Turkey lift the geographical limitation and create Turkish status determinations for refugees before being considered for accession to the EU. The accession document also requires reform on questions related to Kurdish autonomy and rights. While the refugee policy reforms are still sensitive, the language used to promote education and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish bypasses some of the earlier debate and resistance provoked by language like 'political solution' and 'minority rights' (terms that are seen as precursors to Kurdish statehood). However, implementation of these reforms has been significantly delayed.

Professor Kirisçi concluded by outlining three ideas that complicate discussion of the Kurdish question. First, a small minority in Turkey does have aspirations of creating a greater Turkey with territory in Iraq, ideas which threatens the Arab world and the populations in northern Iraq. Second, the possibility of Turkish control of the cities of Mosel and Kirkuk concerns those in Turkey who believe that these oil-rich cities would provide the economic basis for a Kurdish state in Iraq with irredentist claims on the Kurdish population in Turkey. Finally, there is considerable anxiety surrounding a possible repeat of the 1991 refugee crisis and the chaos that followed it. This has prompted an argument that refugees be met on the Iraqi side of the Iraq-Turkey border, which, because it is in keeping with EU concerns regarding refugee policy, has been received with greater sympathy than other claims. As a result, Turkish security forces deployed in northern Iraq would be confined to this effort and to keeping the PKK from crossing into Turkey from either Iran or Iraq. The security forces, with limited cooperation from UNHCR, had been preparing for this. The reality of a non-UN-sponsored invasion of Iraq, however, is that the UN lacks the authority to mobilize humanitarian aid. The Red Crescent is similarly excluded unless it obtains express permission from the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent (ICRC).

Finally, Professor Kirisçi noted that some of these concerns are less immediate than they were a few weeks ago when a refugee crisis seemed immanent.

Dr Pary Karadaghi expanded on the problems of authority and access for humanitarian NGOs in Iraq. She noted that Turkish attitudes and policies are marked by fear of Kurdish self-determination in Iraq. In Iraq, there is a corresponding fear of Turkish aspirations on Kirkuk and Masul. EU accession might alleviate these tensions. Turkey is home to the largest Kurdish population in the world and, until there is democracy in Iraq, refugees will continue to be an issue for Turkey.

The movement of refugees within Iraq is increasing as a result of the war. In October 2002, there were as many as 800,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Northern Iraq. Since then, an estimated 400,000 additional persons have arrived. The displaced persons are concentrated in three government areas. There is also a Turkomen population of about 200-300,000 people in North Iraq. Because the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has been democratically elected for the last 10 years, the Turkomen are free to control their own broadcasting and education, and to run for seats in Parliament. At the moment, however, there are 5,000 Turkish troops currently in the area to protect the Turkomen. However, Turkish security forces moving into the IDP areas in Suleimaniyah, Arbil, and Dohouk, will exacerbate tensions and create the impression of an occupying force. On previous occasions the Turkish military has followed suspected PKK militants into northern Iraq. The history of Iraq as an Ottoman principality contributes to the resentment that would face a Turkish force in Iraq.

Because of political tensions, international NGOS are the ideal providers of humanitarian aid, rather than military or quasi-governmental groups such as the Red Crescent, which are affiliated with national security forces. A strong NGO presence in Iraq would provide stability as well as relief and may, in the future, provide tools useful to building democracy and an open society. Most immediately, however, Kurds need assurances regarding the future of Oil for Food. The UN Oil for Food, implemented in Northern Iraq by the KRG, is particularly important with such large numbers of IDPs in the area. Relief work will be complicated if the Oil for Food relief is cut off or if the only implementing partner in the area is the U.S. military.

Humanitarian plans should also take into account the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. In Saddam's chemical attacks in 1988, 8000 Barazanis died. Halabja received the most attention because 5000 people were killed in a single day. NGOs have supplied villages with drinking water and food to last for 30 days but chemical warfare would make replenishing these villages nearly impossible. Access is already complicated by neighboring countries Iran, Turkey, and Syria, and by U.S. military requirements that aid workers register and receive ID cards. Most aid workers don't want to carry cards issued by the U.S. military.

The panel discussions were followed by a series of questions from audience members.

Q. Please explain the concept of Kurdistan. Is Kirkuk part of Kurdistan?

A. Pary Karadaghi answered that Kirkuk is the heart of Kurdistan but is also a diverse, multi-ethnic city. Twenty-five years ago Iraq launched a campaign to create an 'Arab belt'. Strong measures were taken to encourage the citizens of Kirkuk to identify as Arab. Kurds were expelled and Sunni Muslims, many of them friends of the Ba'ath party, were brought in from southern Iraq. In 1970, the agreement that created Kurdistan allowed Kirkuk to become part of Kurdistan in 1974. Large oil reserves make Kirkuk an especially valuable resource for the Iraqi regime although there are points at which it is possible to access the same oil from Kurdish controlled areas. One concern is whether Saddam Hussein will bomb the oil fields in the Northern governates.

Q. In what circumstances might Turkey enter Iraq in force?

A. Kemal Kirisçi said that Turkish forces would enter Iraq in significant numbers if Turkish intelligence indicated that members of the PKK were active in Iraq. When Colin Powell visited Ankara, the coordination agreement that Powell signed with the Turkish government specified exactly the scenarios in which troops would move into Iraq. The Turkish media is emphasizing staying out of North Iraq, fearing that action there would become a Turkish 'Vietnam' and that it might precipitate Kurdish demands for statehood.

Q. Would Iran enter Iraq if Turkey did?

Kemal Kirisçi answered that it was very possible that Iran would enter Iraq if Turkish troops crossed the border into Turkey. In addition, the US is concerned that if Turkey moved into Iraq, Iran and Syria would follow. Turkey is giving less weight to these concerns.

Pary Karadaghi noted that Iran is not only interested in the Kurdish population in Iraq but also expresses solidarity with the Shi'a minority in the southern part of Iraq.

Kirisçi concluded by urging that efforts be made to avoid a vicious circle of nationalisms, in which each side enflames and enrages the other. Hardline nationalists in Turkey are critical of anything they interpret as serving a proto-Kurdish state. He pointed to the deleterious effects of television footage of Kurds in Iraq singing anti-Turkish songs and noted that Kurdish leaders in Turkey urged that such behavior be understood in the context of Iraq, not Turkey. There is a level of reciprocal mistrust, on the part of Turkey and the Kurds, and Turkey and the NGO community, which Turkey sees as furthering the cause of Kurdish statehood.