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Refugees from Iraq: What happened in 1991 and what may happen in 2003

Event Summary

Thursday, February 27, 2003
3:00 - 5:00 p.m.

Kathleen Newland, Co-Director of the Migration Policy Institute, began by introducing the speakers, Peter Galbraith, Professor of National Security at the National War College, and Colonel Stephen Norton, a Senior Policy Advisor at the Western Policy Center. The third speaker, Asla Aydintasbas a freelance journalist that writes on Turkey and Iraq, was not able to attend as she was stuck in Northern Iraq. John Sitilides, director of the Western Policy Center was there in her place as they has been in constant contact via e-mail. She noted that the potential humanitarian situation in a post-war Iraq has received a significant amount of attention lately whereas only a few weeks ago it was being greatly neglected. She went on to say that there currently exists a great deal of confusion, anxiety, and lack of transparency in the planning for a humanitarian response.

Peter Galbraith began by giving a broad overview of the situation and added that events in 2003 are likely to be very different than those of 1991. Professor Galbraith referred to 1991 as a refugee crisis as people were leaving their homes due to the commencement of military action that began on August 2nd.

According to Galbraith, the people most affected by the war in 1991 were Kuwaitis and foreign workers, which included Westerners, Egyptians, South-Asians, and Palestinians. Most of them left before the outbreak of war, although some were expelled after the war - like the Palestinians as a result of Yasser Arafat's support for Saddam Hussein.

The uprisings following the war in Basra on March 3rd and elsewhere in the north on March 6th, caused a mass exodus of people and put many parts of Iraq under rebel control. The uprisings were put down with great brutality. In the south, those who escaped sought refuge in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (about 100 thousand total). There was also a very large movement of Kurds, 500 thousand to the border with Turkey, 1.4 million towards the border area with Iran.

A "safe area" was created in northern Iraq for the displaced Kurds stranded in the inhospitable mountains on the border between Iraq and Turkey due to Turkey's efforts to prevent the flow of refugees into their territory. This area constitutes the de facto independent Kurdistan region in Northern Iraq.

Because the stated aim of the impending war is the removal of Saddam Hussein, Galbraith pointed out the likeliness of more IDPs than refugees in 2003. He noted that the area most affected in 1991 should be the least affected in 2003 barring bad diplomacy currently being discussed by the Bush Administration and the Turkish government - referring to the possible placement of Turkish troops in northern Iraq. The Kurdish region is stable with significant military resources, all out of the reach and control of Saddam Hussein.

Galbraith indicated that the problem area is likely to be in southern Iraq and offered four possible scenarios, attaching a probability to each one as well as estimates for the number of refugees and IDPs as a result:

• Quick Iraqi Surrender
  25% probability, producing 20,000 refugees and 200,000 IDPs
• Chaotic Iraqi Collapse
  50% probability, producing 50,000 refugees and 1,000,000 IDPs
• Prolonged Iraqi Resistance in Urban Areas
  20% probability, producing 75,000 refugees and 3,000,000 IDPs
• Catastrophic Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
  5% probability, producing 4,000,000 refugees and 11,000,000 IDPs

Galbraith called Turkey's declared motive of wanting to station troops in northern Iraq in order to assist refugees as "bogus" or unauthentic. He sites the actual reason as an effort to keep the Kurds from declaring an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. The Kurds have already developed a constitution and established a parliament, but have made it clear that they do not intend to declare an independent state, preferring instead to be a part of a representative Iraqi government.

Before wrapping-up his talk, Galbraith highlighted the potential problems associated with the presence of Turkish troops in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, namely the likelihood of clashes between Kurdish and Turkish troops. These clashes could perhaps re-ignite the PKK movement in Turkey, dormant since 1989, thereby inviting events that Turkey is actually trying to prevent.

Finally, Galbraith mentioned Turkey's desire to prevent the Kurds from taking Kirkuk, a traditionally Kurdish and Turkmen town before it was "Arabicized" by Saddam Hussein in an effort to secure the towns oil wealth. The Kurds and Turkmen displaced as a result of Saddam Hussein's policies are now living in squalor conditions in Kurdish controlled regions of Iraq. They are armed and want to return to their homes. Galbraith pointed out that the Arabs in Kirkuk are likely to leave before the arrival of the Kurds, meaning there will be an additional 250,000 people on the move.

Asla Aydintasbas had been attending the Iraqi National Congress conference but was unable to attend the briefing as she was stuck in Iraq. Kathleen Newland asked John Sitilides to highlight some of Aydintasbas' points on her behalf as he was in regular contact with her via e-mail.

Aydintasbas' main points on Iraq:

A mass exodus of people is unlikely without the use of WMDs in which case people would likely flee north towards the Turkish border. If WMDs are used, they are likely to be used against Israel.

