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Introduction
On December18, 2003, MPI was pleased to host a roundtable meeting of Non-Governmental Organizations who work with the US Resettlement Program to discuss the preliminary draft of a major study. David A. Martin, Warner-Booker Distinguished Professor of International Law at the University of Virginia, has been conducting this study, which was commissioned by the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration of the U.S. Department of State.

Background
The US Resettlement Program (USRP) has faced difficulties in recent years, with low admissions in the last two years in particular. These difficulties have arisen as the result of one sudden change and one slow moving change. The US view of the world changed as a result of the events of 9-11. This gave sudden rise to security concerns both about the identity of candidates for resettlement and the locations to which US staff might need to travel to determine refugee claims. The end of the Cold War precipitated slower changes to the program. These were delayed somewhat by the exodus from former Yugoslavia, but essentially, the USRP was anachronistic in its focus on specific groups related to Cold War foreign policy. Institutional issues have arisen in the context of inter-agency relations between the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) within the Department of State (DoS) and the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Furthermore, the program is some twenty-three years old, so reassessment is anyway timely. The study looks into the admissions program and not the integration issues. The intention was to look at the processes involved in the program, with a long-term horizon and not to focus on short-term group identification, for example.

Presentation
It is impossible to imagine that the program could realistically go back to filling the ceiling of 70,000 within a year of the low levels of 26,000/28,000. To be realistic, although the ceiling for FY2004 is set at 70,000, it would be realistic to aim for 50,000 this year.

Identifying new, large groups for admission is the biggest challenge faced: it is likely that numbers will need to be found through smaller clusters and more individual referrals. The program needs to have numerical goals rather than ceilings. A Committee of principals from DoS and DHS is suggested as a way both of altering the sense of urgency attached to the program and as a concrete manifestation of the fact that the program has goals rather than limits. This Committee could way the relative magnitude of the problems faced with each group under consideration, meeting on a bi-monthly basis.

With regard to the security issues: many NGOs have suggested that terrorists would not wait in camps for years before being processed and resettled. However, we have to recognize that some terror groups may have the patience to do this and to use the program as a means to enter the US. There also are genuine risks faced by circuit ride teams in some locations, not least because the teams are rather exposed.

Conceptually, there are three main components to admissions:
1. Individual referrals (currently primarily from UNHCR. More could be done on NGO and embassy referrals)
2. Group processing (currently the P1 and P2 categories)
3. Family based (currently P3)

Increased group processing will be the key on increasing numbers. Certainly more individuals could be referred, and there are ways to increase this, but the growth will be modest. Again, the admissions committee idea would be a way to make increases in numbers happen, and keep attention on the numbers on an ongoing basis.

In order to identify groups there could be three steps in the committee process:
1. Identify broad potential groups. Any organization involved in the program, including NGOs could identify groups and draw them to the committee’s attention. Then the committee would decide on:
2. Candidate groups. Deciding which groups to take further with a solid use of inquiry methods – response teams of PRM and DHS personnel and NGO personnel – just a small team, which would take a look and see what the obstacles and barriers are to each group and what their level of need is. In this way, problems that need resolving could be dealt with at an earlier stage than is currently the case (as problems generally become visible only at the last step – when DHS arrives to do the processing.)
3. Designation of a group once the problems are resolved.

Many actors have talked about a universal P3 category for family admissions. If higher admission rates are again achieved then there might be scope to do this. In the meantime, there seems rather to be a need to expand P3 only on a case-by-case and country-by-country basis.

The NGO or Voluntary Agency role in the process is also of interest in this reassessment. There is an undercurrent of concern in some quarters that NGOs have too much influence, and succeed in having people who are not refugees admitted to the program. If legislation would introduce a stronger role for NGOs, the voicing of those concerns might become louder. In fact, the NGOs have a very important role to play, but that role is best being a partnership role, and not something mandated by legislation.

One lesson that has come from the research is that people with a role at different stages of the resettlement process tend to think things work differently in other stages than is in fact the case – and they often have exaggerated expectations of each other.

Discussion

Statutory measures
When the US moved to using the Refugee Convention definition of the five grounds for well-founded fear of persecution there was a feeling that access to protection was being broadened. In fact, where government or individual adjudicators wish to be strict, this definition can be very narrow. Many of the people in need of resettlement as a durable solution are not in immediate life threatening situations, and their definition, as in need of resettlement, should be broader than that for people recognized as refugees through an asylum procedure. However, caution is needed in how any broader definition is cast. If it is a political decision to include some groups then the fear that the program is not being used for ‘real refugees’ can arise. Options include the presumption of refugee status through group designation and the use of the UNHCR Mandate definition, which is broader than the Convention definition as it includes people fleeing war or public disturbance, for example. One suggestion raised was for there to be a cut off point (a ‘floor’) within the program which meant that once that number of admissions had been reached for people who are Convention refugees, a Presidential Determination could be used to identify other groups in need of resettlement for whom refugee status would be presumed. Concerns about the politicization of the program through the Presidential Determination model were raised, but it was suggested that politicization was not necessarily a bad thing, if it meant involving US communities and their lobbying in the decision-making.

An operational impact of broadening the definition of a refugee for resettlement would be to allow DHS staff to use more of their interview time to focus on security and fraud issues.

On this, as on other issues, the point was raised that the study for DoS will have impact beyond the USRP as other countries will look to it for inspiration for their own resettlement programs.

There was some discussion of whether the problem in the program is that DHS does not accept 100% of the cases of a group designated by PRM, or that DHS does not get to see enough people for processing. Many agreed that DHS does adhere to the refugee definition quite closely – sometimes more closely than may be appropriate or necessary, but the law is on the side of such strictness. When recognition rates by DHS are low, PRM decides not to recommend certain groups again – and so a problem of understanding of each other’s position can arise, causing groups not to have access to the program and so numbers remain low.

One key to resolving some of these issues, especially for those in a protracted refugee situation is to have adequate and neutral registration at an early point, so that the flight motives and backgrounds of future resettlement candidates are established at an early stage – and their refugee determination is established from that period.

Structure
The suggestion of a Committee DoS and DHS officials led by the Deputy Secretary of State led to discussion about the relations between the agencies, and their ability to sort out problems which arise due to actions or inactions of either or both of them. It was suggested that responsibility for the program lies clearly with the President, as the program is based on annual Presidential Determinations. Therefore, to keep the program ownership with the White House, the National Security Council could chair a Committee with members from PRM and DHS. In this way an outside player, but one with responsibilities and ownership of the program would be in place to resolve difficulties arising between State and DHS.

In addition, full administration ownership of the program and committee structure would allow the White House to clearly stamp the program with the message that post 9-11, resettlement is important as a humanitarian program, allowing the US to live up to its foreign policy goals and maintain human rights standards.

A further institutional or structural point was discussed in relation to assistance. Suggestions were made for separating assistance out from PRM functions and placing it all with USAID, or, the opposite, to keep assistance with resettlement and other programs at PRM so that they could coordinate a comprehensive approach. In the latter case, one could avoid a particularization of resettlement as the sole activity related to refugees within PRM.

JVA/OPE
The differences between the Joint Voluntary Agency system of the past, and the Overseas Processing Entity of the last two years was discussed at length, with much focus on the benefits of the JVA which have been lost. Several benefits of JVAs above OPEs were identified, with OPEs being characterized as largely clerical bodies. The advantages included:
· Advocacy on the part of refugees on the ground;
· JVA awareness of the full range and complexity of issues in the field;
· Expertise in understanding and interpreting cases, and organizing information in a the way INS (then) required it;
· JVA staff training for INS staff on some situations;
· JVA spotting trends and serving a role in identification of P2 groups;
· Identifying P1 referral possibilities and drawing UNHCR attention to them.

It was felt that JVAs, with their links to communities in the US which would support the integration of resettled refugees, should be reinstated. In particular, it was felt that while IOM often has done a good job of the case preparation, it’s true value and unique capabilities lie in the areas of medical testing, documentation and transportation, rather than in the protection, field work and advocacy roles which are beyond its inter-governmental mandate.

Processing priorities
There is a link between processing priorities and the discussion of the definition and need for statutory measures set out above. The question in processing is why resettlement, rather than just is this person a refugee. Perhaps there is a need to create a system which, without changing the statutory definition, encourages decision-makers to put less attention on the refugee definition and more on processing priorities. In other words, the question that arose was is there a way of using priorities to get around the fact that some people who need resettlement are not determinable as refugees. The US does not have a definition of humanitarian or subsidiary protection in its asylum law, so the ways European states use to apply the UNHCR mandate definition do not apply. It was suggested that the Refugee Corps, once established, might be an institutional way to have adjudicators with more experience specifically of resettlement who come to recognize resettlement need as something other than just well founded fear. Nonetheless, the law is the law, and as long as it does not change, the definition in law remains the basis that DHS will use.

In-country processing
While there was general consensus that many IDP groups present compelling cases for resettlement there was no agreement on a satisfactory way to establish a basis for in-country processing. In some limited cases people can be paroled in, but their situation in the US then is not secure, as nothing is provided for them in the way of either protection or assistance. Furthermore, if there are concerns about the program admitting people who are not ‘real refugees’ then the fact of not crossing the border of their country makes these individuals not refugees from the Convention standpoint. Concerns were also expressed about forced population movements that may occur under the guise of IDP resettlement, and the denial of access to asylum for those people arriving from the country of origin spontaneously rather than through the resettlement program. On the positive side, the fact that IDP resettlement could give people a humanitarian route to protection without needing to undertake a dangerous, smuggled journey was mentioned.

Universal P3 or not
The suggestion for a universal P3 was qualified as not meaning everyone had access – but rather that people whose family members were refugees in need of resettlement would have access to the program and determination procedures by virtue of the close family tie. Many people who currently cannot use the P3 route to get possible access for family members also cannot seek their admission under other visa regulations. DHS’s concern in limiting P3 countries or origin is to limit fraud, which they find arises least when the anchor has entered the US as a refugee or asylee and more when the anchor has entered as an immigrant, or, for example on a diversity visa. The suggestion was made that for people who have been admitted to the US as refugees or asylees, the P3 could apply universally, whereas for people who entered the US by other means could have access only to a limited P3 country list, based on those places with less fraud, or with greater contemporary cases of persecution. Another suggestion was for the status of a broader range of minor family members, such as children adopted during a flight situation or younger siblings where the parents have passed away, to be based on what the status of the parent would have been, had they not died or been imprisoned. Better registration at an early stage would, it was generally felt, help with issues of family relationships and flight motives.