The Iraqi regime is close to collapse. People are pro-war (Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs) and they are looking to be liberated. The people of Iraq, many of whom carry scars of ethnic cleansing, want a final reckoning and welcome the US as liberators. They feel they will never be safe in Northern Iraq as long as Saddam is in power.

Aydintasbas' points on Turkey:

It remains unclear what Turkey's interests are. Many scenarios are being played out and it is still unclear what Turkey really wants. Turkey insists that no refugees should enter their country. According to Turkey, the 1991 Gulf War brought a great influx of Kurdish separatists into Turkey, rekindling PKK activity in the country in the early and mid 90's. According to American and Turkish sources, Turkey is expected to be active in setting up camps for refugees within a 15-kilometer belt within Northern Iraq. Turkey does not want to be bogged down in Northern Iraq and will not enter Mosul or Kirkuk, leaving it to US forces to prevent incursions by armed Kurdish groups.

In the context of minority rights, the Iraqi Turkmen, never given much attention by Turkey in the past, are now receiving considerable attention. Turkey expects a place for the Turkmen minority in a post-Saddam government and may ask the US for the right to enter Northern Iraq to protect the Turkmen in the event of massacres or deportations.

Colonel Stephen Norton, Senior Policy Advisor at the Western Policy Center focused primarily on the stability of Turkey and the U.S. roles and responsibilities (including moral responsibilities) regarding displaced populations.

Norton began by looking back to "Operation Provide Comfort." On February 22nd, 1991, the US declared a ceasefire in their war with Saddam Hussein. Shortly thereafter, around the 6th or 7th of March, Kurds in the north, maybe with our encouragement, began rebelling against Saddam. It didn't take long for Saddam to crush the rebellion and people began to flee in large numbers.

Norton estimated 350-700 thousand people fled to Turkey and were caught in very harsh conditions in 43 different locations, some literally on cliffs with no food, medicine, or shelter from the elements. He pointed out that an estimated 800 to 1,000 people died each day.

On April 6th, 1991, President George Bush Sr. gave the order to commence Operation Provide Comfort, the creation of a safe-area in northern Iraq covering 83k square miles, roughly the size of Kansas.

Norton mentioned some of the problems encountered, including figuring out the scope of the problem. Even with all the advanced technology, that was a very difficult question to answer. Another problem dealt with crossing the sovereign border of Iraq and the military that was sure to be in the area. The biggest problem turned out to be 100s of thousands of booby traps and land mines in the area.

Norton mentioned that 24k military personnel were directly engaged in saving lives, including the British, Dutch, Spanish, and French. 50 NGOs were involved as well working hand in hand with the military and worked well together. The role of the military was to assist in coordination, planning, and resource allocation. Security was established in July of 1991, at which point the operation was handed over to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

Donald Rumsfeld recently called General Garner back to the Pentagon because of his experience in the 1991 Gulf War where Garner coordinated the activities of the military and the NGOs. He will be heading up the office on post-conflict activities that will be taking place in Iraq. According to Norton, Turkish concerns in 2003 are similar to the ones they had in 1991, with the major concern attached to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. The US will hold Iraq together as an independent state and will protect directly the rights of all people in Iraq, whether they're Kurdish or part of another group.

The U.S. plan mainly calls for precluding the reasons for becoming refugees. Because security concerns are the main reason people ultimately flee their homes, providing security throughout the region will be the primary goal. The U.S. will assume responsibility for refugees and will oversee the humanitarian situation until things are stabilized and can be turned over to civilian organizations.

General Garner knows exactly what is required and is involved in the planning at the Pentagon. His involvement will definitely serve as well.

Question and Answer session:

Bill Kerlik of Amnesty International asked about the Baathist Sunni Arabs, fleeing retribution - where would they go? What screening would be done to determine whether amnesty and therefore protection should be granted?

Secondly, Iraqi refugees in Iran, mainly Shiites, are stateless - Iraq claims they are Iranian, Iran says they are not. They all live in camps, they are probably armed and would most likely attempt to return to Iraq.

Peter Galbraith's response - Galbraith pointed out that he discussed the issue of Amnesty in his policy paper and went on to point out that the idea of amnesty is currently being discussed by the Bush administration for all but the top people in Saddam's administration. Galbraith also mentioned problems associated with amnesty, and alluded to the possibility of mob justice.

Regarding Iran, Galbraith agreed with Kerlik about the existence of Arab Shiites, Persians, Shiite Kurds that all fled to Iran in 1991, but noted that those groups were out of the scope of his research as he was focusing on the groups likely to be either displaced within Iraq or forced to flee out of Iraq. Galbraith did mention however the fact that the Iraqi Conference in London unanimously agree that the aforementioned groups should have the right to return to Iraq and there would be a need to coordinate their movement with the Iranian government.

Someone commented that the worse case scenario was bothersome and commended the military for their superb performance in 1991.

She went on to ask about the inflammatory press emanating from Turkey about protecting their Turkmen brothers in Iraq. She pointed out that historically Turkey has preferred to leave the issue of the Turkmen minority of Iraq alone and wanted to know why this was happening now? Why the sudden change of heart?

Galbraith's response - Galbraith pointed out that although Operation Provide Comfort was a remarkable effort, it is still important to learn from its mistakes. He gave the following example: The U.S administration encouraged the people of Iraq to rise up against Saddam Hussein, then they took steps to ensure the uprising failed. It wasn't until then that the safe-area was created. Galbraith added that the only people likely to want to flee Iraq indefinitely were the Baathists.

Stephen Norton added that Turkey showed absolutely no concern for the Iraqi Turkmen in 1991. He went on to say that the idea of an independent state was out of the question in Turkey's point of view. According to Norton, PKK activity increased significantly in Turkey after the 1991 Gulf War and mentioned that 32k Turks were killed fighting insurrection. From the Turkish perspective, the creation of an independent Kurdish state is a threat to their national security.

Joel Charney of Refugees International (RI) asked about the disruption of food distribution as a result of distribution centers being located between Iraqi and Kurdish controlled areas.

Galbraith's response - Galbraith feels the resources in Iraqi Kurdistan are sufficient to meet the need. Galbraith also pointed out that when Talibani (leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) was in Washington last August, he met with Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney to discuss the shipment of antibiotics and other supplies for use in the event of a chemical or biological attack on northern Iraq. The U.S. agreed but as of February 13th, 2003 nothing had been delivered. Now it is too late to pre-position supplies and the only remaining option would be to pre-position medicines. There is no contingency planning for the use of chemical or biological weapons.

Rachel from the Open Society Institute posed a question about the procedure for obtaining licenses to operate in Iraq.

Charney from RI jumped in to note that international organizations have been impeded by the license requirement that has yet to be lifted. Although applications have been "fast-tracked" lately, it's far too late to conduct adequate assessments of the situation on the ground.

Kathleen Newland pointed out that logistics and funding are also major issues creating a lot of discussion about the wisdom of placing the reconstruction and humanitarian assistance office in the Pentagon.

Galbraith mentioned that military planning includes winning the peace, not just toppling Saddam's regime. The Russians and Germans are unlikely to be proactive in producing funds for humanitarian aid in Iraq considering the way the Bush administration has disregarded them in the planning for war.

Demetri Papademetriou of the Migration Policy Institute asked about Saddam's ability to survive if not prosper in the past. What if Saddam follows a series of extreme measures like deciding to fight in the major cities that we don't want to enter, or uses weapons of mass destruction, causing a massive flow of people not from the traditional refugees, but from the major cities. Is there any planning on this end?

Norton responded that if the US forces remain in tact, they would be able to prevent any major problems. His major concern is the targeting of US forces by weapons of mass destruction.

Alex Rondos, the Ambassador at large of Greece and head of the Hellenic Aid Society, arrived late and was invited to offer the EU perspective by Kathleen Newland.

Charlie Moskowitz from Northwestern University asked about Arab and Muslim groups and organizations and their involvement as opposed to the Euro centric model. Is there any talk about how to involve them in the humanitarian activities?

Kathleen mentioned the International Federation of the Red Cross that is working closely with all the Red Crescent Societies in the region.

Norton also mentioned that it is politically different for these organizations to say that they will be actively engaged, but when the war is over that is likely to change.

Galbraith mentioned that you couldn't look at Iraq as simply an Arab state as there are Kurds, Turkmen etc…. He said that Turkey's worries are not unfounded because once you have a Federal unit and territory, you have the basis for an independent state. Trying to restrain that process will accelerate independence so allowing the maximum freedom is in Turkey's best interest. It should be clear that barring exceptional use of force, the Kurds will still have a fully established regional government, with a functioning school system, universities, hospitals, police, and have a force of more than 100 thousand. None of that is going to go away.

Rondos mentioned that if parliaments are not incorporated into the planning, they are not likely to approve budgets for humanitarian aid and no funds can be allotted without the parliament's approval. The humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan were undertaken with the support of the international community. The same cannot be said about Iraq.

Alex went on to say that dangerous assumptions are being made about the willingness or unwillingness of Arab countries to accept a new government or representation in Iraq, especially considering the unresolved issues of the Middle East Peace Process.

Alex noted that there is a step-by-step process, or a chronological way of planning for war; preparedness, disaster, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development. He went on to say that the preparedness, which is the first step is not occurring because of a lack of consensus on how to proceed with Iraq.

There still exists a great deal of confusion on how things are likely to turn out in northern Iraq. Any policy giving Turkey an opportunity to enter northern Iraq could easily lead to disastrous consequences; the liberty of the Kurds could be sacrificed for military convenience.